By Kevin D. Williamson
Wednesday, September 02, 2015
News item: There is a new cholesterol-control drug on the
market, Repatha, which is enormously beneficial to people who suffer serious
side effects from the statins commonly used to control cholesterol or who
derive no benefit from statins. Some 17 million Britons are potential
beneficiaries of the drug, but they will not be able to use it, because the
United Kingdom’s version of Sarah Palin’s death panel — which bears the
pleasingly Orwellian name NICE, the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence — says it is too expensive. The United Kingdom’s single-payer
health-care system is effectively a monopoly, and not an especially effective
one: Cardiovascular-disease mortality rates in the United Kingdom are nearly 40
percent higher than in the United States. That’s not nice. And it isn’t what
was supposed to happen.
News item: Between raising its in-house minimum wage to
$9 an hour and increasing its spending on training, Walmart took on an extra $1
billion in expenses and subsequently failed to meet its earnings expectations.
As the back-to-school rush gives way to the buildup to Christmas, Walmart
employees around the country are seeing their hours trimmed as the company
tries to recoup some of the losses it imposed on itself. Employees say they are
being sent home early from their shifts or told to take extra-long unpaid lunch
breaks, and they say that individual stores have been ordered to cuts hundreds
or even thousands of man-hours. That’s not what was supposed to happen.
News item: “An unprecedented number of Californians left
for other states during the last decade, according to new tax-return data from
the Internal Revenue Service,” the Sacramento Bee reports. “About 5 million
Californians left between 2004 and 2013. Roughly 3.9 million people came here
from other states during that period, for a net population loss of more than 1
million people.” A quarter of that net loss was to Texas, where a state
income-tax rate of 0.00 percent and low cost of housing stand in contrast with
California. That’s not what was supposed to happen.
The news repeats itself until the bits that lodge in our
brains like splinters become history, which also repeats itself. But neither
the repetitious news nor repetitious history endures quite so immovably as our
gift for shielding our brains against learning from either of them.
Politicians tell us what a policy is supposed to do, what
it is intended to do, and they ask to be judged by their intentions. The
so-called Affordable Care Act, we were assured, was intended to make health
insurance a better value and to make health-care institutions give their
customers better service at better prices. Never mind the unspoken premise that
is the law’s foundation — “We can radically increase demand for health-care
services while reducing costs and improving quality because politicians are
magic!” — and its inescapable contradictions. “We meant well,” they say, and
that is supposed to be enough.
It isn’t.
It falls largely to persnickety, unpleasant
eat-your-spinach types, and to certain happy souls blessedly liberated from the
romance of politics by events and experience, to document that what is supposed
to happen and what happens are not the same thing. Britons and Canadians and
Americans can go on all they like about their “right” to health care, but
calling something a right does not make it any less scarce (indeed, it is
absolutely meaningless to proclaim a “right” to any scarce good), and whether
you choose an anything-goes free market or an Anglo-Soviet single-payer
monopoly model, there is going to be rationing, normally through the instrument
of price. The only question is whether you get to make that decision for
yourself or whether an Orwellian NICE guy makes it for you. You can raise wages
at Walmart in the naïve expectation that there will be no consequences — in
much the same way that all manner of bad decisions begin with the exhortation,
“Here, hold my beer.” But there will be consequences. You can loot California until
the only people comfortable living there are too rich to care or too poor to
care, but the people between those limits have cars, and they know where the
local U-Haul office is.
In the social sciences, the term of art for these
developments is “unintended consequences.” Some unintended consequences are
unforeseeable, but many are not. They are at least partly foreseeable, even if
unintended, and our good intentions do not entitle us to blind ourselves to
reality. Demand curves slope downward: When you raise the price of something —
a ton of coal, an hour of labor — then the quantity demanded will be lower than
it would have been at a lower price. The occasional intellectually honest
progressive (an increasingly rare species, unhappily) will admit this, and will
frankly accept that certain trade-offs, such as extending the power of labor
unions or regulators or other political allies, are worth the price extracted,
in this case the misery and privation of poor people denied work and a chance
at self-sufficiency. Every schemer fancies himself a chess grandmaster, and if
you are wondering which of the chessmen you are in his grand conception of the
universe, count on it being one of the little round-headed ones in the front
row.
That we can be reasonably sure that there will be
unintended consequences does not mean that we know what they will be; these
things are unpredictable by nature. Walmart might attempt to recoup some of its
higher labor costs through reduced man-hours of labor, but it might as easily
seek to shift costs onto vendors and suppliers, especially smaller firms that
depend on Walmart for much or most of their distribution. (It is less likely
that Walmart will attempt to pass on costs to customers through higher prices;
lower prices are fundamental to its business model. The same is broadly true of
fast-food companies.) Those firms will, in turn, try to shift costs to their
own vendors, suppliers, customers, employees, etc. Taking a checkout clerk in
Fontana, Kan., from $7.25 an hour to $9 an hour might, through roundabout
cost-shifting, reduce the income of a logistics specialist in Fontana, Calif.,
or that of a hotelier in Fontana, Switzerland. What you can be sure of is that
the experimental standard — ceteris paribus — will not apply. The world will
not sit still while you adjust your favorite variable.
Some outcomes are positively perverse. In the 1960s, the
federal and state governments began imposing more demanding liability standards
on businesses in the belief that if a firm faces greater liability, then it
will be more responsible when it comes to risky activities. The result wasn’t
more corporate responsibility, but more widely dispersed corporate
responsibility, as the economists Al H. Ringleb and Steven N. Wiggins showed.
Instead of higher corporate safety standards, there was a proliferation of
small corporations, the number of which, they calculated, was about 20 percent
higher than it would have been with different liability rules. Why? Because
businesses outsourced high-risk tasks to small, specialized firms with
relatively little in the way of assets, meaning that they could simply declare
bankruptcy and liquidate when faced with a large judgment.
That trend was cited when oil shippers objected to the
imposition of much higher liability standards — unlimited liability, in some
cases — on the matter of oil spills in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster.
But the higher liability standards were passed, and the Obama administration
recently raised them. The oil companies said that the new standards would
encourage reliance upon small, one-ship operators, rust-bucket tankers operated
by substandard crews willing to gamble their relatively meager assets in a
high-liability environment. In reality, something like the opposite happened,
with oil companies slightly decreasing their reliance on independent shippers.
That’s just another example of the fact that the interaction between politics
and economics is not predictable, even when you have the better end of the
argument. We should not be fooled by simplistic predictions that happen to
coincide with our policy preferences.
When Paul Krugman welcomed the inflation of a housing
bubble to offset a collapsing stock-market bubble in 2002, he didn’t understand
that he was urging a policy that eventually would kneecap the world’s economy.
But he’s only a Nobel laureate in economics and so cannot be expected to think
very much about the big picture. The rest of us, though, have to ask ourselves:
How much economic chaos are we willing to accept in exchange for the small
probability that we might get what we want out of economic policy? If your
answer is “Not much,” then what you want is stable rules and as little policy
uncertainty and regime uncertainty as you can achieve. But that means more or
less swallowing something close to the whole of free-market economics like a
goldfish and leaving very little room for the politicians to engage in policy
entrepreneurship. It is easy to understand why politicians oppose that sort of
thing.
But why ordinary functioning adults with a passing
understanding of how the world works and without brain damage oppose it — and
they do — is a mystery.
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