Is This Really Orbán’s Last Stand?

By John Gustavsson

Thursday, April 02, 2026

 

Recently, a bombshell report by the Washington Post alleged, among other things, that Hungary had leaked confidential information to Moscow. With Hungarian voters heading to the polls to elect their next government in less than two weeks, the timing of the report’s release could not be much worse for the current government. It may seem that this could be the final nail in the coffin of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who was already trailing badly in the polls against opposition party leader Péter Magyar. However, the seemingly concerted effort to remove Orbán could yet backfire.

 

WaPo’s revelations have shook not just Hungary, but the EU as a whole — including neighboring countries typically sympathetic to Hungary. According to the report, Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has, for years, routinely called his Russian equivalent Sergey Lavrov during breaks during closed-door Council of the European Union meetings, offering Moscow real-time information on what EU leaders were discussing and providing recommendations on how Russia should act in response.

 

Szijjártó has partially confessed, admitting that he had discussions with Moscow before and after meetings, though he argues that this was “completely normal” and that he also spoke with other countries.

 

Furthermore, WaPo uncovered a plot by Russia’s foreign intelligence service to stage a faked assassination attempt on Viktor Orbán — an attempt that would presumably be pinned on Ukraine in an attempt to rally support behind Orbán. Within the European Union, Hungary remains the staunchest critic of aiding Ukraine, and Orbán is currently holding up a €90 billion loan package, using his country’s veto in the European Council. His opponent, Péter Magyar, is more supportive of Ukraine.

 

Parallel to the WaPo revelations, independent Hungarian media outlet Telex uncovered a Watergate-style operation against Magyar’s party Tisza, which involved state intelligence services placing moles inside the party to gain access to its IT system. Even prior to these revelations, the EU had for the first time activated the rapid response mechanism of the controversial Digital Services Act to force social media platforms to flag and remove disinformation (including deepfakes of Magyar) related to the upcoming election. Péter Magyar has embraced the help and reporting, promising to investigate both political leaders and high-ranking government employees involved in these plots, even going as far as to threaten Foreign Minister Szijjártó with life in prison for treason.

 

As justified as this may be, it is a dangerous strategy. In the end, the EU may be what preserves Orbán’s grip on power. Hungary’s history has rendered it adverse to any semblance of foreign interference: Hungarian voters are always on guard against would-be leaders whom they suspect could turn out to be puppets of a foreign power, much like the despised Hungarian Socialist Workers Party who were Moscow’s patsies during the Cold War and aided the subjugation of Hungary to communist rule. A flawed champion of self-determination will therefore always be preferred to a marionette.

 

And this brings us to how many Hungarians view Viktor Orbán. Unbeknownst to most Americans, Orbán started as an anti-Soviet activist, at one point being arrested by communist authorities for his fight for Hungarian sovereignty. He was the architect behind the country’s EU and NATO accession, and he also played a great role in the country’s recovery from communism. For this, many Hungarians who do not support his policies still very much respect him. The fact that Magyar has repeatedly promised that he, if elected, will govern as an “Orbán of 1998” plays to this: Hungarians respect the leader Orbán was, but not so much the one he is today.

 

It may seem strange that somebody who fought the Soviet Union would later cozy up to Russia. This, however, is to misunderstand what Orbán is doing: Thinking of Hungary as a “buffer zone” between Europe and Russia, Orbán is arguably trying to safeguard his country’s independence by playing both sides (Russia and the West) against one another, keeping one foot in each door.

 

To Orbán, the EU represents at least as great of a threat to Hungarian sovereignty as Russia does, with intrusive regulations encroaching on matters previously reserved for national governments. This feeling of resentment toward the EU is shared by most other Eastern European member states.

 

Yet this in no way excuses his actions, especially with regards to Ukraine. Given his pro-national sovereignty beliefs, Orbán ought to have been Ukraine’s most fervent supporter in its fight to fend off the Russian invasion. That he is instead using Ukraine as a bargaining chip against the EU is petty to the point of being villainous. Last Wednesday, Orbán upped the stakes even further by announcing he would gradually cease natural gas deliveries to Ukraine, until Ukraine restores a Russian pipeline carrying oil through the country to Hungary and Slovakia that was damaged two months ago (ironically in a Russian attack).

 

Since the beginning, Orbán and his party Fidesz have attempted to portray Péter Magyar as a stooge of the EU who would sell out Hungary’s independence and even bring the country to war with Russia. Magyar’s discipline and triangulation have so far rendered these attacks ineffective.

 

After the stream of revelations, and the DSA measures taken by the EU, the Orbán camp is now hard at work claiming that this is a coordinated foreign effort to derail the prime minister’s reelection campaign and usurp the government. Péter Magyar embracing the scoops and promising repercussions could prove to be a bad move, tarnishing his moderate image.

 

While current polls break decisively in Magyar’s favor, it is worth keeping in mind that polls in the last election underestimated support for Fidesz by ten points. The Hungarian opposition would do well to steer clear of foreign help during the closing two weeks of the campaign.

 

Magyar’s election, in any case, would likely prove anticlimactic to many in Brussels who for years have been wishing for Orbán’s replacement. Magyar has promised to not block any non-military aid by the EU, but maintains that he will never contribute Hungarian arms, and much less so troops, and he (correctly) opposes accelerating Ukraine’s accession to the EU. On migration, he and Orbán are virtually identical, with Magyar pledging to keep the border security policies that have so enraged Brussels (he also rejects the EU’s migration pact). Like Orbán, Magyar views increasing fertility rates as a top priority, pledging to dedicate even more funding toward pro-natalist policies. He and his party have mostly been silent on “culture war” issues, though frequently voting with Fidesz against the EU in the European Parliament, not least on social issues.

 

Anybody in Brussels expecting a continental-style mainstream liberal will be greatly disappointed. That is not who Magyar is, and however much they may wish otherwise, that simply is not Hungary.

 

Should Viktor Orbán beat the odds and prevail, the consequences for Hungary would almost certainly be dire. First, such an outcome would immediately raise suspicions of cheating, suspicions that would appear more credible given the revelations by WaPo and others. Social unrest cannot be ruled out. Second, the EU would almost certainly seek to activate the “nuclear option” Article 7, which allows the EU to suspend Hungary’s voting rights in the European Council and Council of the European Union. This move would effectively prevent Hungary from using its veto to stop aid to Ukraine, or on any other issue.

 

While there is no mechanism to formally expel a member, this — combined with new, draconian sanctions ending remaining EU funding critical to Hungary — would be the closest. Hungary would go from unofficial to official pariah state, and the likelihood that Ukraine would repair the pipeline delivering oil to Hungary from Russia would be almost zero. All in all, this would almost certainly cause a recession or stagflation.

 

Orbán may hope that other, increasingly Ukraine-skeptic member states (such as Slovakia) would block Article 7, which requires unanimity, but it appears increasingly unlikely that any European leader would sacrifice political capital to save Hungary. Especially considering that, without funding for Hungary, there’s more left for everyone else.

 

For now, however, political leaders who secretly or openly wish for the end of Orban’s government would do well not to overplay their hand, as the EU is arguably doing with its heavy-handed use of the DSA. It would be a supreme irony if the very institutions and outlets most eager to topple Orbán instead ended up saving him by turning the election into a proxy battle between Brussels on one side, and Budapest on the other. If the opposition cannot resist the temptation of seeking outside help and validation in these final weeks, they may learn a hard truth: Hungarians would rather tolerate a flawed guardian of sovereignty than install a successor who appears a bit too comfortable subordinating it.