By Charles C. W. Cooke
Thursday, January 22, 2026
On the eve of America’s 250th anniversary, Vivek
Ramaswamy offered up a definition of what it means to be an American.
“Americanness,” he wrote in the New York Times, “isn’t a scalar quality
that varies based on your ancestry.” Rather, “you are an American if you
believe in the rule of law, in freedom of conscience and freedom of expression,
in colorblind meritocracy, in the U.S. Constitution, in the American dream, and
if you are a citizen who swears exclusive allegiance to our nation.”
As a strong advocate of the notion that America, in a
meaningful sense, represents an idea, I found a lot to like in this
explication. Nevertheless, I think that it’s missing a crucial word: “good.”
What Ramaswamy, the former Republican presidential candidate now running for
governor of Ohio, describes is a good American, an ideal American,
an American as Americans are imagined in our founding documents.
It is true, in my estimation, that to be a good American is to believe
in the rule of law, and in freedom of conscience and expression, and in
colorblind meritocracy, and in the Constitution, and in the American dream, and
to swear exclusive allegiance to our nation. It is not true, however, that the Americans
who do none of these things aren’t American. An American who opposes the
First Amendment or wishes to implement a caste system or loathes the U.S.
Constitution is a bad American, certainly. But he is still an American —
with the same rights and status as everyone else. To adapt Ramaswamy’s rubric:
At the fundamental level, Americanness isn’t a scalar quality that varies based
on your commitment to noble ideals.
Perhaps this sounds a touch pedantic? It shouldn’t. After
all, the fact that, as a practical matter, Americans are permitted to believe
anything — and, indeed, that they are able to vote in accordance with those
beliefs — is precisely why it is so important for us to be careful in
the selection, education, and assimilation of our immigrants. As an existing
polity, we ought not aim simply to create new Americans; we ought to aim to
create good new Americans. As one might expect, I have no time
whatsoever for those who claim that there is such a thing as a “heritage
American” — a citizen who, because he has more American-born ancestors than
another citizen has, is a superior or “more real” form of citizen. But to
reject that idea, as we should, is ineluctably to accept an alternative set of
obligations. If the United States is, indeed, a creedal nation — and if its
creed is identifiable and particular — then we must emphatically insist that all
newcomers be well versed in that creed. The alternative to this — which
involves the rejection of blood-and-soil claims and an indifference
toward the national doctrine — is civilizational nihilism.
Which is to say that it is neither diversity nor
homogeneity that is “our strength,” but assimilation. And assimilation
necessitates judgment. On the test that the federal government requires
would-be citizens to pass, there are correct answers to its questions — which,
in turn, means that there are wrong ones. Among the questions are “What is the
supreme law of the land?,” “What is the economic system in the United States?,”
and “What are two rights of everyone living in the United States?” The acceptable
answers are “the U.S. Constitution,” “capitalist economy” or “market economy,”
and two among “freedom of expression,” “freedom of speech,” “freedom of
assembly,” “freedom to petition the government,” “freedom of religion,” and
“the right to bear arms.” Once a person has been admitted as a citizen, if he
decides that he opposes all that, the government cannot do much about it
legally. But the citizenry can do something about it — and it should.
One cannot have a country based on an idea unless that idea is rigorously
defended and its enemies vehemently opposed. There is nothing wrong with our
concluding that Ilhan Omar is a bad American and that Craig Ferguson is a good
American, or with our deciding that we would rather have more Craig Fergusons
and fewer Ilhan Omars. To do so is not mean or McCarthyite; it is imperative to
the survival of the project. An existing polity that does not pressure and cajole
and make demands of the new arrivals is a polity that consents to have its way
of life permanently altered.
None of this is new. Five years before the Constitution
even went into effect, Thomas Jefferson was worrying aloud in Notes on the
State of Virginia that an influx of outsiders could imperil the unique
principles of the nascent republic. Acknowledging that there were many upsides
to immigration, Jefferson asked nevertheless whether there might be any
“inconveniences to be thrown into the scale against the advantage expected from
a multiplication of numbers by the importation of foreigners.” Acknowledging
that “every species of government has its specific principles,” he suggested
that “ours perhaps are more peculiar than those of any other in the universe.”
