By Yuval Levin
Saturday, November 16, 2024
We shouldn’t over-romanticize the jobs that people in
Washington have. Politicians, administration officials, judges, generals, and
the like are just people. Their jobs are just jobs, if sometimes exceptionally
challenging and important ones. There are a lot of talented, smart men and
women in America with the relevant experience and skills who could do those
jobs.
But as a new administration gets started, this reality
cuts in two directions. On the one hand, it means that we should moderate our
expectations about the sorts of people who might be appointed to high office.
They don’t need to be world-historical statesmen. There’s always a kind of
barrier of imagination on that front in these moments — it’s just hard to
envision someone new becoming secretary of state or running some other big
agency. But these are management jobs, which have taken shape around a range of
different principals over time, and they don’t require superhuman prowess.
On the other hand, it means that we should think
critically about the particular qualifications for these jobs in relatively
mundane terms too. Most people — like me and maybe you — aren’t at all well
suited or qualified to run any given government agency. And we should not
suspend our judgment about that because we think somehow these jobs are just
about intelligence or charisma, or even because we think only the president can
make the relevant judgments about people’s qualifications.
All of us can have opinions about those qualifications,
but the Constitution assigns the U.S. Senate the role — itself just a routine
part of the altogether doable job that senators have — of exercising that
judgment in a binding way, and approving or rejecting the president’s
appointments for important executive positions. The reason for giving the
Senate that role is to restrain the president’s inclination to appoint
otherwise unfit people because he owes them a favor or because he expects them,
as Alexander Hamilton so well put
it, to possess “the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the
obsequious instruments of his pleasure.” The Framers expected Senate rejections
of presidential nominees to be fairly rare, but believed that making the power
of rejection a part of the job of senators was essential to avert the worst
excesses of executive malfeasance.
Grasping this character of the task before the Senate
could help us better understand the drama of the past week, and the demands of
the coming ones. Most of the people President-elect Trump has so far proposed
for key positions in his administration have been within the range of what the
Senate, even if grudgingly, should abide. His choices to run the departments of
State, Interior, and Homeland Security, for instance, and to run the CIA and
represent the United States at the United Nations, are the kinds of people with
the kinds of backgrounds who generally have those kinds of jobs. Some senators
(especially Democrats) will object to them on substantive policy grounds, which
is fine. But they should, and probably will, be confirmed.
Some of the other people Trump has appointed are the
kinds of nominees whom the Senate tends to treat as borderline approvable —
requiring particularly thorough vetting in confirmation hearings and perhaps
ultimately unsuited to the job. Just about every modern president has had some
senior appointments who fell into this category and has seen one or a few of
them rejected. Trump’s appointments for defense secretary and for director of
national intelligence seem to answer to this description.
Pete Hegseth served honorably in uniform and has thought
a great deal about some of the Pentagon’s challenges. But he has not otherwise
served in government, has never run anything even approaching the scope of the
immense Pentagon bureaucracy, and has built a career around bombastic
denunciations of it that aren’t much like what a secretary of defense would
need to do most of the time. He’ll get a close look because he’s far from an
obvious fit, but I would guess he’ll ultimately be confirmed: He’s well suited
to impressing Republican senators who are in any case very reticent to cross
Trump more than they absolutely have to.
Tulsi Gabbard is a former Democratic member of Congress
who also served honorably in uniform and then rose through Hawaii politics and
served four terms in the U.S. House. But her lack of experience in intelligence
work at any level, her lack of management and administrative experience, and
especially her penchant for conspiracies and parroting of Russian talking points regarding American
policy will obviously present serious red flags for many senators, given the
sensitivity and importance of the job she’s up for. I think there’s a decent
chance she will ultimately be rejected.
But beyond these familiar categories of qualified and
borderline nominees, Donald Trump has also presented the Senate in the last few
days with (so far) two nominees who should be plainly and utterly unapprovable.
Whatever they think of the political dynamics involved, senators should see
that their jobs, at their most mundane and inescapably job-like level, require
them to reject these two.
Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is a raving conspiracist with a
dangerously loose grip on reality. Maybe that makes him an ideal match for
Donald Trump, but that is not the question before the Senate. The question
before the Senate is whether he should run the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the answer — even after accounting for some due deference to the
president’s preferences — is that he very obviously should not.
There are many traditional political reasons for
Republican senators to object to Kennedy’s nomination — like his support for abortion and single-payer health care and
his complete lack of any relevant experience in government or in administration
or management. But that he is a reckless crackpot, and that a lot of the ridiculous lies he peddles
and believes have directly to do with the work of the agency he is seeking to
run, are more fundamental and inescapable reasons. Most Republican senators
seem to know this, but they appear to think denying the president his choice
for this position would be an extraordinary and explosive move. It would not.
It’s a straightforward part of their job, and if enough of them join together
to announce they will do it in advance, it would just mean Trump has to choose
someone else.
A similar logic applies to Trump’s nomination of Matt
Gaetz to be attorney general. Here, too, the familiar measures of qualification
would already point to trouble. Gaetz has very little experience as a lawyer,
none in law enforcement, and has never run anything. But he has been a
legislator for 14 years, which is certainly meaningful experience. In
traditional terms, he might be borderline approvable. But again, as with
Kennedy, the fundamental problem is a matter of character, and in ways that
directly bear on the job Gaetz is seeking.
