By Mario Loyola
Thursday, May 27, 2021
For more than 50 years, the diplomacy surrounding
major outbreaks of Israeli–Arab violence has followed a standard progression.
The United Nations Security Council goes into emergency session, with most
members calling for an immediate cease-fire. America uses its veto power to
stave off Security Council action for a few days or weeks, buying Israel a bit
of time to inflict significant damage on its enemies. Then America decides
that time’s up, and Israel — beholden to America’s moral and material support —
is forced to suspend large-scale military operations. All sides declare victory
and live to fight another day.
The bloody ritual was performed once again last month,
and once again Israel’s principal assailant was Hamas, which brutally rules
over 2 million Palestinians in a part of the “occupied territories” known as
the Gaza Strip, which is between Israel and Egypt, and which Israel stopped
occupying in 2005. Hamas is an Islamist terrorist organization that is
supported by Iran and totally devoted to Israel’s destruction; it has
stockpiled tens of thousands of missiles for the purpose of terrorizing Israeli
communities whenever the fancy strikes.
This time, the fancy struck over a mundane landlord–tenant
dispute in East Jerusalem and Palestinian riots on the Temple Mount. Hamas
used this as a pretext to unleash a new barrage of missile terrorism across
Israel, reaching every major city with hundreds of missiles per day in its most
expansive and destructive offensive yet. Even as Israel’s sophisticated Iron
Dome missile-defense system knocked most of those missiles out of the sky (at
the lopsided cost of about $80,000 per intercept), millions of Israelis
scrambled into bomb shelters, and scores were injured or killed. After eleven
days of fighting, Israel caved in to American pressure and agreed to an
Egyptian cease-fire proposal.
Israel has decided to tolerate Hamas’s existence for now,
partly because the costs of truly defeating Hamas seem prohibitive, even if
destroying it is entirely within Israel’s military capabilities. Hamas values a
Palestinian life at about 1/1,000th of the value of an Israeli life, judging by
the fact that it demanded the release of about 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in
exchange for the release of a single Israeli soldier in 2011. It places even
less value on the lives of Palestinian women and children; given that it
systematically hides its rocket launchers among them, it’s clear that Hamas
sees them principally as propaganda assets that are most valuable when they’re
dead.
From inside schools and next to hospitals, Hamas
barbarically launches indiscriminate missile attacks against Israel, a war
crime against both Israel’s civilians and its own. Its strategy is to turn
Israelis’ concern for human rights into a weakness. The strategy has worked.
Israel cannot stomach risking as many Palestinian lives in order to preserve
itself as Hamas would gladly sacrifice in order to destroy Israel. Golda Meir
long ago said, “We will only have peace with the Arabs when they love their
children more than they hate us,” and so it has proved.
Apart from the question of prudence, and more important
from the diplomatic point of view, is the question of rights. Simply put,
Israel has the right to demand that Hamas surrender unconditionally or be
destroyed. It has a right to use whatever level of force is necessary and
proportional to that end, whether punitive or preventive. And the U.S.
government should say so unambiguously.
The reflexive push for immediate cease-fires, which has
become institutionalized in American foreign policy, only perpetuates the
conflict in the Middle East. It has helped entrench the dangerous fallacy that
Israel’s self-defense actions must be “proportional” to the attacks against it.
And it takes no account of the strategic threat posed by missile terrorism.
Many legal authorities, particularly in Europe and at the
United Nations, nowadays argue that force may be used in self-defense only to
repulse an actual attack, and never for retaliatory or punitive reasons. A bit
more in touch with reality, other authorities say that force may also be used
to prevent an attack, but only if that attack is “imminent.”
A moment’s reflection should suffice for one to see the
absurdity of these claims. The right of self-defense must include the right to
remove immediate threats to a state’s security. The concept of “immediate
threat” is broader than that of an “imminent attack.” It involves many
situations in which an attack is not even theoretically imminent. For example,
an adversary’s acquisition of a weapon against which there is no effective
defense, such as a nuclear weapon, is an immediate threat, whether or not the
adversary intends to use the weapons imminently or ever. Hence, President
Kennedy was entirely justified in imposing a naval quarantine on Cuba
(classified as a “threat or use of force” under the United Nations Charter) in
response to the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles there. And even Barack
Obama, in a speech to AIPAC, endorsed Israel’s destruction of a Syrian nuclear
reactor in 2007, though the reactor was not yet completed.
