By Kevin D. Williamson
Sunday, February 21, 2021
Would things have
worked out better in Texas if it weren’t on an electrical grid that is separate
from the rest of the country?
Probably not, says Professor Wei-jen Lee of the
University of Texas at Arlington, who answered questions with several of his
colleagues in a panel discussion organized by the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Lee, the director of the university’s highly
regarded Energy Systems Research Center, notes that there was not enough
capacity in the surrounding grids to have prevented the Texas blackouts even if
the grids had been connected.
Doug Houseman, a grid-modernization expert at
engineering-and-construction firm Burns & McDonnell, agreed. “Even if it
had been connected, there would have been blackouts, because SPP [the Southwest
Power Pool] and MISO [the Midcontinent Independent System Operator] had no
excess [capacity], and Southwest [which is distinct from SPP] had only four to
six gigawatts, but we were turning off ten-and-a-half gigawatts at that point.”
Far from having spare power to share, adjacent grids were experiencing rolling
blackouts of their own.
“Officially, there
are three U.S. systems, but, in Texas, we like to say that there are two: The
Texas system and the non-Texas system,” Lee says. “In reality, most such
systems are in effect independent systems, regardless of whether they are
connected or unconnected, from a macro-systems point of view. The size of the
system in Texas is about 85 gigawatts, which is larger than a lot of countries
in system capacity.”
In the 1990s, Texas undertook a study of what it would
need to do to connect to the neighboring grids and what the effects of doing so
were likely to be. And here’s a counterintuitive finding: That connection might
very well have made the overall network less resilient. Because Texas produces
a great deal of energy at relatively low cost, connection probably would have
led to the early retirement of some generating capacity in the adjacent
systems, which most of the time would have been able to buy power from Texas.
If Texas were connected to the neighboring grids, it might very well have meant
more widespread dependency on the very Texas systems that failed.
How big a problem
was the interruption in wind and solar power?
By one estimate, Texas’s wind-power output fell to 2
percent of its installed capacity. Even so, that problem was probably not a
very big one, according to an engineer with a background in grid operations.
“Wind doesn’t work in these conditions,” he says, “but they don’t expect it to
work.” As he reads the numbers, electricity production from thermal sources
(meaning natural gas, coal, and nuclear) ramped up at the beginning of the
crisis to just about double its previous level, but then fell by about 25 percent
as the weather interrupted generation in different ways in different
facilities. When it is running at full output, wind can provide as much as 60
percent of Texas’s electricity needs, but the grid managers don’t count on that
in a blizzard.
Exactly how did
the cold weather interrupt electricity generation?
In a variety of ways that are still being reported on and
analyzed. In one instance, a sensor that malfunctioned in a nuclear plant
necessitated taking some power offline for safety reasons. In previous cold
snaps, such as the catastrophic one that paralyzed southern Louisiana in 1989,
steam systems froze up, as did water pipes and some small connections. It’s
likely the same kinds of failures are behind much of Texas’s recent trouble.
It’s also likely that there was a kind of vicious cycle at play: In an effort
to improve their environmental profiles, oil and gas operators have spent years
replacing gas-driven compressors and other parts with electric equipment.
Without electricity, that equipment fails and the gas stops flowing to the
electrical plants, reducing their ability to keep up with demand elsewhere.
Blackouts can cause more blackouts by taking electrical plants’ fuel-delivery
systems offline.
Even when there is additional generating capacity
available, bringing new power online is more complicated than flipping a
switch. “There are two times when things really go wrong,” one engineer says.
“When you turn something off, and when you turn it on. That’s the time when you
are most likely to see equipment failure in plants.”
Professor Massoud Amin of the University of Minnesota
expects that frozen well heads will end up being the main factor reducing the
natural-gas supply. There are heaters and dryers that can help, he says, but
these are insufficient given the extreme cold Texas experienced.
Is the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) simply incompetent?
Amin doesn’t think so. He’s the former chairman of the
Texas Reliability Entity, which (the bureaucracy here gets complicated)
oversees ERCOT under the authority of the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC). “ERCOT has some of the best people I’ve ever had the
privilege of working with,” he says.
But incentives matter. Another engineer with a more
critical view points to the economic incentives at work. “The commercial models
are driving behaviors,” he says, “and there’s no real penalty if they don’t
show up with the power. People get paid for what they deliver — people don’t
get paid for providing guaranteed capacity. In addition to actual power,
there’s reserve capacity, and that’s not really covered in the ERCOT model. If
you want the capacity there for an emergency, then someone has to provide it.
