By Nick Catoggio
Monday, November
25, 2024
The problem with seeking rhyme or reason in Donald
Trump’s policies is that not only is he not an ideologue,
he’s—ahem—“mercurial.”
He believes in “America First” … yet began his first term
as president by bombing
Syria and ended up assassinating
the head of Iran’s Quds Force.
He’s a populist fighting for the working man … whose
biggest domestic accomplishment was a tax-cuts bill that primarily benefited
the rich.
He’s a pro-lifer who kept his promise to end Roe v.
Wade … and now promises to protect
access to abortion in blue states.
In conclusion, Trumpworld is a land of contrasts.
For years, ambitious nationalists have tried to put
intellectual meat on the bone of Trumpism in hopes of converting one unstable
man’s whims into a proper philosophy of government. It’s a fool’s errand. Trump
is a snarl of narcissism, transactionalism, paranoia, and grievance; he has a
few strong beliefs—like limiting immigration and tariff-ing everything in
sight—but beyond those it’s anyone’s guess what he might do in a second term or
which advisers will prevail upon him.
But that’s not very satisfying punditry, is it?
Insightful commentary tries to find order in apparent
chaos. In his latest
New York Times column, Ross Douthat did his best to systematize the
“messy
coalition” Trump has assembled for his new Cabinet by offering three
theories for why the president-elect chose the nominees he did. Maybe he’s
building a Euro-style parliamentary government that includes leaders of allied
factions. Or maybe he’s chosen a team of human wrecking balls yearning to
demolish their own agencies. Or maybe, as
I’m inclined to believe, he prizes a “team of podcasters” who’ll do a lot
of talking on television and not much decision-making.
The probable truth is that none of these is correct,
though. There’s no specific strategic rationale guiding Trump’s nominations, I
suspect, just a tangle of “vibes” that appeal to him as he considers each
vacancy. How “loyal” is the candidate? Is he or she broadly anti-establishment
in outlook? Has he or she demonstrated unusual contempt for, or ruthlessness
toward, political opponents? Is he or she good
on television?
Practically every major nominee has been some combination
of crony, contrarian, killer, and commentator. (Ironically, the example par
excellence is the one who already
withdrew.) Even Marco Rubio, one of the least Trumpy of the group,
transformed years ago into a dependable MAGA apologist eager to do battle on
Sunday morning TV in defense of his patron.
They’re all birds of a feather with slight differences in
plumage. But there is an exception.
On Friday, Trump nominated Rep. Lori Chavez-DeRemer of
Oregon to be his new labor secretary. Of all his picks, she’s the most
unusual—and has received an interesting reception on the right.
‘Slightly different.’
“I guess it shouldn’t be surprising he picked a pro-union
labor secretary,” one of my editors said this morning of Chavez-DeRemer’s
selection, “but this feels weird in a slightly different way than, say, RFK.”
It does, and no wonder. Chavez-DeRemer isn’t a prominent
Trump surrogate who’s raised big bucks for him and slobbered over him in media
appearances, as new treasury secretary nominee Scott
Bessent has. She isn’t a well-known conspiratorial
kook beloved by Trump’s populist base like Robert F. Kennedy Jr. or Tulsi
Gabbard is. She’s earned no reputation for ruthlessness of which I’m aware,
unlike Matt Gaetz and Pete
Hegseth. And I don’t think I’ve ever seen her on television. Insofar as
she’s done appearances, they’ve been forgettable in a way that’s
uncharacteristic for Trump nominees.
She’s undistinguished as a crony, contrarian, killer, or
commentator. What is she doing in this Cabinet?
Chavez-DeRemer is the clearest (and maybe only) example
in the bunch of the “parliamentary coalition” theory Douthat described. Her
most notable action since joining Congress last year was supporting the Protecting the
Right to Organize (PRO) Act, a pro-union bill that would have expanded
collective bargaining rights and undercut red states’ right-to-work laws.
Nominating her is plainly Trump’s attempt to consolidate the electoral gains
he’s made with union members by placing a labor-friendly Republican atop the
Labor Department. Populist righties wanted a party of the working man and now,
by God, they’ve got it.
