National Review Online
Tuesday, November 21, 2017
When Christian Lindner, leader of Germany’s market-minded
Free Democrat party, walked out of the three-party negotiations intended to
forge a new federal government from the fragmented political spectrum that
emerged from the recent elections, he signaled the end of Germany’s post-war
political settlement — one of almost astounding stability. As Josef Joffe has
pointed out in Politico, for most of
the last seven decades, almost all German governments were different
combinations of three political parties: the center-right Christian Democrats,
joined by their conservative Bavarian regional allies, the Christian Social
Union, at a national level (thus the CDU-CSU); the center-left Social Democrats
(SDP); and the aforementioned Free Democrats (FDP). On rare occasions the
CDU-CSU alliance would join the SPD in a “grand coalition,” but most of the
time the FDP would decide which of the two main parties would be its larger
partner in a coalition. By and large this system gave Germany stable, moderate,
sensible government that shifted slightly left or right as elections and the
FDP dictated. It suited both Germany’s cautious post-war electorate and the
country’s allies very well.
But things started to change after the Cold War and
German reunification. First the Greens moved their politics away from Peace
Movement leftism to a more centrist progressivism stressing environmentalism
and open borders. Next some voters in the former East Germany, nostalgic for
the meager but comforting security of Communism, helped to midwife the birth of
a welfarist party to the left of the SDP, namely the Linke. And, finally,
Chancellor Merkel’s “welcome politics” offering sanctuary to Middle Eastern
refugees without limit provoked the rise of a “populist” party, Alternative for
Germany, which joined Euro-skepticism to anti-immigration politics. In the last
election these new parties achieved a surprise result: a completely fragmented
political spectrum of six parties of which two — the Linke and the AFD — are
treated by the other four as only dubiously democratic and therefore
unacceptable as coalition partners. When the SPD decided not to enter a new
coalition, the parliamentary arithmetic thus required a “Jamaica coalition” of
the CDU-CSU, the Greens, and the FDP.
Lindner’s walk-out made that impossible.
It’s hard to quarrel with his decision. A Jamaica
government — so-called because of the colors of each party’s symbols — was a
coalition of incompatibles. Its equivalent in the animal world would be the
pushmi-pullyu, a version of the mythical llama with heads at both ends, from
the Doctor Doolittle stories. The Greens want greater openness to immigration
and more reliance on “renewables” in Germany’s already expensive energy policy;
the Free Democrats want lower taxes, especially on business, fewer migrants,
and protection of the German taxpayer from further payments to Europe’s South
to keep the euro afloat. Lindner walked out because he could see that the FDP in
a Jamaica coalition would be the party making the concessions.
Free Democrats had done exactly that in Merkel’s earlier
CDU-CSU-FDP government and as a result had fallen below the 5 percent “hurdle”
a party needs to leap over in order to enter the Bundestag. They felt wounded
by this previous experience and suspicious of Merkel whose usual political
strategy is to lean left (at their expense). And though one should never say
never in politics, still it will be hard to persuade them to change their minds.
That’s also true for the SDP, who were so shocked by their loss in the recent
election that they decided to retreat into opposition and renew their ideology
in the dim light of a vote share of only 20 percent. If neither a Jamaica nor a
grand coalition is on the cards, then what?
If no other coalition can be cobbled together, the choice
is between a minority government and a new election. Merkel doesn’t want a
minority government (of which she would be the head) because she would have to
make more concessions to other parties to win key votes than if they were her
coalition partners. She would then be far weaker as chancellor than she already
is as a less-than-successful candidate. She may, however, be forced to accept
that outcome. Germany’s president, the SDP’s Frank-Walter Steinmeier, wants to
avoid another election (probably for respectable reasons of political
stability) and so favors either a new coalition or a minority government. But
his hands are tied by a constitution that requires a new election if three
attempts to form a government fail. Most of those in the German establishment
and punditocracy want a new coalition because they think that even a Jamaica
coalition would continue with most of the policies they consider important on
Europe, migration, energy, the environment, etc. They also fear that an
election would return all six parties in much the same proportions as now — as
polls suggest — and that would mean an acceptance that “populism” is now a
permanent part of the German system as of the systems of other European
countries. And they don’t want that above all else.
Lindner and his party are now the main obstacles to a
partial restoration of an unsatisfactory status quo. Opinion polls suggest that
they are now being blamed for the “crisis.” But the polls also suggest that the
blame has reduced their support only marginally. Unless Markel and the Greens
agree to adopt more FDP policies than they have done so far, moreover, the Free
Democrats have nothing much to lose from risking another election — and perhaps
something to gain. Merkel’s prestige, towering only yesterday, is now falling.
As the immediate loyalist reaction of supporting her leadership dissipates, as
it is likely to do, she will become still weaker. Her conservative allies in Bavaria’s
CSU (and in her own party) already blame her for their loss of support over
migration. No other political leader now dominates the German scene — not the
SPD’s Martin Schulz, neither the Greens’ nor the Linke’s leaders, and certainly
not the AFD at any level. By putting a halt to a prolonged chaotic process of
negotiations that seemed to be going nowhere, by doing so with the attractively
mature argument that not being in government at all was better than being in a
bad government, and by appearing as the one positive protagonist in a cast of
squabbling antagonists, the FDP’s Lindner may be laying the groundwork for a
serious improvement in his party’s prospects when Merkel finally goes.
That may not be tomorrow, but it is unlikely to be as
long as four years away.
No comments:
Post a Comment