And, unless you are willing to pay for it through the PUC (Public Utility
Commission) or ERCOT, people are not going to do it from the goodness of their
hearts — it’s too much money.”
Just as the economic incentives do not support the
maintenance of a lot of reserve capacity, they do not provide much support for
the storage of natural gas and other fuels. It’s a just-in-time world for
energy, and that creates both efficiencies and risks.
Another engineer, writing at Judith Curry’s “Climate
Etc.”, observes
Providing extra generation
capacity, ensuring committed (firm) deliveries of gas during the winter, [and]
upgrading transmission facilities are all expensive endeavors. Premiums are
paid to ensure gas delivery and backup power and there is no refund if it’s not
used. Such actions increased the annual budget and impact rates significantly
for something that is not likely to occur most years, even if the extreme
weather projections are appropriate.
Was this just a
“black swan” event that nobody could reasonably plan for?
Maybe, maybe not. “We need to rethink how we approach
extreme phenomena,” says Panos Moutis, a systems scientist at the Scott
Institute for Energy Innovation at Carnegie Mellon University. “We need to
consider whether these extreme phenomena are going to be appearing more and
more as we go further down the line.” There’s a lot of math involved in
answering that question, but there are also non-technical factors in play. “At
the end of the electrical grid are customers, including families with children,
old people, sick people, hospitals — these should be at the head of every
concern about the electrical grid.”
Lee concurs:
From the customer point of view,
the biggest complaint we have is that ERCOT’s rotating outages was supposed to
be a planned outage. We expect that
if it’s a planned outage, then we should be informed about when power will be
out and when power can come back on, so that people will be able to prepare. If
I can prepare, then I’m willing to work with the utility system, because this
is an unusual situation. But if you leave people in the dark. . . . I had a
friend who lost power for 50 hours — that’s not a rotating outage.
The narrative, as usual, is way out ahead of the hard
data. “An awful lot of information doesn’t exist yet for us to understand what
happened,” Houseman says. “There are technical, regulatory, and legislative
reasons it happened — and there are technical, regulatory, and legislative
things that need to happen to fix it. There’s no silver bullet.” His advice:
“Be skeptical of what you hear, especially on places like Twitter.”
“This was a rare but high-impact black-swan event,” says
Pete Wung, chairman of the IEEE Smart Grid Program. But rare is not the same
thing as unforeseeable or unthinkable: The 1989 deep freeze that hit Texas and
Louisiana is one precedent, and unusual winter storms as recently as 2011 have
strained power systems.
In any case, though, the main challenge for Texas and the
surrounding states going forward probably is not going to be blizzards that
happen once every ten years, but summers that are hot every year, with bigger
populations living in bigger houses making bigger demands on the system during
the air-conditioning season, which is to say most of the year.
What can be done,
and what will it cost?
Substantially improving the North American grid would
mean adding about 9 percent to the existing stock of high-voltage lines at
about $2 million a mile, or a total cost of $84 billion, Amin says. For that,
we’d get a “stronger, smarter, interconnected backbone.” Reorganizing sections
of the grid into semi-autonomous microgrids, as has been done at facilities
such as universities and industrial parks, is another possible improvement.
States in New England have successfully experimented with AI-based systems that
predict failures and demand spikes in their systems, something that could be
replicated relatively easily elsewhere.
There’s always the go-to solution of simply building more
capacity, too. But that isn’t straightforward, because building enough capacity
to weather a storm like the one that paralyzed Texas would be an
extraordinarily expensive undertaking. “How are utilities going to get approval
to spend the kind of money we’d have to spend for a black-swan event?” asks
Steve Collier, the vice president for business development at Conexon. “The
number of gigawatts of capacity that would have to be built, the strengthening
of the utility systems, would not be worth it for one event.”
Is this going to
happen again?
It very well might. This wasn’t one failure but a complex
of interrelated failures, and fixing one or two of the issues won’t fix the
overall problem.
“Everything went wrong,” Amin says.
For perspective, Houseman points out that Texas was
obliged to try to produce enough power to cover nearly a month of ordinary
usage in four days.
The unmet demand, Moutis says, amounted to about 1 terrawatt-hour, equal to the consumption of a small country. “The rolling blackouts were not as rolling as we’d wanted. We have to understand how severe it was, how beyond expectation it was, beyond our planning,” he says. “One failure leads to cascading failures, and that takes us further from what we can guarantee in terms of system reliability. This was beyond what our system could guarantee.”
No comments:
Post a Comment