By Yascha Mounk
Monday, November
18, 2024
There are many reasons Democrats lost. They suffered from
an unpopular incumbent, were punished for the high inflation of the last years,
and fielded an uninspiring candidate who never managed to put forward a clear
governing agenda. But the most fundamental reason why so many voting groups
that had long been supposed to buoy blue fortunes have turned red—and the one
that is most likely to dog Democrats’ chances in upcoming electoral cycles,
when they no longer bear the burden of incumbency—lies in the fact that they
are seen as being far outside the cultural mainstream.
Democrats now speak with the inflections and the
vocabulary of the coastal, college-educated upper crust of the American
meritocracy. This is rapidly alienating a multiracial coalition consisting of
everyone for whom there is no space in that upper crust—plus those who resent
the constant self-monitoring and self-censorship that is required to remain a
member of it.
To overcome the damage to their increasingly toxic brand,
Democrats need to change how they talk and what they say. This includes
jettisoning some of the most unpopular elements of the left’s identitarian
thinking, popularly known as “woke,” that they took on over the past decade—the
emphasis on equity and DEI, the vocabulary of BIPOC
and LatinX. But it goes much further than that. Democrats need to
convince Americans that they are willing to speak the truth even when that
truth shocks the activist groups that make up a big part of their base; that
they sympathize with ordinary citizens who are fed up with crime and chaos
rather than with the petty criminals who disturb public order; and that they
have figured out how to stand up for inclusion without violating common sense.
Will the American left be able to effect such a profound
self-transformation?
It is tempting to believe the left is finally turning
away from wokeness. Back in September, for example, The Economist reported a modest decline in the frequency with which terms like
“intersectionality” and “microaggression” were mentioned in mainstream media or
scholarly articles. The magazine duly concluded that we had passed “peak woke.”
Now, the open disavowal of some identitarian positions to
which Democrats seemed deeply committed until a couple of weeks ago has seemed
to validate that prediction. Since Trump’s victory, elected officials like Gilberto
Hinojosa, the outgoing chair of the Texas Democratic Party, and Rep. Seth
Moulton, a moderate Democrat from Massachusetts, have sensibly urged Democrats
to ditch their most unpopular positions on cultural questions. “Democrats spend
way too much time trying not to offend anyone rather than being brutally honest
about the challenges many Americans face,” Moulton acknowledged last week. “I have two little girls, I don’t want them getting
run over on a playing field by a male or formerly male athlete, but as a
Democrat I’m supposed to be afraid to say that.”
Many Democrats I have spoken to in the last few days are
hopeful that the vibe shift on the left will prove real. According to New
York Times opinion columnist Maureen
Dowd, “Some Democrats are finally waking up and realizing that woke is
broke.” Longtime Democratic strategist James Carville seems to share the same
opinion. Democrats, he told Dowd, are fleeing identitarian positions “like the
devil runs away from holy water.”
But I am skeptical that this is how things will
ultimately turn out.
The first indication that Democrats will find it hard to
pivot away from their toxic brand of identity politics in any meaningful way is
that those who called for a repositioning are already being punished for
speaking their minds. Hinojosa, for example, was quickly
forced to apologize for his remarks; a day later, he
resigned from his position. Moulton even attracted fury from inside the house:
Matt Chilliak, his campaign manager, quit
in apparent protest at his comments. Some of his
former staffers called
on Moulton to apologize. The chair of political science at Tufts University
said the department would no longer send interns to his office (though the
university quickly
walked back his comments).
Far from agreeing with the diagnosis offered by Hinojosa
and Moulton, many parts of the party are in outright denial about the extent to
which what Carville has aptly named “faculty
lounge politics” is harmful to its electoral prospects. Jon Stewart, who
for all of his affected irreverence is usually a reliable spokesperson for the
Democratic mainstream, summarized the emerging consensus on his show last week.
Kamala Harris, he
claimed, did not run on identity politics, and so identity politics was not
responsible for her defeat. “They didn’t do the woke thing,” Stewart quipped.
“They acted like Republicans for the last four months.” Some progressive
journalists with big platforms were even more dismissive. According to one,
the election was decided not by the hope for “a better life for your family and
future for your community,” but rather by a widespread “desire to dominate and
inflict cruelty on outgroups.”
