By John R. Bolton
Thursday, July 25, 2024
Since the late 19th century, generally
well-meaning idealists have tried to conjure an international judicial system
that would transform diplomatic, military, and economic conflicts into legal
disputes. Led by sensible legal experts (who, of course, thought as they did),
the global rule of law would replace destructive strife. If the rule of law
worked within nations, why shouldn’t it work internationally? Whether parading
under the banner of “world government,” “global governance,” or “the
rules-based international order,” this blinkered, reductionist view of foreign
affairs always includes a judicial component.
After World War II, the pace quickened. The United
Nations Charter created the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to which
nations could bring their disputes, replacing the failed Permanent Court of
International Justice (formed by the Treaty of Versailles as an adjunct of the
League of Nations). No one noticed the irony. The charter admonished the
Security Council “that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by
the parties” to the ICJ (Article 36), and U.N. members agreed to comply with
ICJ decisions in cases to which they were parties.
Contemporaneously, the victorious Allies established the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to try allegations of “crimes against peace,” war
crimes, and “gross abuses of human rights” committed by Germany and Japan.
These tribunals were controversial even in their day, faulted for trying ex
post facto charges (thereby violating the principle Nullum crimen sine lege,
“No crime without law”), for being “show trials” with largely predetermined
outcomes, and for constituting mere “victors’ justice.”
Advocates of judicializing international affairs wanted
more, and in 1998, by the Statute of Rome, established the International
Criminal Court (ICC), seated in The Hague near the ICJ. The European Union and
Bill Clinton were ardent supporters of the treaty. Clinton signed it in his
administration’s waning hours, knowing there was no chance of Senate
ratification. His chief negotiator described the ICC as “the ultimate weapon of
international judicial intervention” and “a shiny new hammer to swing in the years
ahead.” George W. Bush reversed course, ordering the treaty unsigned in 2002,
effectively ending any prospect of U.S. membership far into the future. India,
Russia, and China, among others, also did not join.
American opposition to both the ICC and the Rome
Statute’s substantive provisions (defining four crimes: genocide, aggression,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity) was hardly confined to the Bush
administration. Shortly after the statute entered into force, Congress enacted
the American Service-Members’ Protection Act, authorizing, among other things,
“all means necessary and appropriate” to release Americans held by or on behalf
of the ICC. For good reason, it was dubbed the “Hague Invasion Act.” Simultaneously,
President Bush launched a global campaign under the statute’s Article 98 to
prevent U.S. citizens from being turned over to the ICC, in time securing
agreements with over 100 nations. The Trump administration made further efforts
to protect U.S. interests, although Joe Biden has abandoned many of them.
***
The ICC’s flaws are too numerous for one brief
article. Fundamentally, the very concept of the ICC is illegitimate, an utterly
unwarranted derogation of our constitutional, democratic sovereignty by an
unaccountable entity operating in an international void. The court is not part of
a coherent international-order structure. It is simply “out there” pretending
to be a court in a pretend constitutional system that lacks even a pretend
legislature to make laws and a pretend executive to enforce them. The ICC combines
all three branches of government authority into one body, defying every
American concept of separation of powers and the “structural constitutionalism”
the Framers believed so critical to protecting our freedoms. Though ICC
supporters claim it as vital, it is precisely this consolidating of functions
that makes the court most dangerous.
The ICC is not checked anywhere in its jurisdictional
reach, its legal conclusions, or its prosecutorial discretion. ICC supporters
argue that its member governments ultimately control the judges and the
prosecutor, but that is entirely theoretical. So far-reaching is the ICC’s
purported jurisdiction that it applies even to nonmembers such as the United
States and Israel when alleged crimes are committed on the territory of a state
that is party to the Rome Statute. When such nonmembers try to protect themselves
against the ICC’s excesses, they are accused of interfering with its
independence. While the ICJ decides cases among nations, the ICC purports to
exercise jurisdiction directly over individuals, authority no prior
international organization ever claimed. Americans fought a revolution against
such usurpations.
ICC advocates believe that if they just pretend hard
enough, real governments will come to accept the prosecutor’s unaccountable
decisions and follow the ICC’s orders. Unfortunately, for over two decades, it
has been the court and its prosecutor that have done most of the pretending.
Nonetheless, Westerners especially have a childlike capacity to pretend; they
see hope in the ICC where potential aggressors see only opportunity. Those whom
the threat of prosecution and punishment is supposed to deter have not been
impressed, an outcome surprising to ICC partisans but not to history’s hard
men. The likes of Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un, and Ayatollah
Khamenei couldn’t care less about the threat of “legal” consequences for their
actions.
The ICC’s most dangerous component is its essentially
unaccountable prosecutor, whose extraordinary leeway makes U.S. “independent
counsels” look tame. As with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the Rome
Statute’s substantive crimes are vaguely stated, written in broad and sweeping
diplomatic prose. They do not pass muster by American standards, which require
clarity and precision in criminal statutes in order to give citizens notice of
what prohibitions and obligations they face. The Supreme Court has long
employed the “void for vagueness” doctrine to declare unconstitutional laws
that afford too much discretion to prosecutors, impermissibly putting citizens
at risk of prosecution for crimes they never understood existed.