Even putting aside various serious accusations about his
private behavior, his public actions as a member of Congress show that he is
unprincipled and irresponsible, and refuses to be bounded by any sorts of rules
or norms. Gaetz has shown an exceptional ability to operate within an
institution without in any way being constrained or shaped by its purpose or by
his role in it. That is exactly the opposite of what you would want in the
leader of the federal agency most responsible for the facilitating and administering
of the rule of law. It’s precisely how DOJ has gone wrong when it has gone
wrong in recent years, and the idea that Gaetz could fix that is thoroughly
belied by simply everything about him.
This resistance to institutional roles, along with his
bottomless fealty to Trump, is again precisely why he must have seemed to the
president like a good fit. But the Senate should want to avoid an AG who would
simply be the president’s “obsequious instrument,” and more generally should be
looking for a good fit for the job, not for the president. No senator could
seriously believe that Gaetz is such a fit. And it is simply and plainly their
job to say so.
Defenders of these appointments, and of Trump’s more
borderline appointments too, have generally evinced their own kind of
romanticization of the jobs in question. The cases for them tend to fall into
arguments like “that place needs a good hard shock” or “only a jerk could clean
up that department.” This is fine as a general expression of disgust at the
excesses of a terrible bureaucracy, but not as a job description for a senior
administrator. An inclination to destroy something is not evidence of an ability
to manage it, or reform it, or improve it — quite the contrary.
We do need a functional Pentagon, and a reliable Justice
Department, and effective health and welfare programs. And getting from here to
there would require some vision of how those ought to work and a capacity to
organize that work and give it direction. This would require some demolition,
but also a lot of construction and renovation — a lot of mundane everyday
administrative leadership.
To suggest that these jobs require purely performative
disrupters who know how to go viral is to equate talk with action and to
mistake the character of these positions no less than to suggest that they call
for superhuman statesmanship. And to insist that the old criteria no longer
matter because Donald Trump managed to get 49.9 percent of the popular vote and
so we are in some new epoch of post-something-or-other is to set the president
and the country up for failure.
That President-elect Trump made these poor choices
suggests that he is in the grip of these mistakes himself. And that could
hardly come as a surprise. He is a man of deep delusions, who frequently
confuses talk and action. He seems to be naming press secretaries, rather than
chief executives, for some of these departments. Even after having been
president for four years, he does not appear to have a clear conception of what
his chief subordinates are actually supposed to do, and therefore also of what he
is supposed to do, and what he did well and poorly last time. He seems to think
that where he failed it was because he was not sufficiently himself, and he
allowed himself to be restrained.
This is roughly the opposite of the truth, and Trump’s
potential for policy and political success this time depends decisively on his
being restrained some. This is why the Senate doing its job, even when that job
involves resisting Trump’s will, is also essential to his effectiveness and to
the possibility of advancing some of the agenda that Trump and congressional
Republicans have in common.
These appointments could end up posing a real risk to
that agenda. But it is far from clear that Trump and his team, ensconced as
they are in a thick, musky cocoon of digital self-congratulation, are aware of
the risks they run by starting out this way. Bad administrators would obviously
make effective administrative action more difficult. And genuinely durable
policy accomplishments will require legislation, too.
Trump probably has about 18 months to advance such
legislation before Congress is fully taken up with mid-term elections in which
at least the House will be in play. Republicans have very narrow majorities in
both houses, and getting anywhere on any legislative front under these
circumstances will require momentum and focus, both of which could be undone by
avoidable intra-Republican controversies.
That risk might be especially great if the
president-elect pursues a strategy of recess appointments. Republican senators
don’t want to resist or oppose Trump. But even they might discover some hint of
institutional pride if the president demands that the Senate shutter its
operations for a while so that he can circumvent the constitutionally required
confirmation process and put in place cabinet officials that most senators
oppose.
The whole idea is a constitutional abomination, of
course. No one thinks this is the purpose of recess appointments. And worse
still is the notion floated by some around Trump of forcing a recess by having
the House adjourn and either pressuring the Senate to comply or using the
president’s (never before used) power to force an adjournment during which he would make
recess appointments. The very idea that the speaker of the House would collude
with the president to undermine the Senate’s constitutional role and
effectively make the legislative branch a passive plaything of the executive should
outrage any member of Congress.
Or at least it would if members were inclined to do their
jobs. That’s the challenge that now confronts Republican senators in
particular. They need to see it not as an existential crisis or a shocking
exigency, but part of the perfectly doable role they’ve sought out and won just
as the president won his. Their job in this moment is to express their honest
judgment of the qualifications of some presidential nominees, and to insist on
some of the most basic prerogatives of the institution they occupy. If they
mean to do that, they should make it clear now, in advance, so that the
president-elect can move along to put more acceptable nominees before them for
these positions.
If senators can do their job forthrightly in this moment,
they would make it just a little more likely that the president and his cabinet
might do theirs too.
Is that too much to ask? We’ll soon find out.
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