Trump’s Animus Against NATO Could Lead to a Geopolitical Disaster

By Eric S. Edelman & Franklin C. Miller

Tuesday, April 07, 2026

 

Donald Trump does not understand NATO. Neither does he understand alliances, let alone alliance leadership. Nevertheless, based on animosities and grievances he has harbored in his ignorance for multiple decades, he appears disposed to allow the most successful political-military alliance in modern history to be destroyed. Vladimir Putin could not be happier, as this would represent one of his long-sought vengeful goals in retaliation for the Soviet Union’s breakup. That would be a true tragedy for Europe and, indeed, for the United States—and it is even more the case because Trump’s animus is based on a series of assumptions that do not bear scrutiny.

 

In brief, Trump appears to believe:

 

·         Member states of NATO have not paid their “bills” or “dues” or
“NATO fees,” reflecting an imperfect, to say the least, understanding of how NATO functions as an alliance and an organization.

 

·         NATO must follow America’s lead even when not consulted about military action.

 

·         NATO is a “one-way street—we will protect them, but they will do nothing for us.”

 

·         Joining in the military operations against Iran and clearing the Strait of Hormuz to end Iran’s chokehold on Gulf energy supplies have become a “loyalty audit” of the alliance.

 

All of the above are palpably false.

 

NATO does not have “member dues.” Each individual nation both submits funds to the alliance’s common activities and also contributes to the common defense by maintaining its own military forces. It is certainly true that since the end of the Cold War, many NATO states have been delinquent on both scores, and in fairness Trump is not the first president to complain that U.S. allies have not borne their share of the collective defense burden that comes in the form of national spending on defense. But things are changing, in large part due to Trump. At last year’s NATO summit in The Hague, member states agreed to the goal of spending 5 percent of their GDP on defense (3.5 percent of defense on their armed forces and an additional 1.5 percent of GDP on critical infrastructure protection and investment in the European defense industrial base), leading Trump to pronounce this “a big win for Europe and for, actually, Western civilization.” Trump either has forgotten this or is misrepresenting what occurred. (The United States, for the record, has not committed to raising its commitment of 3.5 percent to 5 percent.)

 

NATO, a collection of 32 independent and (mostly) democratic states, is not an American vassal. The alliance, founded in 1949 under American leadership, has throughout its nearly 80-year history always stressed collective action based upon consultation and coordination. Trump did not consult with NATO (or any of its member states collectively or individually) before attacking Iran. They were, therefore, under no obligation—moral or otherwise—to assist in his unilateral campaign. This stands in sharp contrast to NATO’s collective response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Those attacks marked the only time that Article 5 has actually been invoked—and it was to defend the U.S., not Europe. Over the next 20 years, hundreds of NATO troops died in the Afghanistan war, including nearly 500 Britons, 159 Canadians, 90 French, 62 Germans, 53 Italians, and 44 Danes. (On a per capita basis, British losses were almost as large as those of the U.S., and the Danish losses actually slightly exceeded those of their American comrades in arms.) Trump’s allegation that the allies “have not been there for us” traduces the memory of these brave NATO soldiers.

 

The suggestion, rampant in parts of the administration, that NATO is a “gift” the United States has bestowed on Europe is bad history and even worse geopolitics. In both 1917 and 1941, the United States found itself joining wars it sought to avoid but nevertheless was compelled to enter. After the end of World War II, a bipartisan consensus united Democrats and Republicans in the view that, to prevent a third recurrence, the United States must be involved in European affairs to deter and, if necessary, stop a hostile foreign power from threatening American interests by dominating the European landmass. NATO was and is the result. The threat in 1949 was an aggressive Soviet Union bent on imposing hegemony over Western Europe; today the threat is a hegemonic Russia led by a cold-eyed dictator seeking to reimpose Russia’s control over its neighbors.

 

Then and now, this poses a threat to America’s vital national security interests. Our role in NATO not only stabilizes the continent but has brought an unprecedented eight decades of relative peace to an area that routinely fell into general wars every 10 to 20 years. Additionally, the U.S. role in NATO has provided us with a network of military bases across Europe, which allows the projection of American military power far from our shores—proving that forward defense begins with forward basing. It has also granted Washington unprecedented influence in shaping events in Europe, a capability it lacked until NATO’s creation.

