By Ashoka Mody
Wednesday, April 29, 2020
On April 16, responding to the COVID-19 crisis, French
president Emmanuel
Macron said Europe had arrived at its “moment of truth.” Economics is a
“moral science,” he insisted. The euro zone’s financially stronger nations,
therefore, have an obligation to look after their weakest partners by
establishing a fund that “could issue common debt backed by a common guarantee.”
It was the expected high-minded call for a technocratic solution, and it dodged
the fundamental underlying political question. In a euro zone still based on
nation-states, the strong, broadly speaking, ‘northern’ members have always
asked why they should aid their weaker southern counterparts. Today, leaders of
those northern states are being called to help the southern members on a scale
never before contemplated. Not surprisingly, when they all met in a
videoconference on April 23, they ignored Macron.
Europe is indeed at a moment of truth, but European
politicians have yet to grasp how bleak that truth really is. All economic
forecasts today are too optimistic. Even the strongest European countries will
have their hands full coping with domestic economic distress. In such
conditions, everyone is on his own. Cooperation is hard enough within federal
states, as recent tensions in Germany
and even more so the
U.S. demonstrate. Cooperation on the scale required within the euro zone,
based as it is on the E.U.’s confederation of nation-states, would require a
remarkable political revolution.
All economic forecasts are
optimistic
Every country in the world is experiencing an economic
slowdown. But the downturn will be particularly severe in Europe, because European
nations entered the COVID-19 crisis in
a near-recessionary condition. The virus has caused them severe economic
damage, and their tightly interlocked economic relationships with one another
and with China hold them hostage to the economic performances of their trading
partners.
Any expectation of a swift, V-shaped recovery from this
sharp economic decline is delusional. Although some countries and regions are
beginning to experiment with lifting their economic lockdowns, the process will
be slow and will deliver limited economic gains. President Donald Trump may
want to speed up the reopening of the American economy, but a recent
authoritative study of the 1918–1920 influenza pandemic in the United States
warns that if non-pharmaceutical interventions don’t continue, more deaths and
greater economic damage will result. Hence, as Donald McNeil writes in the New York Times, the opening-up period
will be a “dance,” an extended back-and-forth. “Essential parts of the economy
could reopen, including some schools and some factories with skeleton crews,”
McNeil notes. But where the virus threatens again, authorities will need to
pull back and wait before attempting to repeat the process.
Such a staggered and fitful reopening will bring with it
a slow recovery. An economy is like a system of cogs and gears. Different parts
of the economy reinforce demand for one another. If, for example, restaurants
work at only 30 percent capacity because of lingering fears of infection and
their customers’ shrunken ability to spend, many restaurant suppliers might not
see value in incurring the costs of restarting their own operations. Such
stoppages will filter down the supply chain, sending some producers into
bankruptcy and causing long-term damage. The negative effects of a partial
recovery will be magnified in a world of international supply chains. Even when
a country’s businesses are ready to sell goods and services, its international
buyers might still be in complete or partial lockdown.
Uncertainties — about the likely course of the disease
and the timing and coordination of the economic resumption — will add to the
depth and duration of the downturn that lies ahead. The uncertainties are
reflected in historically high stock-market volatility, especially when measured
by the number of days on which the market has gained or lost at least 2.5
percent of its value. Using this metric of volatility in their historical
economic models, Stanford University economist Nick Bloom and his coauthors
anticipate a slump that is larger and more prolonged than that predicted by
virtually any other forecast.
Compounding these handicaps is the unprecedented amount
of debt that households, companies, banks, and governments have racked up.
According to the Washington-based Institute of International Finance,
outstanding global
debt doubled from $120 trillion in 2006 to $240 trillion in 2019, reaching
320 percent of world GDP. Far too many countries (and all sorts of borrowers
within each country) took advantage of ultra-low interest rates to maintain (or
even increase) high levels of indebtedness. Debt ratios rose especially for
corporations and almost every government. Now, borrowers must repay those debts
amid collapsing output.
European banks, especially in the southern euro zone,
have particular vulnerability here because borrowers have yet to fully repay
debt accumulated during the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the
euro-zone crisis that followed. Making matters worse, in both the north and
south of Europe, banks have chronically low profitability. European banks had
been trading at market-to-book value ratios of well below one even before the
coronavirus pandemic began; those ratios have now fallen farther. Financial
markets are saying to banks, “Your assets are worth much less than you think
they are,” and it’s not hard to see why. Many banks face the prospect of large
losses — in some cases so large as to put their solvency in question, thus
threatening a wider financial crisis. Foreseeing intensifying stresses,
investors are already demanding higher interest rates for new lending to
European banks.
