By Rebeccah Heinrichs
Thursday, July 02, 2026
President Trump often touts the number of wars he’s
ended, and notes that ending Russia’s war against Ukraine has been harder than
he thought. The root of the problem is that Vladimir Putin is ideologically
committed to his hostility against the United States and the West. This is why
Trump’s strategy hasn’t worked. He has sought to appear impartial and demand
that both sides compromise, focusing on territory in the Donbas, as if the war
is a violent real estate dispute between feuding personalities.
But Ukraine (and Volodymyr Zelensky) is neither at fault
for the cause nor for the continuation of the war, and if he surrendered the
territory Russia demands, the war would continue and end in Ukraine’s total
defeat. Only Putin can end the war by, at the very least, accepting a cease-fire.
Ukraine and NATO could then focus on rebuilding their stocks and defense
industrial capacity to deter further Russian aggression, especially as the U.S.
urges Europe to help carry more of the burden of defense.
Trump has shown a willingness to adapt when his plans
don’t work, and now is the time to shift the strategy. The only way for Trump
to help end the war is by applying pain and pressure to Russia and encouraging
Ukraine and the rest of NATO to do the same. For a while, Trump seemed
convinced that Ukraine couldn’t hold back Russia. But flouting the Russian
argument that Moscow will inevitably succeed, Trump noted in September of last
year that he thought Ukraine may be able to retake territory Russia occupies,
that the Russian economy was faltering, and that Putin should make a deal.
Since the president observed this, developments have presented an opportunity
for a new diplomatic push.
First, Ukraine is winning. In recent weeks, the nation
struck more than 1,500 miles deep into Russian territory with attacks on oil
refineries in Siberia and Moscow. Ukraine has also successfully targeted Crimean bridges and energy infrastructure, which fund the war. Last month, the
Ukrainian military liberated more Ukrainian territory than Russia seized. U.S. officials
affirm this new battlefield reality; Ambassador Dan Negrea, representing the
United States to the U.N., stated
recently, “Russia is taking 40,000 casualties per month” and “time is not on
Moscow’s side.” Ukraine’s bold and daring attacks against Moscow’s legitimate
military targets, while avoiding Russian civilians, bring the war much closer
to the homes of Russians who may blame Putin for the fear and chaos. Ukraine’s
recent attack in Moscow came with a foreboding promise from President Zelensky.
“If Ukraine is going to burn, your Moscow will burn too,” he said, adding that
the attack was meant to push Russia to stop. “It is time to end the aggression,
time to end this war.” The United States should encourage, not restrict,
Ukraine’s bolder operations and should exhort NATO nations to continue
supplying Ukraine with weapons, including by purchasing key systems from
American companies.
Second, Ukraine has proven itself a net contributor to
the strength and security of the U.S.-led West. Ukraine has received air defenses, guided bombs, medium- and long-range
strike missiles, and other weapons. Ukrainians have adapted the way they use
them, have improved the missiles’ technology, and have made Ukraine a coveted
location for Western arms producers to test their weapons and tactics against a sophisticated
adversary. Ukraine’s success in the current phase of the war, which primarily
uses drones, has made it a world leader in unmanned warfare. Ukrainians created
the Sting drone, which can intercept Russian suicide drones at
a fraction of the cost of traditional interceptors. The country’s advanced
indigenous drone capabilities led the U.S. State and War Departments to form a
framework for a joint
drone production deal. The United States should look for more ways to take
advantage of this alliance, Ukraine’s drone warfare ecosystem, and its
battlefield experience.
Third, the Russian economy is veering toward crisis.
Russia’s budget deficit skyrocketed in the first four months of 2026, going well
beyond the desired annual target of 3.79 trillion rubles to 5.87 trillion
rubles (approximately $81 billion). Russia is facing a wave of corporate defaults and increased risk for
consumer lending and bonds, along with a 5.52 percent inflation rate. The Russian public is feeling
the biting pain of a war that until recently has been kept mostly out of sight.
Russian households are suffering from 18 percent higher food prices, sky-high
utility bills, and gasoline shortages. The United States has allowed its sanctions waiver on Russian oil to expire, and
it should go further and embrace Congress’s effort to pass secondary crushing
sanctions against Russia, while cracking down harder against Russia’s shadow
fleet.
Ukraine has agreed to every cease-fire Trump has
announced. Ukraine will compromise enough if it agrees to a cease-fire along
the current lines of contact, as long as the temporarily occupied Russian
territories are never recognized as de jure Russian. Russia has thus far
refused to alter its original objectives and still seeks the total subjugation
of Kyiv, though its aggression has inspired Sweden and Finland to join NATO and
has made Ukraine an even stronger, more robust military power with increased
national cohesion and proud identity.
As Secretary of State Marco Rubio asserted
earlier this month, “All of our sanctions are on Russia and all the aid that
we’ve provided has been on the Ukrainian side. . . . We are not an impartial
mediator here. We clearly are supporting one side over another.” The U.S.
strategy should more overtly reflect that reality if it is to be effective. The
United States should lead our allies to increase the pain against Russia now
and sharply to make it clear: things will only get worse for Russia, and Putin
should take the deal.
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