That’s one thing that makes her nomination “weird.” There
really is strategic logic to it. It’s not just a matter of
Trump grooving on the nominee’s obsequiousness and retributionist “vibes.”
But the other thing that makes the pick weird is how
mortified many conservatives have been by it.
It makes sense that Senate Republicans like Bill Cassidy would look askance at Chavez-DeRemer, as Congress still has a
healthy number of legislators who were weaned on Reaganism. But I was surprised
by how much backlash there was online Friday night as news of her nomination
circulated. Since 2015 the Trumpist project has sought to uninstall movement
conservatism as the “software” for Republican politics—and that project is
almost complete. The GOP as an institution no longer prioritizes small
government, containing rival foreign powers, restricting the number of
abortions performed in America, or even basic decency or competence in its
leadership.
There’s hardly any Reaganism left … except when it comes
to having a pro-union labor secretary, apparently, which seems to cross some
atavistic Buckleyite red line. Weird, as my editor said. And even
weirder is the fact that Trump’s electoral performance among union members has
gotten plenty
of media hype, which you might think would earn him the benefit of the
doubt on this nomination among partisan conservatives who are ecstatic about
his victory.
Why is Lori Chavez-DeRemer a bridge too far for lapsed
Reaganites when massive deficits, rethinking U.S. alliances, and backing away
from national abortion restrictions haven’t been? I think the answer has less
to do with ideology than with tribalism, as virtually everything in modern
right-wing politics does.
Forced labor.
There is some ideological mooring here. It’s worth
remembering that two of the biggest star turns in Obama-era Republican politics
came at the expense of organized labor. Chris Christie became a right-wing
media sensation by battling
New Jersey’s teachers unions, and Scott Walker scored a major legislative
victory over intense Democratic opposition by reforming
collective bargaining in Wisconsin.
But a lot of conservative ideological mooring has come
unmoored under Trump. Why hasn’t right-wing opinion about unions done so as
well?
One reason, I assume, is the role teachers unions played
in lobbying
to keep schools closed during the pandemic after it
became clear that children had little to fear from COVID. Despite politicians
bending over backward to prioritize teachers’ safety, from ushering them toward
the front of the line for vaccines to appropriating nearly
$200 billion for public education to address
COVID-related problems, unions encouraged friendly Democratic politicians to extend closures well into
2021. Parents’ outrage at the learning loss their children suffered may have
helped reelect Trump; his nominees to fill the public health positions in his
Cabinet are all “COVID
contrarians,” coincidentally enough.
The human face of union opposition to reopening schools was
Randi Weingarten, head of the American Federation of Teachers. She’s become
a top-tier political villain in Republican politics because of it—yet there she
was on Friday night cheering Donald Trump’s nominee to lead the Labor Department. “It is
significant that the Pres-elect nominated Rep. Chavez-DeRemer for Labor,” she
tweeted. “Her record suggests real support of workers & their right to
unionize. I hope it means the Trump admin will actually respect collective
bargaining and workers’ voices from Teamsters to teachers.”
The implied warranty in Trump’s Us-and-Them brand of
politics is that he’ll use public power to ruthlessly punish the right’s
cultural enemies. That Weingarten, the dictionary definition of a tribal enemy,
should be gratified by his choice on labor policy feels like a grievous
breach of that warranty.
There’s another reason why Chavez-DeRemer might be hard
for partisan conservatives to swallow, though. Compared with issues like
government spending and foreign interventions, there’s been little ideological
work done by populists to “uninstall” the Reaganite conventional wisdom on
unions.
Consider: Trump began signaling as early as 2016 that
he’s reluctant
to reform entitlements (although he does pay lip
service to the idea occasionally) and ran enormous
deficits as president even before COVID arrived. From his early days as a
presidential candidate he made
clear that he doesn’t view traditional U.S. allies and
enemies the way Reaganites do and proved the point by holding an infamous summit with
Vladimir Putin in Helsinki in 2018. His Republican
fans have been marinating in all of that anti-conservative contrarianism daily
for nearly 10 years, regularly amplified by
talented demagogues in the media they like to
consume.
