By Mike Nelson
Wednesday, May 13, 2026
Over the weekend, the Iranian regime responded to
President Donald Trump’s one-page proposal setting conditions for further
negotiations and, potentially, the end of hostilities in the Strait of Hormuz
while dealing with the larger issues in the conflict later. The specifics of
the Iranians’ counterproposal are not yet known but reportedly include the same outrageous demands included in
previous proposals: reparations for damage during the conflict, Iranian control
over the strait, and the retention of Tehran’s enriched uranium, among others.
The president, rightly, responded quickly that the Iranian proposal was “TOTALLY
UNACCEPTABLE.” And, while it is good that Trump didn’t give away the farm by
accepting this, the enduring question remains: What now?
Operation Epic Fury began 74 days ago, and the ceasefire
announced April 8 to provide two weeks for negotiations has lasted for more
than a month. In other words, the majority of the conflict with Iran has been
in a timeout. With the exception of responding to Iranian disruption of
maritime traffic with its own blockade, the administration has done nothing
since the start of the ceasefire last month to bring about any of the goals it
has articulated throughout the war.
Optimistic claims about the imminence of regime collapse
or capitulation have not willed either into being. Whether the president is
lying to the public or to himself, he must snap out of it and recognize that
the current approach of hollow threats followed by limitless offers, proposals,
and overtures has resulted in nothing of value. In fact, it has had the
opposite effect, weakening our negotiating position and diminishing the value
of American promises and threats. Someone close to Trump should force him to
face reality: The current approach makes him look foolish and weak. Even after
continued extensions and second chances, the president described the ceasefire
as “on life support.” Why not pull the plug?
To bridge the vast gap between the current status of the
conflict and the achievement of its previously stated goals, the president must
do one of two things, or a combination of both: Ramp up pressure on Iran or
rein in the objectives that he seeks to accomplish.
Unfortunately, to appreciate this, Trump must do
something out of character: Take criticism and learn from it. Rather than
viewing criticism about the war’s prosecution as an opportunity for a course
correction, the administration has categorized anything other than obsequious
praise as either disloyalty to the United States or as the hyperventilating
of “panicans.” But despite the president’s dismissiveness, the
weight of public opinion speaks for itself. Sixty percent of Americans oppose the war, 66 percent believe the president hasn’t made the
case for the military campaign, and only 19 percent believe it has been successful. It should be neither
partisan nor controversial to point out that Trump is intemperate, impulsive,
and injudicious in his strategic thinking and decision-making—all of which have
complicated the conflict with Iran and upped the odds of a negative outcome.
Amid public backlash to the war’s execution, there are
undoubtedly many among the president’s critics who take pleasure in the
difficult situation in which he finds himself. But they ignore the fact that an
embarrassing quagmire and defeat for Trump would likely also mean an
embarrassing quagmire and defeat for the United States. For many of these
political partisans, domestic schadenfreude has led to skewed moral
calculations.
But there are many who, although critical of the
president’s decision-making and planning, do not wish to see the Iranian regime
gain power in the region. We are frustrated with the administration because its
unseriousness might advantage our enemies and weaken American power abroad, and
we have sought to counsel a path that prevents the most disastrous outcome.
After all, I learned Farsi as part of the special forces qualification course
specifically in preparation to partner with Iranian rebels who might seek to
overthrow the regime someday, and I spent five years of my military career at
Central Command and its special operations component facing, preparing for, and
planning against the Iranian threat. In other words, we criticize the
president’s conduct of the war because we want him to change it to avert
catastrophe.
So how should the president right a ship currently on
course for a collision with a rocky coastline?
First, as mentioned, he should acknowledge that the
current approach is not working. Neither the overtures toward diplomacy nor the
previous military strikes have created sufficient incentive for the Iranians to
capitulate to American demands. Nothing has enticed Iran to pursue diplomacy;
therefore, we should shelve the carrot and return to the stick.
As I mentioned on a recent Dispatch
Podcast, Trump’s coercive measures in Iran largely fit into two bins: a
long-term game of economic chicken with a mutual blockade of the strait or the
escalation of the military campaign. The former will come with significant
financial strain, for the United States and the rest of the world; the latter
will endanger American lives and deplete our stockpiles of critical munitions
in already short
supply. Both will require the willingness of the American people to endure
the difficulty, something that, as of yet, the president has been reticent to
seek or communicate honestly about.
