NATO’s Not Dead

By Eric Edelman & Franklin Miller

Saturday, January 31, 2026

 

No one should gainsay the damage that the Davos debacle over Greenland has done to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Nonetheless, the direst predictions by some that this indicated that the second Trump administration would withdraw the U.S. from NATO have not come to pass. In fact, the National Security Strategy released in December and the new National Defense Strategy published last week both accept the continuation of NATO’s collective defense mission.

 

That the premature obituaries spread wildly is a symptom of the fact that we live “in the moment” in an information environment driven by the constant drumbeat of social media. Major developments are reported and instantly command commentary to audiences of millions by presidents and prime ministers, politicians, media personalities and others — many of whom know nothing of the history of a given issue, its broader ramifications, or how it might best be managed. The series of events surrounding President Trump’s desire to acquire Greenland are a case in point, and they have led a host of people on both sides of the Atlantic to proclaim that NATO’s demise is nigh. Those prophecies, however, are grounded in basic misunderstandings about the alliance and its history.

 

According to the pundits, the president’s intentions created “the greatest crisis in NATO’s history.” This belies that fact that the alliance has been beset by crisis since the ink was drying on the 1948 North Atlantic Treaty and betrays ignorance of or amnesia about the failure of NATO to meet its Lisbon conventional force goals in 1952, the 1956 Suez crisis with Britain and France, de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the integrated military structure and expulsion of NATO from France, Europe’s refusal to join the U.S. in Vietnam, the neutron bomb and Euro-missile crises, the French and German refusal to join George W. Bush in the War in Iraq, and Obama’s “pivot to Asia.” Each was a major crisis, but in each case, diplomacy, wisdom, and time allowed the framing of a successful resolution. Trust broken became trust restored.

 

Another modern misunderstanding of NATO history is that despite repeated claims by isolationists and so-called foreign policy realists that the American contribution to NATO is simply a subsidy for Europe’s bloated welfare states, the United States did not help create and then join NATO as a gift to Europe. After two world wars, U.S. political and military leaders finally recognized that our national security was imperiled if Europe was dominated by an aggressive and hostile power. Such was the case in 1949 — and such is the case today. If Vladimir Putin came to exert military and political power over NATO’s European states today, America’s global status, our ability to project military force, and our worldwide economic influence and interests would be at risk and held hostage by the Kremlin. With that said, Europe has underspent on its own defense. Thanks to pressure from President Trump and his predecessors, as well as the brutal war on Ukraine begun and continued by Putin, that situation is changing. Many European NATO states have pledged to raise their defense spending over the next ten years, and some have actually begun doing so. The situation is still not satisfactory, but it is moving in the right direction.

 

Also, it is foolish to believe that the European members of NATO by themselves can create a combined military force to deter and defeat Russian aggression with high confidence, as some pundits have surmised. Various alliance members have extremely impressive military capabilities, but none possesses the overall integrated capability to match Russia across the board — including conventional, command and control, intelligence, space, cyber, and nuclear. Serious European experts and leaders recognize this as well. In fact, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte (a former prime minister of the Netherlands) has just testified before the European Parliament to this effect. “If anyone thinks here . . . that the European Union or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the U.S., keep on dreaming,” he told lawmakers. “You can’t.”

 

And finally, no matter what the pundits say, the British and French nuclear deterrents are not sufficient in and of themselves or even in combination to protect the alliance against Putin’s demonstrated nuclear adventurism and blackmail. (In fact, French nuclear forces — at French insistence — are not even integrated into NATO’s planning process.) As NATO’s guiding policy document, the Strategic Concept makes clear: “The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance.” In the wake of the Greenland imbroglio, some European scholars and parliamentarians and even a former senior American and NATO official have pushed for a European nuclear deterrent. But such calls are dangerous, as they create false expectations in Europe while simultaneously feeding the hopes of American neo-isolationists that Europe can provide for its own defense without America’s crucial extended nuclear deterrent.

 

So what does all of this mean?

 

First, NATO has weathered serious internal crises in the past, and if the alliance’s leaders exercise good judgment, keep their messaging tight, and avoid hyperbolic, apocalyptic predictions, they can do so again. Thanks to the internet, this is more difficult than in previous crises, but it can be done. Leaders should avoid emotionally laden words such as “rupture” when talking about the future of NATO, as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said in his Davos speech. Presidents and prime ministers (and their key aides) need to relearn the lesson that quiet diplomacy can accomplish much more than populist speeches and tweets.

 

Second, NATO should focus on the very serious threat that Russia, even with the limitations exposed by the war in Ukraine, presents today and the potential that China and Russia together might threaten the High North because of their expressed interest in the Arctic, rather than on creating and exploiting the internal divisions that benefit no single capital or politician and actually hurt the overall alliance effort.

 

Third, the situation NATO is in is by nature an evolving one. Because NATO is an alliance of democracies, no one leader or ruling coalition lasts forever. Presidents and prime ministers are replaced. Today’s problems are not necessarily those that will bedevil future generations of leaders. A review of NATO’s previous crises suggests as much since the changing character of war and intensifying cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea may well bring challenges we can only guess at today.

 

Finally, NATO is an institution which has flourished, evolved, and survived for almost 80 years.  It is the most successful politico-military alliance in modern history. It has survived numerous crises over the decades and has withstood a few premature burials, all because at the end of the day its purpose — to preserve peace and security in Europe — is so critically important and serves the national interests of all of its members.

 

One can acknowledge that NATO is likely to emerge from its current predicament looking a bit different from the pre-Trump alliance without composing a premature obituary. Instead of living solely in the here and now, it’s imperative that the adults in the room learn from what has happened before.