While all European countries can anticipate a terrible
economic year ahead, COVID-19 has landed hardest on the weakest of them: Italy.
The Italian economy has not grown since the creation of the euro zone in
January 1999, and it was in one of its near-perpetual recessions when the virus
began raging through Lombardy and the Veneto, the country’s most productive
regions. The cracking of the Italian fault line will send financial tremors
throughout Europe and the world. Everyone who needed to know did know that Italy
did not belong in the euro zone. Saddled with undisciplined politics, the
Italian economy depended on the accommodating flexibility of the lira whenever
it was in trouble. The fact that the ongoing crisis is so ferocious puts that
historical error in even starker relief.
Europe’s problem: It is a
confederation of states
The euro zone has to deal with this impending economic
and financial crisis within the framework of a confederation of states similar
to the one that governed the United States between 1776 and 1789. In those
years, the states refused to share the burden of Revolutionary War debts and
pension obligations to soldiers. New York state famously held on to tariff
revenues collected on imports at its ports. In the same way, on matters that
significantly impact national budgets, the E.U.’s member states have placed
national interests ahead of the union’s broader objectives. The incentives to
continue doing so are even higher, because the sums required to dig out of this
crisis are so huge.
The U.S. is a useful benchmark. Despite the chaos and
damage the federal government has caused in coordinating the containment of the
virus and despite ideological disagreements in Congress, the U.S. economy will
receive a fiscal stimulus of upward of 10 percent of GDP through successive
messy initiatives.
In the euro zone, the northern countries have the money
to revive their economies, if just barely. The southern countries do not.
Germany, like the U.S., is very likely to end up running a fiscal deficit
greater than 10 percent of its GDP as a result of measures to boost its
domestic economy, and will probably need additional funds to prop up its banks.
Italy and Spain, undergoing much larger economic shocks, have even greater
fiscal-stimulus needs, but lack the money to finance them. The Italian and
Spanish governments also need to worry about debt
— over 20 percent of their GDP — due for repayment this year. Will
investors lend them new money to roll it over?
Whichever way you look at the numbers, Italy needs at
least €200 billion in stimulus money and possibly another €200 billion as a
safeguard in case the markets do not step up to purchase the portion of its
government debt maturing this year. Spain will need more than half those sums.
The exact amounts are fuzzy, and a moving target, but they are large and
neither Italy nor Spain can rustle them up without outside help. The European
response to this predicament is to lend to Italy and Spain through official
funding sources. But such a strategy would ensure that these two beleaguered
countries will emerge from the crisis with truly gigantic debt burdens.
Instead, common sense suggests that, between them, Italy and Spain should
receive grants of perhaps €100–150 billion to tide them over the coming months.
In the U.S., the stimulus funds dispensed under the CARES
Act include grants of about $150 billion to the states and eligible local
governments. It is important to note that in the United States, sizeable fiscal
transfers occur automatically. The worse hit the state is, the less it pays by
way of federal income taxes and the more it receives in benefits. But even so,
the states need more to cover their steep revenue shortfalls, and they are
lobbying the federal government hard to get it. Matters in the euro zone are
way more serious. Because the euro zone does not have a central budget, member
states do not receive the automatic support through reduced taxes and higher
spending that U.S. states do. Hence, the Italian and Spanish needs for large
fiscal grants are urgent, but it’s hard to imagine that a confederation of
states would find the necessary political consensus to provide them.
Europe’s involutionary
overdrive
Unable to act on the scale required, European leaders
have settled for pretending to act. Plans and ideas have generated great
excitement only to fade and give way to newer plans and newer ideas destined to
meet the same fate. On April 9, European Union finance ministers ended one of
their marathon negotiations with illusory promises of new money. Under one
initiative, member states would pledge €25 billion of guarantees, which the
European Commission would use to borrow €100 billion. The Commission would lend
that €100 billion to governments to share the costs of keeping workers on
payrolls. How and when such an idea might become operational remain unknown, as
do who, in particular, will dole out the funds, and what political legitimacy
they will have to decide who gets funding priority. (While those questions are
being pondered, the Finnish government is already backing away from its
commitment to this plan, and other member states may well soon follow suit.)
Another idea is that the European Investment Bank (EIB)
would offer €25 billion of guarantees to private lenders. The hope is that
lenders would be willing to lend up to €200 billion to European borrowers. This
plan — a rewarmed version of similar past plans — would merely reshuffle and
relabel some of EIB’s lending, with negligible impact on growth and employment.
Finally, there is the possibility of Governments’
borrowing from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the euro zone’s bailout
fund. This money was always available. The amount lent would be for
virus-related expenditures only, and would be capped at 2 percent of a
country’s GDP, but would come with fewer strings attached than in the past. The
amounts are too small to help significantly but would ladle on more undesirable
debt.