Second, the president needs to scale down what he thinks
we can and will actually accomplish. It seems unlikely that the Iranian regime
believes it will get everything it sought in its various proposals and, more
likely, is using these maximalist demands as leverage to get the agreements it
actually wants. The president, therefore, needs to ensure he and his national
security team are clear about the conditions America requires in the aftermath
of the conflict. This understanding is critical for many reasons, including as
a check on the president’s temptation to make a hasty and unfavorable
agreement, claim victory, and withdraw from a war with which he has grown bored
and frustrated.
At a minimum, the administration must secure some
quantifiable change to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In the aftermath of Operation
Midnight Hammer last summer, the Islamic Republic’s enrichment capability
was severely diminished. Yet Iran retains several hundred kilograms of highly
enriched uranium that, for the time being, neither the United States nor the
regime can easily reach or move. Removing this uranium from Iranian control,
almost certainly through an agreement, is a definitive, physical step to hinder
Iran’s progress toward a bomb. Within the bounds of the negotiation, we should
be clear that the regime must surrender its stockpile to the U.S., not hand it
off to a third country like Russia for later retrieval. The U.S. should also
demand some form of verifiable inspections regime—more aggressive, transparent,
and with fewer sunset provisions than the Obama-era nuclear deal.
Sadly, outlining realistic goals would also mean
recognizing the parts of the job we will leave unfinished.
The abandonment of the Iranian people to the oppression
of their despotic regime, despite encouraging a popular uprising that millions
of protesters embraced at great personal sacrifice, will remain an enduring stain
on Trump’s legacy and America’s reputation. Regardless of the administration’s
insistence that regime change was never a goal of this operation, the meaning
of Trump’s vow that help was on its way is clear. That the president was
speaking off-the-cuff when he made these statements, with no understanding of
what would be necessary to fulfill them, does not wash away the costs in blood
and oppression.
We will also have to accept that, regardless of any final
agreement to end the conflict, we have altered the regime’s position in ways
that disadvantage us.
First, not only have we failed to topple the regime, but
the hardliners within it have likely strengthened their position as a result of
the conflict. Functional decision-making has shifted away from civilian
leadership and seems to rest
in the hands of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps senior leaders. A country
ruled by a small oligarchic group of religious zealots will now be ruled by the
more militant and aggressive cadre within that already terrible coterie.
Second, we have provided Iran with proof of the
effectiveness of a strategic deterrent: the ability to hold global energy
hostage via maritime disruption. Regardless of any de jure agreement
about Iranian dominance in the Strait of Hormuz (something to which we cannot
agree), the regime knows how effective its de facto control via threat
is—and it will likely rebuild and adapt the means by which it could threaten
this vital waterway in the future.
Ultimately, the regime will continue to exert its
regional influence, and any financial incentives given to it as part of a
settlement will assuredly go to rebuilding its missiles, drones, and proxies.
Tehran will likely continue to acquire a nuclear weapon as the ultimate
deterrent. And it will almost assuredly continue to suppress political
opposition and execute dissidents, as it has throughout the conflict in
defiance of American protestations. All of these outcomes are the result of
Trump’s decision to rush into a conflict he didn’t take seriously or fully
understand, with the assurances of a defense secretary too willing to oversell
what he could accomplish.
But while a measure of success will look like a far cry
from the bombastic statements from the president and his acolytes in the winter
and early spring, it is still better than the alternative. Already, the United
States is looking feckless, timid, and risk-averse. Trump, in an act of protest
that the American people are not more patient with him, has several times pointed to the duration of previous American wars,
including the Civil War, World War II, and the Iraq War. But he misses the key
point: These wars required the very kinds of focus, dedication, and resolve the
president shows he lacks as he seeks a hasty exit from the war. Abraham Lincoln
was pressured to sue for peace and allow an independent Confederacy—a result
that likely would have occurred had the election of 1864 gone differently.
George W. Bush resisted intense pressure against the war in Iraq, and instead
approved the surge of 2007-2008 that turned the tide of that conflict. The
president seems to want broad support for a war without articulating why it
warrants that support. It is hard to see the American people backing a conflict
that their commander in chief seems to have already lost interest in.
The question is whether we can wrest some achievement
from the current situation, or whether we will incur additional negative
outcomes. While any victory may be far more limited than what the president
overpromised or suggested, and may come with long-lasting complications, we
must prevent the truly catastrophic outcome of an obvious American defeat.
American resolve is being tested and judged, and a country that will not endure
the slightest hardships against a militarily weaker opponent is not one that China
will take seriously as it seeks dominion over the South Pacific and Taiwan, not
one with which Middle Eastern partners will pursue enduring relationships to
counter Iran in the future, and not one from whom the global community will
take assurances of security nor threats of coercion with sufficient gravity.
Just as our embarrassing withdrawal from Afghanistan bolstered our adversaries,
so too will an embarrassing end in Iran.
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