By Kevin D. Williamson
Wednesday, March 4, 2015
Corinne Ramey, a freelance writer working in
collaboration with the Nation Institute, has published a long and deeply
reported account of the deficiencies in the U.S. transportation system, with an
emphasis on the poor quality of service and low environmental standards on
offer to poor and largely nonwhite communities relative to well-off and largely
white communities. The report was published in Slate under the unsubtle homepage
headline “America’s Transportation System Is Racist,” though the article itself
suggests very strongly that this is a case of a reporter’s being more
intelligent than the people writing her headlines. The piece is very much worth
reading.
Ramey’s catalog of woe will not surprise those who are
familiar with American transit issues: freeways that act as socioeconomic
Berlin walls, bus and rail routes that both reflect and sustain the racial
boundaries in large and small communities, the colocation of low-income
residential areas with heavy-transit corridors and the air pollution that
accompanies them, the desire of some residents in more affluent areas to have
just enough bus service to get their housekeepers to work but not so much as to
encourage visits from perceived undesirables, the entrapment of carless
households in automobile-scale communities.
These are real problems, the costs of which are difficult
to calculate: A first job very often is a life-changing experience for a young
person, an avenue of personal advancement that could be easily blocked by lack
of transportation. (Never mind being able to afford a car; many of us have our
first work experience before we are old enough to legally drive.) Reasonably
healthy elderly people very often are able to manage their lives much more
effectively and retain a significantly greater measure of independence when
they have access to good transportation options. Good transit systems provide
both economic and quality-of-life advantages: Think of how much less desirable
Manhattan would be as a place to live if residents had to drive, and how much
more desirable Houston might be if they didn’t.
Ramey does not really much argue that the animating
principle here is racism in the sense of malicious intent toward nonwhites —
she does troll some newspaper comments sections for racially charged
vituperation about “thugs” and the like, but the results are unpersuasive —
instead leaning on a “disparate impact” criterion, i.e. the argument that the
people who run our transportation system do not necessarily hate blacks and
Hispanics, but end up mistreating them anyway. To that end, she considers at
some length Supreme Court jurisprudence and the possibility of using Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a lever for cleansing the transportation
system of its worst racial biases.
The obvious parallel here is the government schools. Like
the transit bureaucracies, they are run by the sort of people who work in
government bureaucracies, but more so. (The teachers’ unions are famously the
most important financial patron of Democratic politicians.) The defects that
Ramey identifies in the transportation system are much more dramatically
visible in the schools, and the distribution of those defects across racial
lines is even more severe.
Are the government schools racist? In a sense, yes: in
precisely the same way that the transportation system is racist by Ramey’s
reckoning.
Some of our transit troubles are simply artifacts of
passing time. Cities such as Las Vegas, the largest U.S. city to have been
founded in the 20th century, are built at automotive scale rather than
pedestrian scale, as are most of the cities that had their major growth periods
during the automotive age. In 1940, the city of Houston was about as populous
as modern-day Wichita. By 1960, it had nearly 1 million people, and today the
Houston metropolitan area has some 6.3 million people, spread out over so many
square miles — the sprawling urban conglomeration is roughly the size of Lebanon
— that it has about 1/42 the population density of New York City. This is
partly a result of public policy — all those interstates and freeways we built
in the 20th century were a subsidy for sprawl — and partly a driver of public
policy — it is difficult to retrofit an effective commuter-rail network to a
city with 1 million more people than Denmark and the population density of an
abandoned amusement park.
Dwight Eisenhower’s beloved interstate network has its
admirers — many at National Review, though I am not among them — because we
find it difficult to imagine what life would be like without all that blacktop.
This is an excellent example to apply Frédéric Bastiat’s principle of the seen
and the unseen. In the case of our transportation network — which is every bit
as politically dominated as our schools — we err in comparing what we have
today with what we had in the 1940s, as though innovation and progress would
have come to a halt without the federal spur, as though the project of moving
people around would stay still while practically every other economic good and
service, from corn to mobile phones, advanced at such a pace that the
commonplaces of life in the early 21st century would be indistinguishable from
magic by an observer visiting from the early 20th. Whether the subject is the
schools or the roads, the correct comparison is not between what we have today
and what we had during the Roosevelt administration, but between what is and
what might have been. That is in the end an impossible calculation to make,
because technological innovation and social change are not predictable.