 

The president’s insistence that NATO must involve itself in the war against Iran also ignores the fact that in 1949, when the NATO treaty was being drafted, largely at U.S. insistence, the treaty limited the obligation of a common defense to an attack on the “territory of Europe or North America.” This was to avoid the U.S. being dragged into wars sparked by the push for decolonization in the 1950s and the fact that France was already embroiled in Indochina, and Britain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and others had colonial dependencies throughout the Third World.

 

There have been frequent crises in the alliance triggered by recriminations that allies have expected support from other NATO partners in conflicts that they have not received. The 1956 Suez crisis is instructive here. Britain and France colluded with Israel to invade Egypt without telling the United States, even though the U.S. arguably shared an interest in not having the Suez Canal nationalized by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The result was a sharp break by the U.S. with its two closest allies, ending when the Eisenhower administration forced them to withdraw (thereby foreclosing their role as Middle Eastern powers). In today’s circumstances, the shoe is on the other foot. Trump acted without consulting allies in launching the current war with Iran. Our European NATO allies clearly have an interest in degrading Iran’s military capabilities and perhaps an even greater interest than the U.S. in opening the Strait of Hormuz because they are more dependent on energy supplies from the Gulf than the U.S. But it takes a certain amount of gall to ask our allies to undertake a complex and risky military mission (clearing the Strait of Hormuz) which, in current circumstances, the U.S. Navy is unwilling to undertake because of the high level of risk to warships transiting a narrow body of water that Iran retains the ability to turn into a shooting gallery.

 

The president’s angry comment last week that U.S. membership in NATO is “beyond reconsideration” marks one of his strongest rebukes of the alliance to date: “I would say [it’s] beyond reconsideration. … I always knew they were a paper tiger, and Putin knows that too, by the way.” Actually, Putin knows that NATO collectively fields more than 3.5 million active personnel, with combined defense spending representing over half of the global total. The alliance holds a massive conventional advantage over potential rivals, with roughly 20,375 aircraft, 2,818 naval vessels, and 12,299 main battle tanks. He knows it poses a massive impediment to his imperial desires, and it is a main reason he is trying so assiduously to destroy it politically.

 

If Trump remains determined, to America’s and Europe’s complete and utter detriment, to turn his anger and emotion into action, if he truly intends to withdraw from or downgrade U.S. participation in NATO, he will thankfully run into several legal roadblocks. In December 2023, Congress approved Section 1250A of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which specifically requires either the advice and consent of the Senate (requiring a two-thirds vote) or an act of Congress before the president can unilaterally withdraw the United States from the alliance. Both conveniently and inconveniently (depending on one’s point of view), the co-sponsor of the provision was none other than Secretary of State Marco Rubio (who had championed the requirement since 2020). It is not clear if the legal provision infringes on the president’s treaty-making powers, but it is safe to say that if Trump attempted to withdraw in defiance of the law, the issue would be tied up in litigation for some time.

 

Furthermore, if the president were to attempt to neuter NATO by withdrawing U.S. troops from Europe without formally withdrawing from NATO, he would be stymied by a provision in the 2026 NDAA co-authored by the chairs of the respective Defense and Armed Services Committees that says that the U.S. must maintain at least 76,000 troops in Europe. If the end strength falls below that number for more than 45 days, the secretary of defense must certify to Congress that the troop movements are in the national security interest of the United States and were executed in consultation with NATO.

 

Of course, the current administration has not distinguished itself for scrupulous adherence to the rule of law, so it is conceivable that Trump, despite the impediments created by Congress, might attempt to create a fait accompli by simply announcing the U.S. was withdrawing and daring anyone to stop him. This would constitute an act of recklessness virtually without parallel in the postwar history of the United States. In a world marked by increased and intensifying cooperation among America’s adversaries—Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—wantonly destroying the alliance that, with all of its flaws and controversies, provided the basis for deterring communist aggression in Europe and ultimately for winning the Cold War, would divide the U.S. from its most important partners and make the world safe for authoritarian aggression including potentially war on the Korean peninsula, conflict in Europe in Moldova, along the Suwalki Gap or against Estonia and Finland and, of course, the dangers that lurk in the Indo-Pacific over the future of Taiwan.

 

Nations are clearly capable of such acts of self-inflicted damage. Others have done it. In the hands of the current national leadership, one can only hope that Otto von Bismarck’s adage that “God has a special providence for drunks, small children, and the United States of America” still holds true.