By Ilya Shapiro
Wednesday, November 22, 2017
When Neil Gorsuch was nominated to the Supreme Court,
pundits focused on two aspects of his judicial record: his dedication to
textualism in statutory interpretation and his skepticism of the growth of the
administrative state. These beliefs align the justice with a growing chorus of
lawyers and academics who think the judiciary has become too deferential to
executive agencies, allowing bureaucrats to interpret statutes contrary to how
Congress wrote them.
Well, later this month the Court will hear a case that,
precisely because it doesn’t involve a hot-button issue such as immigration or
transgender bathroom access, could be the perfect vehicle for reasserting
judicial review of a relatively unfettered bureaucracy. Digital Realty v. Somers involves the question of who gets
whistleblower protection under Dodd-Frank, an issue that is clearly addressed
in the statute but has nonetheless bedeviled the courts, generating a jumble of
contradictory rulings and confusion in the workplace.
Congress passed Dodd-Frank in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis, and the law’s whistleblower provisions provide incentives for
employees to report securities violations to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The goal was to strengthen the agency’s ability to prosecute the
sorts of misdeeds that contributed to the crisis. Congress thus defined a
“whistleblower” as an “individual who provides . . . information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”
The current case involves a Dodd-Frank claim by a man
named Paul Somers against his previous employer, Digital Realty Trust. Somers
alleges that he was fired in 2014 for reporting violations of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (one of the laws covered by Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower provisions) to company management. Digital moved to dismiss this
claim because Somers had failed to report the alleged violations “to the
Commission” as the law requires.
Not only is this language clear in Dodd-Frank, but
different provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley apply to internal whistleblowers. These
protections require administrative review before a case reaches the federal
courts, and they come with lower potential damages and a shorter statute of
limitations. In other words, Congress determined that statutes incentivizing
two different activities with distinct policy ramifications — reporting to the
SEC versus to company executives or anyone else — should provide different
protections.
The law’s plain language should have thwarted any attempt
at administrative mischief, but the SEC was feeling particularly inspired as it
promulgated rules for enforcing Dodd-Frank. The agency maintained Congress’s
definition during the public-comment period of that process, but before the
rule became final, the agency surreptitiously decided it could improve on
Congress’s work. In the final rule, it expanded the anti-retaliation provision
to include individuals who merely reported a violation — without necessarily
reporting it to the SEC. The SEC gave no explanation or notice for this change,
but simply ruled by fiat.
According to the SEC’s creative interpretation, people
reporting protected activity to anyone
— local police, their kid’s soccer coach, maybe even a think-tank scholar —
qualify for Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections if they can claim a nexus
between that reporting activity and the employer’s retaliatory behavior.
Some have attempted to justify this kind of overreach by
invoking the Supreme Court’s 1984 ruling in Chevron
v. Natural Resources Defense Council. There, the high court held that
agency interpretations are due judicial deference when (1) the statute is
ambiguous and (2) the agency’s rule is reasonable. Neither condition applies
here. Nevertheless, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit cited Chevron in rejecting Digital’s
commonsense reading of the statute.
Thus the parties will argue over whether Congress meant
to limit Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections to persons reporting violations
to the SEC when Congress expressly
defined a whistleblower as an individual who reports protected activity to the SEC.
This case epitomizes how Chevron deference has gone too far. What started as a necessary
tool for preventing courts from unduly meddling in administrative
decision-making has warped into courts’ refraining from checking the executive
branch altogether.
Reasonable people can disagree as to whether Congress got
the law right. But it’s not an agency’s role to rewrite laws it dislikes.
The SEC essentially nullified Sarbanes-Oxley and
unilaterally expanded Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions. What
self-respecting plaintiff’s attorney would pursue a Sarbanes-Oxley claim
arising from internal reporting when Dodd-Frank’s easier, more lucrative path
beckons? If an agency is entitled to deference under such circumstances — where
the text is so clear and the rulemaking process so suspect — it raises
questions about the whole enterprise of judicial review.
While Digital
Realty has played second fiddle to the flashier cases up this term, it may
be the case with the most significant and long-lasting practical effects.
Indeed, whether the justices scold lower courts for manufacturing ambiguity to
trigger Chevron or call for a broader
rethink of judicial deference — just so long as they don’t simply agree with
the SEC’s statutory interpretation, which seems unlikely — it will bring us one
step closer to restoring constitutional balance among the branches of
government.
Sometimes big gifts arrive in small packages. Digital Realty v. Somers, one of this
term’s “sleeper” cases, may just be the one Justice Gorsuch and his colleagues
were waiting for.
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