By Elliott Abrams
Thursday, October 22, 2026
The war with Iran will likely cost Republicans votes in
the upcoming midterms. In part this is President Trump’s fault: his wandering
explanations, excessive claims, and repeated threats to “decimate” or
“annihilate” Iran or end its “whole civilization” are no way to persuade
Americans that he has a sensible policy and is implementing it.
But if one puts aside the bluster and looks only at what
has been accomplished, his policy deserves more support. It has been clear for
decades that Iran is seeking to build a nuclear weapon. That’s why even the
Russians and Chinese supported, off and on, U.N. Security Council sanctions on
Iran, and why Barack Obama negotiated his 2015 Iran nuclear deal, though it
only postponed Tehran’s program. Trump is the first president who looked at the
advances Iran was making and, recognizing the narrow opportunity to stop them,
struck. Today, Iran is no longer weeks or months away from a bomb but probably
years away. Moreover, U.S. threats that we will never permit an Iranian nuke
and will use force to prevent it (something even Obama threatened) will be
taken far more seriously now that we’ve done it once.
In addition, Trump has blocked off the Strait of Hormuz
for Iranian exports and imports, driving Iran’s economy into the mud. In early
October, the Iranian rial hit its lowest value ever, having gone from roughly
800,000 to the dollar when Trump took office in 2025 to 2.7 million to the
dollar. Meanwhile, non-Iranian oil exports through the strait are rising. The Wall
Street Journal reported in late September that “Iran’s ability to choke off
oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz . . . is breaking down,” with “Middle
Eastern crude exports” rebounding. Oil is the lifeblood of the Iranian economy;
it provides the cash the regime needs to survive, and Trump’s policy is
squeezing it hard.
This is all good news, but it does not mean that the
Trump administration has put tough decisions behind it. Iran may react to the
pressure by seeking a deal, and if one is reached, it must be a better deal
than the June memorandum of understanding. That agreement was an example of
poor diplomacy and an embarrassment for the Trump administration. For example,
at a moment when the new president and prime minister of Lebanon were
denouncing Hezbollah and demanding that Iran butt out of Lebanese affairs, the
MOU mentioned Lebanon three times in its first paragraph — an acknowledgment of
Iranian involvement that U.S. negotiators should have rejected out of hand. The
MOU also pledged that the United States would not “interfere” in Iran’s
“internal affairs,” which is old Soviet language meant to bar U.S. support for
human rights for the Iranian people. If Iran comes looking for a new deal,
Trump needs a new team or at least new instructions to toughen up the U.S.
position.
But the thugs of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), who are now running Iran, may react with more attacks instead of more
negotiations. The Shiite militias that the IRGC controls in Iraq and its
friends the Houthis in Yemen can expand their attacks on Saudi Arabia, and the
Houthis can work even harder to block shipping through the Red Sea and the Suez
Canal — a key alternative to the Strait of Hormuz. Iran itself can decide once
again to bypass its proxies and attack Israel directly, though the penalty for
doing that is potentially severe. The top IRGC leaders know that they can
easily become Israeli targets, as the late Supreme Leader Khamenei was. They
must also wonder what will happen if they restart their attacks on U.S. bases
and get lucky; how would a post-midterm-elections Donald Trump react against
Iran if an Iranian strike killed a significant number of Americans? Iran’s best
bet in these circumstances, if the squeeze becomes unbearable, may be to hit
Gulf Arab economic targets again, and harder. That would mean striking oil
facilities, power plants, and desalination plants, which could do enormous
damage not only to the Gulf states but to the world economy. The Gulf Arabs
would then need to decide whether to sue for peace and try to bring Trump with
them, or to recognize that the threat to them will never end while the IRGC
rules Iran. That would mean asking Trump to continue the squeeze on Iran and
bearing the damage they are suffering until the regime falls or is hit with
enough military force to stop it from attacking its neighbors.
The fact is that almost every country in the world is
suffering the consequences of Iran’s and its proxies’ actions: China, India,
nearly all of Europe and all other oil consumers that must pay higher prices,
Egypt (whose Suez Canal revenues have fallen by billions of dollars), and the
Gulf countries that are Iran’s direct targets. The only possible exception is
Russia, an oil exporter that profits when world prices rise and that, for its
war in Ukraine, has an ongoing military relationship with Iran. But not even
Russia and China would benefit were Iran to get a nuclear weapon — hence their
history of backing U.N. sanctions resolutions.
Here is where the Trump administration has failed badly.
It should have been easy to build a strong international coalition against
Iran, much as the United States once did against Saddam Hussein. If China and
Russia did not join, and helped Iran, for example by providing intelligence on
U.S. military sites and activities, that would be all the more reason to build
a broad international coalition to collapse Iran’s economy until it abandoned
its efforts to close the Strait of Hormuz — and agreed to end its nuclear-weapons
program.
But that kind of diplomacy seems beyond the Trump
administration, which instead insults and threatens allies like Denmark and
Canada and has imposed tariffs without considering national security
requirements. By now, in late 2026, the chances that Trump could put together
such a coalition of like-minded states is gone, destroyed by actions in 2025
and 2026 that have offended and alienated too many countries. So the pressure
on Iran — military, economic, and political — will be more exclusively American
than it might have been.
As we have learned repeatedly, the Iran situation can
change overnight. With U.S. elections coming up, Iran may think it can affect
the outcome by holding back or by striking now. If Iran’s rulers are truly
worried about economic collapse, there will be internal debates in Tehran about
whether to pursue serious negotiations or a major new military attack. Given
that IRGC terrorists are in charge — instead of officials such as Iran’s
president or foreign minister (who seem to favor new talks with the United States)
— the latter is more likely. And depending on the targets Iran chooses, our
Gulf allies, Israel, or the United States itself may be back in heavy conflict
before year’s end.
If so, we have to hope that Trump will not repeat the
error he made last February — failing to explain the conflict to the American
people. A Truth Social post is simply not enough, especially when the
president’s rhetoric has been all over the place and the war is so unpopular.
This is the other major Trump failure. Thinking back to the first Iraq War,
when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney together gave powerful and persuasive press conferences, only deepens the
sense of what is missing now.
Americans know that Iran is an enemy, that a nuclear
weapon in the hands of Iran’s terrorist regime would be a great danger, and
that Iran has been killing Americans for decades. That Trump has failed to win
more support for what is at base the right policy in part reflects poorly on
Democrats, who (especially in an election year) put partisanship far ahead of
national security. But of course it reflects poorly on the administration
itself. If the conflict continues — a choice that may be made in Tehran, not
Washington — public support will continue to decline unless Trump, or someone
else in the administration or the U.S. military, does a much better job of
talking to Americans. A further decline in public understanding and support
could be disastrous if Trump faces a Democratic Congress, especially as the
country moves next year into a presidential-election campaign in which
opposition to military action in Iran may become a Democratic rallying cry.