Moreover, each of the party’s fractious wings is
insisting that Harris lost because she did not follow its preferred policies
and political style. Sen. Bernie Sanders and his allies have been blaming the
defeat on the unwillingness of Democrats to fight for more economically
progressive policies. Meanwhile, other wings of the party have blamed the
defeat on the fact that Democrats were insufficiently radical on cultural
issues or did not change course on the conflict
in the Middle East. Nearly all senior Democrats believe that the party
should change; it just so happens that most of them think it should come to
agree with what they have said all along.
It is so difficult for Democrats to coalesce around a
real course correction in part because many of their most unpopular positions
are downstream from their fundamental view of the world. For decades, Democrats
have conceptualized the country in a way that is deeply suffused in identity
categories. Rather than addressing voters who happen to be Latino, they believe
that they need to mobilize “the Latino community.” Rather than recognizing the
fluidity of American identity, they believe that the country is fundamentally
divided between whites and “people of color.” And rather than believing that
the solution to the undeniable fact of persistent discrimination and
disadvantage lies in the realization of universal ideals, they increasingly
assume that the rights and responsibilities of each citizen should
fundamentally depend on the identity group into which they were born.
Commentators who think that Democrats are about to ditch
wokeness usually assume that doing so would take a course correction only on a
few hot-button issues. Avoid using the term LatinX, stop saying that you want
to defund the police, acknowledge (if you are really brave) that it isn’t
entirely obvious whether trans women who have undergone male puberty should be
allowed to compete in women’s sports, and you’ve fixed the problem. But
Democrats’ unpopular stances on these issues are merely a symptom of a much
more deeply rooted way of seeing the world—and unless they undergo a
fundamental transformation in that worldview, they will quickly embrace new
positions on cultural issues that will turn out to be just as unpopular.
This finally brings us to the most fundamental obstacle
to a real course correction: the staffers, the donors, and the activists who
are the real decision-makers in the Democratic Party. Democrats are disproportionately
dependent on young staffers who have recently
graduated from prestigious colleges. Many of these staffers have been
socialized in the hothouse culture of campus activism in which one supposedly
offensive remark can lead to lasting social ostracism. And since they stand at
the beginning of their careers, they often have a greater incentive to
demonstrate ideological purity than to win the next election.
Campaign finance poses another structural problem. Many
people assume that (to use the lingo of professional fundraisers) the “high
net-worth individuals” and “ultra-high net-worth individuals” who now provide
Democrats with a big percentage of their cash tend to pull the party to the
center. But while some of them do have more moderate views on economic
questions than the average Democratic primary voter, there is also ample
evidence that their view on cultural issues tends to
be far more progressive.
Finally, Democrats have over the past years become
increasingly deferential to the many well-funded activist groups that now make
up a key segment of the left. Their attempts to target particular demographic
groups in particular heavily lean on activist organizations whose affluent and
highly ideological leaders claim to speak on behalf of millions of ordinary
Americans. As the New York Times’ Ezra Klein recently
pointed out, when leaders of the Democratic Party want to get a sense of
what various demographic groups want, they ask the constituent members of its
“nonprofit complex”—but the answers these give have turned out to be “really,
really deceptive.”
The composition of the Democratic coalition is a big part
of the reason for the party’s ideological intransigence, as has been obvious
over the course of the past days. The profile of the average Democratic staffer
helps to explain the revolts that Hinojosa and Moulton faced as soon as they
tried to ditch a small part of the party’s identitarian orthodoxy. The cultural
commitments of its donor class help explain why progressive
district attorneys who turned out to do significant
damage to the party’s brand could count on lavish campaign contributions. And
the overreliance on astroturfed activist groups with little organic connection
to actual voters helps explain the wide gulf between the positions Democrats
take on immigration and the view
of actual Hispanic voters.
American political parties don’t have a real leader
unless they hold the presidency or are in the middle of a presidential
campaign. As a result, it is highly likely that the Democratic Party will
continue to be cacophonous until the next presidential primaries. This
Democratic cacophony may well include a few more voices that are openly
critical of the party’s identitarian dead end than before—but it will also
feature many politicians who want the party to continue deferring to the
donors, activist groups and young staffers who remain deeply immersed in those
same identitarian ideas.
The Democrats’ fight over wokeness will last for at least
another four years. Their disastrous defeat this year suggests that, if it does
eventually end, it will likely be in one of two ways: Either a representative
of the party’s small anti-woke faction manages to win the 2028 primaries on a
new and more inclusive vision for the future of the country—or a hand-picked
successor to Trump inflicts an even more decisive loss on the Democratic Party
that fall.
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