This Is What It Looks Like When a Great Power Is Losing a War

By Noah Rothman

Monday, May 11, 2026

 

In the war against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States is “losing.” In fact, the president may have already “lost” his “disastrous and irrational war” with the theocrats in Tehran. Trump is reportedly chastened by his failures, and the far-reaching consequences that America will suffer as a result of this epochal setback are only beginning to come into view.

 

At least, that’s what we’re hearing from the highest echelons of American public life. Yet, as military historian John Spencer recently observed, these are subjective appraisals. Wars are not won or lost in the comments section, and victors are not determined by vibes alone. Rather, they should be “judged through military capability, economic endurance, political cohesion, freedom of action, strategic leverage, and the ability to sustain power while degrading an opponent’s.”

 

Those who want to know what it looks like when a great power is losing a war should look to Russia.

 

The “symbolism” of this year’s “diminished” Victory Day parade in Moscow is “hard to overstate,” read The Economist’s coverage of Vladimir Putin’s comprehensive embarrassment this week. Indeed, the downscale event, which featured none of the heavy equipment that typically lumber through Red Square, occurred without incident because Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (or, as Putin now refers to the head of the supposedly Nazi menace in Kyiv, “Mr. Zelensky”) pledged not to rain Ukraine’s long-range drones down on it.

 

Moscow’s downcast parade, The Economist added, was a metaphor for Russia’s increasingly frustrating battlefield setbacks. The Kremlin’s spring offensive inside Ukraine has already failed, the report contended. Last month, Russian forces experienced a net loss of territory they controlled inside Ukraine for the first time in nearly two years. Kyiv’s drone armada is striking ever deeper inside Russia. Moscow is now losing a staggering 35,000 soldiers per month to combat with Ukraine’s forces, contributing to the roughly 1.4 million total number of Russians killed or wounded by Ukrainian forces. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure are putting pressure on its exports, which fell by 7 percent in April even as revenues generated from oil and gas sales climbed due to Iran war-related supply constraints.

 

“The stoicism and fatalism of Russian soldiers must be wearing thin,” King’s College professor Sir Lawrence Freedman told The Economist. “If the Russians have nothing to show for their efforts, I would not be surprised if in some places things start crumbling.” Yet, if Russia’s soldiers remain stolid, the Russian people are beginning to buckle.

 

“Something in the air has changed in Russia,” the Carnegie Endowment’s Alexander Baunov ascertained last week. “Now even loyalists complain about the mounting restrictions and repression, and once-upbeat businesspeople are now despondent.”

 

The Russian people, Baunov contends, increasingly chafe at the restrictions on their liberties imposed on them in pursuit of a battlefield victory that now appears to be unattainable. “Military growth no longer means increased income and opportunities,” he noted, “negative growth in the first months of 2026, judging by the commander-in-chief’s somber tone, amounts to a retreat.”

 

The outbreak of war proper in 2022 forced the various elite groups to unite in order to survive. Now the uncertainty over the war’s outcome is causing cracks in the regime’s foundation and ceiling, and the entire edifice is subsiding. Even if it survives, it will no longer look like it used to.

 

Looking back at Spencer’s criteria, they appear far more applicable to Putin’s Russia than Trump’s USA. Moscow does not have “freedom of action” on the battlefield. It has lost the ability to dictate the tempo of events. Its economy is shrinking now following several years of war-driven growth. If Baunov is right, the regime’s “political cohesion” is visibly eroding. Russia does not have the requisite “strategic leverage” over Ukraine’s foreign partners necessary to force them to sacrifice Kyiv. And Moscow’s ability to “sustain power” while degrading Ukraine’s is in doubt. Given Kyiv’s growing global prestige as the world leader in indigenous defensive drone technology, Ukraine has arguably eclipsed the Kremlin’s geopolitical influence.

 

Even those who are certain that Donald Trump has lost the Iran war would struggle to convince dispassionate observers that Iran is in anything resembling the position Ukraine presently occupies. Until they can, all the talk of how the president has led America into defeat should be taken with a grain of salt.