National Review Online
Wednesday, May 19, 2021
When Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets Russian
foreign minister Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of an Arctic Council summit in
Reykjavik later today, observers at home and, perhaps, more importantly, abroad,
will harbor grave new doubts about the Biden administration’s resolve to meet
Moscow’s threat to European security.
The Biden administration decided to shield Vladimir Putin ally Matthias Warnig
and the corporate entity overseeing the construction of the Nord Stream 2
Russian-backed pipeline from congressionally mandated sanctions which were
approved in 2019, and which Foggy Bottom has taken great pains to delay,
according to an Axios report.
That’s a huge mistake, and it risks depriving Ukraine of
a major source of revenue as Kyiv continues its grueling fight against
Moscow-backed separatist forces in the eastern part of the country and
confronts a Russian military buildup on what’s left of its border.
The pipeline, which is about 95 percent complete and runs
from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea, circumventing routes that run
through Ukraine, can now only be stopped by U.S. sanctions penalizing firms
involved in its construction. The tricky part is that many of these entities are
German and Swiss, hence the German government’s self-interested opposition to
the sanctions, which now seems to be dictating U.S. policy.
This is a change. The Trump administration could not have
cared less about Berlin’s resistance. Chancellor Angela Merkel and other top
officials have maintained that Nord Stream 2 is merely a business transaction,
one that should not be sullied by politics and extraterritorial U.S. sanctions
targeting German firms. An indignant Merkel told the Bundestag last summer that
“we will act in this context.”
Ukrainians, naturally, see it differently. “Remember,
this is not a business issue,” President Volodymyr Zelensky told Le
Figaro last month. “No, it’s a matter of war.”
Like Ukraine, Poland and other countries in the region
are threatened by Russia’s tightening grip on their allies’ energy supply. In
the past, Moscow has demonstrated no hesitation to turn off the spigot when it
needs to get what it wants, but Berlin, driven by the importance of “securing”
energy supplies for its industries (something imperiled by Merkel’s misguided
turn away from nuclear to renewables) and by a lingering attachment to
neo-neutralism, seems content to ignore the obvious opportunity for blackmail
that Nord Stream 2 will represent.
Where the Trump administration raised hell, however, the
Biden administration has toned down the American campaign against Vladimir
Putin’s energy ambitions in order to avoid irritating Germany, a country
that it sees as a vital strategic partner.
Blinken has warned entities involved in the pipeline that
they are at risk of triggering U.S. sanctions, and the State Department will
technically deliver on his threat. In fact, it has to act, because that’s what
the law requires, as impatient members of Congress have pointed out repeatedly
over the past several months. Senators Bob Menendez and Jeanne Shaheen wrote in
a March letter to Blinken that the sanctions “are not simply an authority
provided to the executive branch — they are mandated in law — and publicly
available information suggests that further sanctions are warranted.”
The administration is technically meeting these statutory
requirements while vitiating their intended effect. As Axios reports,
it will sanction a “handful of Russian ships” and also designate the Nord
Stream 2 corporate entity and its head, Warnig (a former Stasi agent), thus
admitting they are involved in sanctionable activity and fulfilling its legal
obligations. Yet Blinken’s team will at the same time use its authority under
the law to waive the actual sanctions on the corporate entity and Warnig.
Yesterday afternoon, the administration put a ridiculous
spin on the story. Officials told Axios that the waiver actually “establishes
leverage” over those entities, since they know that the U.S. could impose
sanctions at any moment. If so, why not actually impose the sanctions? And even
though Blinken’s team followed up the report by releasing the summary of a call
with the German foreign minister where the secretary of state “emphasized U.S. opposition” to the pipeline, the
administration’s actions speak louder than its diplomatic talk.
Some might say that soft-pedaling U.S. opposition to Nord
Stream 2 brings the U.S. closer to Berlin when German support to counter China
is more important than ever. This ignores, however, the awkward reality that
the Merkel government, with its eye firmly on the opportunity for German
companies in China, has courted Beijing, expressing relative indifference to
the Chinese Communist Party’s abuses. Making matters worse, the administration
appears to be aligning itself with a government that may be on the way out. If
the country’s ruling coalition is replaced in September by a coalition led by
the Greens (something that is by no means impossible), Berlin may change
direction, since that party opposes Nord Stream 2.
The administration’s approach reveals a key fault of its
foreign policy: When the president says, “diplomacy is back,” he means that a
certain deference to Western European leaders is back. When he and his top
advisers extol the importance of alliances, they really only mean a few of
them.
Earlier this month, Blinken took an admirably tough line
against Moscow, visiting Ukraine for meetings with top officials, including
Zelensky. “I can tell you, Mr. President, that we stand strongly with you,”
Blinken said, adding, “We look to Russia to cease reckless and aggressive
actions.”
But if the Biden administration refuses to pluck such
low-hanging fruit as sanctioning Putin cronies, why would Lavrov take such
demands seriously?
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