In the Pacific, China Isn’t Just Threatening Taiwan

By Mike Coté

Sunday, June 30, 2024

 

Repeated hostile Chinese military incursions into another country’s sovereign territory. CCP claims over this same territory and attempts to exclude the rightful owner. Use of civilian cover to bolster Beijing’s military capacity. Deliberate pushing of international legal boundaries to the limit of outright conflict. Bogus narratives denying this truth and blaming the victim.

 

This malign cycle repeats over and over, always rising in intensity and slowly but surely bringing China’s favored policy outcomes closer to realization.

 

You would be forgiven if you think this story is about Taiwan, but it isn’t. It’s actually about another island archipelago just to its south: the Philippines. And the ever-increasing danger to this Asian nation from Beijing is perhaps even more concerning for the United States than the threats to Taiwan.

 

This trend menacingly accelerated just last week, when eight Chinese Coast Guard vessels attacked a two-boat Philippine naval-resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal, a disputed atoll firmly within Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In that brazen assault, Chinese military personnel were armed with various weapons, including axes and knives, while their counterparts were unarmed. The shoal, known as Ayungin in the Philippines and Ren’ai Jiao in China, sits barely above the waterline even at low tide. The extent of the Philippine buildup on the semi-submerged reef is a rusty hulk of a ship intentionally beached in 1999, the BRP Sierra Madre, still technically a commissioned vessel in the country’s navy. Ayungin sits less than 150 miles from the main territory of the Philippines, but more than 700 miles from China’s southernmost primary territory, Hainan. Still, China has claimed the atoll as its inviolable sovereign territory and is willing to push these claims at the point of a bayonet.

 

This is part of a broader Chinese push to violate the sovereignty of the Philippines. For instance, in contrast to the relatively minor Ayungin garrison — if it could even be called that — China has fully reclaimed and militarized various similar shoals in the South China Sea. Mischief Reef, a mere 20 miles away and also within the EEZ of the Philippines, started out as a mirror image of Ayungin; now, it hosts a military runway, a naval harbor, and anti-aircraft batteries, all built in the last decade. China repeatedly, including just last week, sails its warships through the internationally recognized waters of the Philippines, assailing local fishermen with high-pressure water cannons. China’s misleadingly named Coast Guard — in reality, a highly militarized operation on par with neighboring navies — patrols these littorals, intimidating their rightful legal occupants, while government officials promote China’s claim to the whole of the South China Sea.

 

These gray-zone tactics fall just short of constituting outright warfare and are meant, alongside coercive diplomacy, to overwhelm the forces and erode the resolve of China’s smaller, weaker neighbors. They give China a level of plausible deniability in terms of escalation, while still entrenching Chinese hegemony in the region. But they have not gone unnoticed. The Philippines has made sure of that through a relentless publicity campaign. This push, although helpful in bringing attention to the issue, has not altered Chinese behavior. Sunlight may be a great disinfectant, but it is not much of a deterrent. Manila is still being bullied out of its own sovereign territory and being deprived of key economic resources therein.

 

Some may wonder why this is America’s concern at all when there are multiple other international conflicts to worry about, including in neighboring Taiwan. But the United States is not obligated by treaty to come to the defense of Taiwan; it is obligated to defend our allies in Manila, even if the area of their territory being targeted is a tiny outpost. The 1951 U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty states that “an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.” This is clear, binding language that would potentially apply to even minor reefs in the South China Sea.

 

Understandably, both Washington and Manila are hesitant to get into a shooting war with China for such low stakes — something Beijing has taken full advantage of. But China does not want a major conflict either; it is merely betting that our side will be the first to blink in this game of geopolitical chicken. So far, it has been correct, but it need not always be so. There are several steps the United States can take to counter Chinese gray-zone aggression, bolster our bilateral relationship with the Philippines, and show America is a strong deterrent force in this critical region.

 

First, we must begin by leveling the playing field in the South China Sea. Beijing cannot be the only regional power to cement its control of disputed territory through artificial-island construction and maritime-reclamation projects. By aiding Manila in building out its infrastructure on these atolls, we provide the Philippines with a stronger, more permanent security presence. America’s military is adept at logistical support, through which we could greatly improve Manila’s position. We could also supply the Philippine maritime forces with non-lethal weaponry, helping to even the odds. Cross-training opportunities with the U.S. Coast Guard and our navy would transfer knowledge, aiding in tactical wherewithal. All of this could be easily accomplished given our significant military presence in the country.

 

Next, we must work with the Philippines to monitor and publicize Chinese gray-zone activity. America has a geopolitical megaphone; we can use it to great effect here. Promoting the Filipino narrative, disseminating the evidence of Chinese malfeasance, and constantly talking about this issue in the press will bolster the already-successful transparency campaign. At the same time, we must also clearly define the stakes — not just for the South China Sea and the Western Pacific more broadly, but for the entire world. China is acting this way to test its neighbors, but also to test the global system as a whole. The persistence of that system relies on the belief that threats to it will be dealt with. Undermining that belief has knock-on consequences, none of them good.

 

America should also work to create a regional diplomatic structure meant to resolve overlapping claims, operate navigational exercises, and challenge the local maritime supremacy of the Chinese Coast Guard. Promoting peaceful bilateral settlements of territorial disputes in the South China Sea would put diplomatic pressure on Beijing and further unite the other littoral nations against it. There has already been progress on this front between Vietnam and the Philippines, and the U.S. should work to facilitate more. Freedom of Navigation Exercises (FONOPs) are a core competency of the U.S. Navy, allowing us to show the flag abroad, enforce the proper use of territorial and international waters, and deter belligerent action. Running more of these FONOPs, particularly in conjunction with interested regional partners, would help strengthen the resolve of smaller nations and outmatch the Chinese forces in the area.

 

Finally, the U.S. must clearly and directly signal that escalation of Chinese belligerence against the Philippines will result in the activation of the mutual-defense treaty. Laying out the consequences for malign action will ensure that Beijing knows what is at stake, and put the ball in its court. Establishing strong promises of force through repeated rhetorical invocation of the treaty will not only deter China, but reinforce our friendship with Manila. This strong commitment to our ally will boost America’s credibility in the region and further afield in an era in which that credibility is sadly eroding. As such, it will serve a vital purpose for our national interests.

 

It is far beyond time we helped our friends join the fray and fight fire with fire. In doing so, we can deter a much more dangerous conflict and undermine our greatest foe at the same time. To use a phrase Chinese diplomats are overly fond of, that is a win–win for American interests.