Turned loose on the Rome Statute’s definitions of crimes,
U.S. courts would not hesitate to declare much of them unacceptably vague.
Moreover, the statute’s drafters openly advocated expanding the list of
criminal prohibitions as the prosecutor and the ICC confronted new
circumstances. Here, of course, the lack of separated powers and checks and
balances figures importantly. It is one thing for a popularly elected
legislature to enact new criminal laws but quite another for a prosecutor
accountable to the ICC alone, and a court accountable to no one, to do so,
especially where the ex post facto issue arises every time a new “crime”
is detected. Nor are defendants protected by jury trials, as our Sixth
Amendment requires; cases are tried instead before panels of the court, juries
being so 18th-century to the statute’s drafters.
ICC supporters believe that many of these concerns are
overstated because of the doctrine of “complementarity.” Embodied in the
statute’s Article 17, complementarity means theoretically that jurisdiction to
handle serious international crimes lies primarily in member states, with the
ICC involved only rarely. Although reasonable-sounding, complementarity is not
some well-settled principle of international law. It is simply an academic
theory, carrying about as much force in the real world as most such fantasies.
In practice, the ICC decides whether states have sufficiently met their
obligations, and if not, the ICC will act. States are subordinated to the ICC’s
unreviewable decisions, period. This is as plain a usurpation of sovereignty,
especially from constitutional democracies, as one can imagine. What other
countries accept is up to them, but America bends its knee to the ICC at its
own peril.
Concern about the mirage of complementarity is not
hypothetical. The prosecutor’s recent decision to seek arrest warrants against
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and defense minister Yoav Gallant,
along with two Hamas officials, amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza (and other
Iranian-backed terrorist threats against Israel) was a fire bell in the night
that complementarity was no protection at all. Moreover, by interfering in the
heat of battle, the ICC undoubtedly made resolving the war politically more
difficult, all the while exhibiting the stench of moral equivalence by seeking
arrest warrants against both sides as if they were equally culpable. Similar
concerns apply to the prosecutor’s decision to proceed against Vladimir Putin
and then–Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu in the ongoing Ukraine
conflict. Who holds the ICC to account for these unilateral decisions? The
precedent for irresponsible interference in future conflicts is unmistakable.
The solution is to treat questions of whether and when to
prosecute internationally as unique to their circumstances. Prosecution über
alles is not the answer. Nations should take responsibility for their own
citizens’ crimes even if that is impossible until there is regime change in the
offending state. That may mean justice delayed, but international probity will
ultimately increase only when nations accept responsibility for crimes
committed in their names. Merely that the ICC can try cases more immediately is
no answer. The hard reality is that many (perhaps most) contemporaneous ICC
trials would be in absentia, which simply fuels grievances that provoke future
conflicts. Who, for example, believes that trying Putin in absentia would
increase global peace and security? The most grievous crimes ultimately require
international resolution in broad political terms, not narrow legal ones. The ICC
cannot bear that burden.
***
For Americans, the fundamental question is how to protect
ourselves and our allies from this illegitimate court and prosecutor. During
two decades of operation, the concerns expressed while the Rome Statute was
being negotiated have too frequently become realities. “Fixes” to the ICC, of
whatever magnitude, will not suffice. The institution itself is irreparably
flawed.
Sporadic U.S. cooperation with ICC investigations is
potentially dangerous. Indeed, the most insidious temptation is for Washington
to assist the ICC when the likely accused nation is discernibly evil. In George
W. Bush’s second term, for example, the United States cooperated with the ICC
in the Darfur conflict and more broadly. Barack Obama found numerous
opportunities, including in Kenya, Libya, and the former Zaire. Under Joe
Biden, with the support of several congressional Republicans, U.S. cooperation with
and rhetorical support for the ICC advanced to its highest levels, especially
regarding multiple allegations of Russian war crimes in Ukraine.
Although such cooperation has not to date increased the
chance that Washington will join, the risk is still real, and the allegation of
hypocrisy hard to ignore. The unpleasant reality is that U.S. cooperation with
the ICC when it suits us is hypocritical and ultimately
damaging to America’s principled case against the ICC’s legitimacy. Biden
personally demonstrated the hypocrisy when he criticized the prosecutor’s
pursuit of senior Israeli officials while simultaneously supporting the ICC
investigation of Russian crimes in Ukraine.
The only safe and conscientious American approach is what
I have long called the “three noes”: no U.S. cooperation of any sort with the
ICC, no direct or indirect financial contributions to the ICC, and no
negotiations with other governments to “improve” the Rome Statute. We should
continue and expand our efforts, especially with European Union members, to
obtain Article 98 agreements to protect U.S. citizens. And we should
continuously reexamine the adequacy of our weapons against ICC efforts to
investigate American conduct.
This zombie organization cannot ultimately survive
without American support. We shouldn’t give it oxygen.
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