What is worth noting is that today’s central planners,
offering us a more rational and moral transportation system — high-speed trains
that run on good wishes and are kind to poor people — are the intellectual
heirs of the same people who brought us the current asphalt-dominated mess that
they complain about.
Racism is ancillary to the problem. There are two ways of
allocating capital: through politics, or through markets. Our progressive
friends generally prefer to use politics when there is a choice, because they
distrust markets, thinking them disorderly, irrational, vulgar, and prone to
being dominated by the top-hat-wearing and bemonocled Mr. Monopoly cartoons
that haunt their nightmares. Using politics is, in their view, more democratic.
Most of the evidence is contrary to that proposition. In politics, it is quite
easy for a small number of powerful people — wealth is only one form of power —
to get their way. In politics, one rich guy can make a difference. The theory
of progressive planning is that government intervention allows the aggregation
of the interests of the non-wealthy and the non-powerful, but in reality
central planning accomplishes the opposite: Ramey and others are correct in
their intuition that highways and rail lines were built with the interests of
the connected in mind. If, for example, you wanted to build an interstate
highway through Austin in the middle of the last century, you’d find that influential
parties — the University of Texas, downtown merchants, the wealthy people in
the better neighborhoods surrounding the university and the capitol — would
want to be close to the highway, but not too close. The easiest way to
accomplish that is to run the road through a poor area adjacent to the downtown
core leaving a narrow commercial strip to act as a buffer on their side, which
is more or less what happened. If that happened to wall off poor and nonwhite
people in east Austin, Texas Democrats did not care very much about it.
Repeat that across scores of cities large and small and
you have a big piece of the unhappy situation that Ramey describes. She writes
hopefully about “increased community involvement and awareness of civil rights
issues in transportation planning,” but the problems in our transportation
system, like the problems in our schools, are not the result of bad politics,
of politics dominated by special interests, of racist politics, of classist
politics, or politics carried out by insufficiently well-meaning and
intelligent people — they are the result of politics per se. Political
institutions are incapable of rational economic planning, because they operate
outside of the market environment and thus are cut off from the critical economic
intelligence communicated by prices, and they are vulnerable to all of the
temptations described by public-choice economics, because human beings do not
cease to be self-interested once they win an election or are appointed to a
highway commission or school board.
At a large scale, this creates problems that cannot be
undone. If you think that Title VI is going to help undo all the mischief done
by interstate routes shaped by long-forgotten parochial interests or an Amtrak
rail network shaped almost entirely by the demands of congressional barons who
have long since shuffled off this mortal coil, then you have failed to
understand the nature of the problem. Los Angeles is already shaped like Los
Angeles, and it is not going to be undone.
Most people understand and appreciate the difference
between market performance and political performance in many areas, if only
because they cannot help but notice that the Apple Store and the DMV are such
radically different experiences. Poor, nonwhite people are as eager to send
their children to private schools as are members of the country-club set in
Greenwich, but political domination of the education system deprives them of
the means to do so — and, cynically enough, purports to do so in their
interests. We understand that our cars and our computers get better because of
investment, innovation, and competition, but for some reason — some ancient
reason — we believe that transportation is a special commodity that requires
government oversight, as though the king’s road were the only road. Our actual
historical experience suggests precisely the opposite — many of the
mass-transit systems remembered with nostalgia were built not by well-meaning
legislators but by ruthless real-estate speculators and developers looking to
give downtown workers an easier path toward buying a house in the suburbs. New
York City’s subways were, in their earliest incarnations, private enterprises.
The oldest intercity paved road in this country was privately built and
operated by the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Road Company, which broke
ground on it in 1792. But somewhere around the time the federal government
began acting like a subsidiary of the railroad companies — the great
Progressive Era! — we began to think of roads and railways as projects that
could not be completed or maintained without political management. Later, the
federal government changed its allegiance to the automotive industry, and in
the age of the nuclear weapon began constructing what is in reality a commercial
highway system in the name of national defense, preparing for another campaign
against Pancho Villa in the shadow of the H-bomb, a laughable rationalization
for a gigantic exercise in central planning. Those who promise that it will be
different this time — that if only we commit the resources to the right sort of
people, we’ll get it right — may be well-intentioned, but they are still wrong.
Many in 1776 thought the idea self-evidently insane, but
we have since proved that we don’t need a king. We don’t need the king’s road,
either.
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