Retaking Kherson

National Review Online

Thursday, November 10, 2022

 

It seems that Ukraine is about to retake Kherson, spoiling yet another day for Vladimir Putin. Kherson was the first major Ukrainian city to fall to the Russian invaders and is the only provincial capital to have suffered that fate. It is a port city located at the point that the Dnipro flows into the Black Sea. Cross the Dnipro, head southeast for a while, and you are in Crimea. From relatively early in the occupation, it was made obvious that the city was to be incorporated into Russia. It was moved, with only partial success, into the ruble zone, a Russian curriculum was introduced into its schools, and, in September, the Kherson oblast (administrative region) voted to merge with Russia by, unsurprisingly, an improbably large majority. By then, however, Ukrainian forces were already on the attack. Russia has now announced that its troops are pulling out of the city. They appear to be establishing a more easily defensible position on the east bank of the Dnipro, with a view, clearly, to blocking any Ukrainian advance towards Crimea.

 

This has been preceded by the evacuation from Kherson to Russia of large numbers of civilians. How many went voluntarily is unclear. Russia has deported large numbers of Ukrainians into Russia since the invasion in what looks like hostage-taking, or maybe a form of ethnic cleansing, or both.

 

Ukraine’s recapture of Kherson, a city that, in Moscow’s eyes, is now a part of Russia, is a major humiliation for the Kremlin. It’s notable that the Russians sent defense minister Sergei Shoigu and General Surovikin, their commander in Ukraine, to announce the pullback at a choreographed Kremlin press conference; Putin was nowhere to be found, in an obvious effort to keep the stink of defeat off the czar.

 

But humiliation or not, Russia has little choice. The Ukrainian counteroffensives beginning in September have threatened to trap tens of thousands of Russian troops on the west bank of the Dnipro, with only two crossing points should the Russians be forced to withdraw in a hurry. The noose had been slowly tightening, supplies had begun to run low, and the Russians have wisely decided that they better get out before they are trapped.

 

More than that, the fall of Kherson will create a major obstacle in the way of any land-based Russian attack on Odesa. It is also the first chip in the land bridge to Crimea that Russia established earlier on in the war. Presumably, like Mariupol before it, Kherson will now be reduced to ruin by Russian shelling, rocketry, and drones. Indeed, Kherson’s city-center and suburbs will remain entirely within the range of massed Russian guns firing from the far side of the river.

 

So, what next? As winter approaches, Russia, which has been systematically destroying Ukrainian power stations, is evidently looking to freeze Ukraine into some sort of submission. Moscow will also be watching the weather to Ukraine’s west. The challenges to Europe and its economy posed by the energy crunch have been underplayed of late, which is a mistake. And the colder the winter, the greater the chance that Europe’s support for Ukraine will start to crumble.

 

For the U.S., the fall of Kherson is a cause both for celebration and, if unfairly, some concern. It seems likely that a part of Kyiv’s strategy is to establish facts on the ground ahead of any peace talks (or, more realistically, pressure from the West for peace talks). But a desire to push further on towards Crimea, however understandable, might lead to Russia escalating the conflict into very dangerous territory indeed. Russia’s nuclear talk, as well as increasingly blood-curdling commentary from hawks in Moscow, may be carefully choreographed theater designed only to scare, but if there was any danger that Crimea might fall, it must be assumed that Russia would hit back with whatever it took.

 

For now, however, we can only wait and see and, yes, continue to send money, arms, and matériel to Ukraine, using the leverage that support buys to influence what Kyiv does next, but discreetly. If Russia could never accept losing Crimea, neither could Ukraine ever accept being told publicly that it could never try to win Crimea back. That said, absent a collapse in the Russian army, a Ukrainian attempt to break through to the peninsula looks as if it would be a stretch too far.

 

That leaves the most likely prospect for now as something akin to a military stalemate in Ukraine while Russia and the West continue their war of economic attrition. In time, that might lead us to press Ukraine to come to a settlement with Russia. If so, we should be under no illusion that the result, however “successful,” would be anything other than a temporary and fragile truce, easily violated at the Kremlin’s whim or advantage. Simply walking away from Ukraine the moment that any deal is cut should not be an option. If Ukraine were eventually to fall, Russia would not, as Putin has already made clear, stop there.