Inevitably, little by little, they’ve been conditioned
not to care about fiscal responsibility or about defending the international
liberal order from authoritarians. Ditto for formerly outré beliefs like
anti-vaxxism and curing economic ills with tariffs: A lot of political
energy has been spent over the last few years smuggling those ideas into
mainstream right-wing thought. But comparatively little has been devoted to
presenting organized labor as beneficial to the economy or useful to the
working joes who voted for Trump on November 5.
That means unions are still “Democrat-coded.” The old
Reaganite software on that topic is still running.
In fact, while partisan conservatives are doubtless
grateful for the support of union members in defeating Kamala Harris, they may
have assumed that the political alliance the two groups have formed was a
purely cultural one. Trump owes blue-collar Democrats who supported him this
year the same thing he owes Republicans, Reaganites might have imagined—a war
on crime, illegal immigration, and all things “woke.” That he might also feel
obliged to meet them halfway (or more than halfway) on actual labor issues
may not have occurred to many.
It’s one thing for them to watch their tribe of
Republicans be turned inside out ideologically, with yesterday’s
“constitutional conservatives” devolving into power-worshipping authoritarians
today. It’s quite another for them to find themselves in a new coalition with
members of the other tribe and Trump seemingly
converting to those members’ beliefs rather than insisting that they convert to
his.
Why, it’s enough to make someone wonder who the “Us” and
who the “Them” really is.
What’s ‘conservative’?
Responding to Douthat on Sunday, Jonah Goldberg said that
he largely
agreed that movement conservatives are now just one
faction among several in the Republican Party’s new coalition. “But what is
annoying,” he went on to say, “is the least conservative elements of this
coalition are the most determined to insist that any criticism of, or deviation
from, the popular front party line are not conservative.”
Is that true? I’m asking earnestly.
In my experience the word “conservative” is used less
often nowadays to describe the components of Trump’s party, even the elements
of it that have traditionally used that term in describing themselves. “Social
conservatives” increasingly are “evangelicals” or just “Christians”; “fiscal
conservatives” are a functionally extinct species and don’t have a name at all.
The closest thing, I suppose, is Elon Musk’s dopey half-commission,
half-meme DOGE.
Trump himself rarely talks about “conservatism,” of
course, and was way
ahead of the curve in separating it conceptually from
the Republican Party he hoped to build.
But I think I know what Jonah means. Never Trumpers are
often mocked by the right for justifying their support for Democrats on
“conservative” grounds, never mind the arguments
on the policy merits. If the GOP is now amorphous enough ideologically to
include organized labor, Jonah might say, the least its fanboys can do
in attacking those of us who want no part of it is to stop concern-trolling us
about the fate of a “conservatism” for which they don’t care a whit.
That too is ultimately explained by tribalism, though.
Populists who scold others for betraying “conservatism” by criticizing Trump
are reaching for the most useful weapon at hand with which to bludgeon a
right-wing opponent. After eight years, you’re not going to shame Jonah
Goldberg or me by accusing us of being traitors to Trump or to MAGA
nationalism. We don’t care. We’re not on those teams. But we are on Team
Conservative, and so if you’re looking to wound us by accusing us of having
failed our tribe somehow, that’s the way to go.
“Conservative” has become an empty byword for tribal
authenticity, in other words, as the GOP becomes less conservative in
substance. Nothing would be more absurd or more predictable than MAGA fanatics
hammering Senate Republicans for being “unconservative” by opposing Lori
Chavez-DeRemer—except, I suppose, Senate Democrats then turning around and
helping her get confirmed by voting for her en masse.
Republicans might confirm her without their help, though.
A leader like Trump who’s capable of persuading millions of Reaganites to
embrace absurdly profligate spending and isolationism can surely persuade them
to love unions as well. Having already gotten his base to back a pro-choicer,
a former George
Soros adviser, and a Bashar
Assad apologist for his Cabinet, getting them to back
a crony of Big Labor should be a piece of cake.
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