Apart from the question of when force
may be used (jus ad bellum) is the question of how force
may be used (jus in bello). For example, the long-standing consensus is
that force used in self-defense must be “necessary and proportional.” But
necessary and proportional to what? Many commentators appear to think that the
requirement of proportionality in self-defense turns on the level of force
being used against the victim. But that would be a preposterous rule, as it
would in effect make it illegal to achieve decisive victory in a war started by
somebody else. The best you could ever hope for would be a stalemate, which
would reduce the potential penalty facing any would-be aggressor — the opposite
of deterrence.
Under Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, it
is a war crime to risk civilian casualties that would be excessive in relation
to the “concrete and direct military advantage” to be gained by the attack. The
United States has never ratified Protocol I, with good reason. It is wrong to
suppose, as most commentators do, that the objective must be purely tactical,
such as the destruction of a particular military installation. International
law must also allow for objectives that are broadly strategic, such as the
destruction of Hamas’s military capacity.
Wars usually end when one side loses the will to continue
fighting. That usually happens when one side faces such overwhelming force that
it loses hope for ultimate victory and accepts defeat. The modern developments
in the law of war make such a scenario hard to imagine.
Indeed, those developments have something remarkable in
common. They would have all but guaranteed the victory of the Confederacy in
the Civil War. They would have made it even more difficult for democracies to
prevent the outbreak of the Second World War — and would have made it virtually
impossible for them to win it. And today, they prevent democracies from doing
much of anything to stop the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous
weapons in the hands of the world’s most dangerous people.
If the strategic objective is legitimate, then any level
of force that is “necessary and proportional” to achieve that objective should
be considered legitimate. That understanding corresponds to the law of war as
it was always understood before the United Nations began making the world safe
for aggressive dictatorships, state sponsors of terrorism, and nuclear
proliferation.
With more than 4,000 powerful missiles fired across a
wide swath of Israel’s civilian population, in just eleven days, Hamas
demonstrated that it poses an intolerable threat to Israel. In much of Israel,
life came to a complete standstill as Hamas’s missiles rained out of the sky.
Streets were deserted and Ben Gurion Airport was closed. Millions of Israelis
have already learned to live with the sounds of the warning sirens, knowing
they must run for cover within seconds, even with the protection of Iron Dome.
If Hamas emerges from the recent conflict with its long-term capabilities
largely intact — and there is little reason to think it won’t — many Israelis
could decide to leave Israel for safer shores. This is especially true given
that the threat of missile terrorism grows worse by the year, as those devoted
to Israel’s destruction amass ever larger stockpiles of ever more powerful and
sophisticated rockets.
A state that can’t ensure the basic security of its
citizens is not a viable state. That is why the specter of missile terrorism
poses an existential threat far beyond the casualties and considerable
destruction of the rockets themselves. Faced with such a danger, Israel would
be entirely justified in concluding that it cannot tolerate the continued
existence of Hamas. The destruction or unconditional surrender of Hamas would
be an entirely legitimate war aim, just as the Allied powers in World War II
gave the Axis a choice between destruction and unconditional surrender.
Like everyone else, Israel has an obligation to avoid
civilian casualties that are avoidable. But civilian casualties arising from
Hamas’s abominable tactic of hiding its rocket launchers among its own
civilians are war crimes attributable entirely to Hamas.
Certainly, the destruction of Hamas would entail
consequences that Israel might not want to deal with, such as having to
reoccupy Gaza, which nobody on earth would want to do. But before Israel
decides what course of action is most practical, let’s be clear about what it
has a right to do.
It’s time for the U.S. to end its reflexive policy of
imposing cease-fires on Israel in conflicts started by enemies that practice
missile terrorism. The U.S. should make clear it will give Israel all the time,
resources, and diplomatic cover that it needs to inflict upon those enemies a
defeat from which they will never recover.
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