And yet, he presumed, the country would soon be populated by “emigrants” from
places with completely different political cultures, who would “bring with them
the principles of the governments they leave.” Indeed, “it would be a miracle
were they to stop precisely at the point of temperate liberty.” Short of such a
miracle, “they will transmit to their children” their alternative ideas, and,
“in proportion to their numbers,” put them into “legislation” via the political
process.
Jefferson’s worries were only partly substantiated. Yet
the risk he is describing here is self-evidently real. Mercifully, America has
remained unique. But that uniqueness is not intrinsic to the soil; it is the
product of blood, toil, tears, and sweat. On America’s 150th birthday, Calvin
Coolidge remarked, “About the Declaration there is a finality that is
exceedingly restful.” He submitted that “if all men are created equal, that is
final”: “If they are endowed with inalienable rights, that is final. If governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, that is final. No
advance, no progress can be made beyond these propositions.”
Taken seriously, Coolidge’s construction suggests that
the United States has no choice but to insist on the continuation of its
fundamental ideals — which are not merely some ideals among many but the
only ideals suitable to a free country. Naturally, these ideals cannot
be maintained by our pivoting to an interest in “heritage Americans.” Neither
can they be sustained by our taking an unholy interest in the immutable
characteristics of each person, as if stupidly tallying up categories were some
mysterious shortcut to national flourishing. Rather, our only path is to
identify which traits undergird America, and then to adopt and enforce whatever
rules are necessary to ensure that those traits are passed on to the future
citizenry.
When doing so, we must avoid the sophistic conclusion
that America’s principles themselves require us to be agnostic about the
political assumptions of our immigrants. In essence, this approach holds that
(1) America is a creedal nation, (2) one of our principles is toleration, and
(3) it is therefore none of our business what newcomers to our society believe,
providing that their behavior is not criminal.
As a description of how we ought to treat native-born
Americans, this is satisfactory. It is regrettable, of course, but if a person
who was born in Des Moines finds that she simply does not like the United
States, or its people, or its system of government, or its economy, there is
nothing much we can do about it other than, assuming her schooling had failed
her, to propose reforms to the education system or to attempt to persuade her
to participate more fully in the culture. But this attitude cannot apply to
immigrants, because immigrants have in almost all cases chosen to move
here and because it is morally unacceptable to choose to move to a new place
and then immediately try to nudge it away from the ideals that made it
compelling in the first instance. (It is true that refugees often did not
choose to move here, but in my view, if you are a refugee and the United States
took you in to save your life, you have no excuse for being anything other than
ecstatically grateful every single day of your life.) An immigrant who does not
like the United States should not be in the United States. An immigrant who
does not like Americans should not become one. An immigrant who does not favor
the Constitution should not be accorded a vote within its protections. An
immigrant who wishes to socialize the economy to his benefit should be rejected
as an unwanted drag. Right up until the point at which an immigrant becomes an
American, it is the prerogative of his hosts to evaluate whether he fits in.
Immigration, among other things, is an audition.
In making his case, Vivek Ramaswamy quoted Ronald Reagan,
who once said: “You can go to live in France, but you can’t become a Frenchman.
. . . But anyone, from any corner of the Earth, can come to live in America and
become an American.” This line often provokes grumbles from figures who insist
that, pace Reagan, it is entirely possible to move to France and become
a Frenchman, or to England and become an Englishman, or to Australia and become
an Australian. Those grumblers are half correct: One can, indeed, emigrate to
those places and obtain citizenship, but it is not the same as becoming an
American, which for 250 years has implied something far more magical, more
expansive, and more aspirational than exists anywhere else. America, as
Fitzgerald put it, has “about it still that quality of the idea.” It’s an idea
that can continue to inspire devotion indefinitely, if the people responsible
for its conservation have the confidence to keep their standards high.
No comments:
Post a Comment