National Review Online
Wednesday, January 14, 2026
In a properly functioning constitutional republic, the
Supreme Court’s job is reading legal texts; matters of elementary common sense
are left to the people and their representatives. But our era’s cultural
complaints sometimes require the justices to turn their attention from law to
the difference between fiction and reality.
So it was with Tuesday’s oral arguments in two cases challenging West Virginia and
Idaho laws that limit participation in girls’ and women’s sports to — brace
yourself for this one — girls and women.
In last year’s Skrmetti case involving a Tennessee ban
on “gender-affirming” hormone therapies, the Court did not need to get into the
basic definitional questions about sex and gender because it resolved the case
by dismantling a convoluted legal theory about how two different uses for the
same hormone were supposedly the same medical treatment. But with transgender
athletes, as Justice Scalia would say, this wolf comes as a wolf — not a ewe.
The plaintiffs in West Virginia v. B.P.J. and Little
v. Hecox would prefer to argue that it is invidious discrimination against
transgender people to not let them unilaterally redefine their sex. But the
current Court has little appetite for creating a new constitutional “suspect
class,” so the ACLU lawyer arguing the case has to engage in some definitional
legerdemain to argue that banning males from female sports is, at least in some
cases, impermissible sex discrimination under the equal protection clause and
under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act. That was good enough for the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits, to their shame.
The very existence of female-only sports that exclude
males is sex discrimination. That’s the entire point. Yet, the Court’s
precedents have long allowed sex discrimination that is based upon real,
biological sex differences. In competitive sports, those are glaringly obvious
and have real consequences not only for who wins but also for the safety of
female athletes. That’s why most of these cases involve males trying to play
with the females, rather than the other way around. Males who identify as female
can still play sports — just not as females. The stubborn reality of biology is
why the Court applies a more lenient test (“intermediate” scrutiny) than it
does when assessing race discrimination, which is presumed to be irrational and
thus can be justified only by the most compelling interests and applied only in
the most narrowly tailored settings.
We think Justice Samuel Alito cut to the heart of these
cases when he asked Kathleen Hartnett, the ACLU’s lawyer, “For equal protection
purposes, what does — what does it mean to be a boy or a girl or a man or a
woman? . . . How can a court determine whether there’s discrimination on the
basis of sex without knowing what sex means for equal protection purposes?”
That question goes double for Title IX, which bans discrimination “on the basis
of sex.” Congress must have meant something when it used that word. Yet,
Hartnett responded as if this was an unsolvable stumper: “We do not have a
definition for the Court.”
That ought to be the end of the case. If the Constitution
and federal law define sex, we assume those definitions to be what the public
understood when the 14th Amendment was ratified in 1868, when the Civil Rights
Act passed in 1964, and when Title IX was passed in 1972 — none of which would
have expected the term to mean that men who identify as women are women. If the
Constitution and federal law are agnostic on the question, however, states and
schools are entitled to their own definitions, in which case a traditional
biological definition cannot violate federal law.
Hartnett’s only proffered alternative is to argue that a
subset of a subset — males who can show that they have purged the effects of
testosterone from their bodies — should have their own constitutional and
statutory exemption from being treated as males. It makes no sense to think
that either the 14th Amendment or Title IX was drafted to require such a thing,
and it would be far more cumbersome and invasive to ask schools to administer
such a regime rather than recognize reality: boys are not girls, and men are
not women. It really is that simple.
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