With regard to the big prize, Macron’s Eurobonds, or
“corona bonds” plan as some call it, the madness continues. In dry legalistic
terms, this plan would allow governments to borrow jointly. In practical terms,
it would put Germany on the hook if the Italians did not repay their debts. It
is no surprise then that the Germans have steadfastly said “Nein.” Germany’s
refusal is fortunate for Macron, who made yet another headline-grabbing gesture
without the money to back it up. If they borrowed jointly, the euro zone’s member-states
would need to repay the corona bonds jointly, and France is already struggling
to pay its own bills. Besides which, the question of who will decide who gets
to spend the funds from a corona bond remains unanswered.
People look to Germany as the billpayer of last resort.
But Germany has its own long-term problems. Its gasoline–based car industry is
facing obsolescence. China, the most rapidly growing market for German
exporters in the last two decades, was slowing down even before the coronavirus
struck. And German universities are ill-prepared for ongoing technological
changes. Germany is still Europe’s most powerful country, but it is a
diminished giant.
Prodded to act in the “European cause,” German chancellor
Angela Merkel reacted angrily. “You can’t accuse everybody else of being less
European than you are every time you don’t get what you want,” she told her
fellow leaders. She then used a bureaucratic trick that served her well in
2017–2018, when Macron was pushing hard for a single euro-zone budget: She
pointed instead to the E.U.’s budget as the ultimate source of funds. That
strategy, she knows, is the best way to kill any new funding plan. The E.U. has
a total spending authority of about a trillion euros over seven years, and the
next budget cycle is caught in a cruel vise. Claimants on the E.U.’s budget
have grown while the departure of the United Kingdom, a significant net
contributor, has left a hole that no one is willing to fill.
All hopes now are focused on the prospect that member
states will pledge even more money by way of guarantees that will allow the
European Commission to borrow from financial markets. If this plan does not
fizzle like the corona-bonds plan, it will come too late, well after the crisis
has taken a savage economic toll. If the buzz from European leaders is correct,
the Commission would eventually use its borrowed funds not only to lend more
money to member states, but also to make outright grants. If so, will richer
member states agree to a scheme that would, logically, almost certainly end up
leaving them out of pocket?
In uncharted waters
While this impasse continues, all eyes are on the
European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB can, in principle, print money to postpone
the day of reckoning. But the ECB is the central bank of a confederation of
states. In the United States, the United Kingdom, or Japan, the central bank
buys the government’s bonds knowing that if it incurs losses, the government
will raise taxes on its own citizens to make whole the central bank’s capital.
Indeed, that understanding underpins the current support operation in which the
Fed is expected to buy more U.S. treasuries than the net new borrowing by the
government. The Federal Reserve System is also providing credit lines to
support municipal bonds, with the important provision that the federal
government will share any losses incurred.
The ECB has given itself the authority to buy bonds of up
to about €1 trillion. That sum seems large by euro-zone standards, but is
trivial compared to the range and size of the Fed’s coronavirus-related
measures. The basic difference is that the ECB has no fiscal counterpart. The
ECB already owns 23 percent of Italian government bonds. If it were to cover
Italy’s financing needs this year, it would end up owning over 40 percent of
Italian government debt. If the Italian government then failed to service the
debt held by the ECB, German and other taxpayers would — without their consent
— need to replenish the ECB’s capital and effectively foot the bill for Italy.
By not dealing with the mess now, the euro-zone will find
itself dealing with an even larger mess later. The ECB cannot solve the euro
zone’s fundamental flaw. It is a central bank without a fiscal union — a
confederation of states that may have reached the limits of confederation
acceptable to the voters of many of its member states.
When I concluded the hardcover edition of my book EuroTragedy two years ago, I offered a
final prediction: “A new crisis—and there always will be a new crisis—will test
the euro zone severely, especially if, as is likely, Italy is the epicenter of
the crisis. Political divisions will deepen as financial tensions unfold, and
the crisis could tear through the euro zone’s financial safety nets.” That
moment may now have arrived.
The extraordinarily severe COVID-19 crisis is set to
confront European leaders with a choice they have so far ducked. Will they move
the euro zone (or even the broader E.U.) toward a genuine federation, which
subordinates national parliaments to a European parliament with unquestionable
democratic authority? Will they instead wait for a miraculous economic
recovery? If they wait, Italy’s (and Spain’s) debts — and financial-market
pressures — will mount, forcing a decision between dramatic, politically
concerted support or a retreat from postwar integration.
It is into these uncharted waters that Europe has now
embarked.
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