By Jerry Hendrix
Monday, April 06, 2020
In announcing a major initiative to combat drug trafficking
in the Pacific and Caribbean and to defend the United States against the threat
posed by the Maduro regime and associated drug cartels, the U.S. government is
making the right move. But the assets chosen, in particular the assignment of
three destroyers, seem to be the wrong tools for the job. It’s as if the nation
had decided to use a farm tractor to mow the front yard.
At an April 2 White House briefing announcing the
initiative, President Trump was joined by Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, national-security
adviser Robert O’Brien, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, and
Chief of Naval Operations Michael Gilday, who came together despite
social-distancing guidelines to present a united front against Maduro and other
South American and Central American drug traffickers. The drug cartels are
seeking to take advantage of the coronavirus pandemic, counting on the United
States to be too distracted by the crisis to stop an increased flow of illegal
drugs into the country. Nicolás Maduro, the illegitimate leader of an
illegitimate government, was specifically called out as being part of a
narco-terrorist conspiracy that is responsible, according to the White House’s
statement, for smuggling some 250 tons of cocaine into the United States, with
at least half of that arriving by sea. In response, the Navy will be assigning
three destroyers, a littoral combat ship, and a detachment of P-8 Poseidon
surveillance aircraft to the U.S. Southern Command to assist with this mission.
Counter-drug operations are clearly a critical mission
for the United States, given the tragedy of addictions and deaths associated
with illicit-drug use and their impact on American families and the economy.
The argument can even be made that the use of U.S. military assets to carry out
that mission is appropriate: Stability is of strategic importance, as is
maintaining laws and norms in the Western hemisphere. Furthermore, increasing
levels of Chinese activity and investment in the Western hemisphere make it
ever-more important for the U.S. military to have a highly visible presence in
the region. We cannot be strong abroad if we are weakened at home; there must
be no doubt that the Western hemisphere is our home, and that we are in charge.
Nevertheless, the use of destroyers for this particular
purpose raises concerns. At $1.8 billion each, Arleigh Burke–class destroyers
are among the world’s most expensive and technologically advanced weapons
systems. Many of these ships are engaged in ballistic-missile defense and other
high-end missions around the world. Although there is great demand for the
vessels to support complex engagements, they are engaged all too often in
low-end missions such as Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South
China Sea or naval-presence patrols in any of the numerous maritime regions of
the globe where U.S. regional combatant commanders have identified important
U.S. national interests and have asked for ships to support them. These
missions have the appearance of overkill, as a highly technically specialized
warship is used for purposes that rank low in terms of technical requirements,
such as providing naval presence in places like the Gulf of Guinea or taking
part in counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Oman.
So why are high-end ships being used so consistently to
do low-end missions, of which counter-drug operations in the Caribbean and
Pacific are yet another example? The answer is that the Navy doesn’t have the
low-end ships to match with those missions.
“Low-end” refers traditionally to frigates and corvettes
that are smaller than destroyers or cruisers, have smaller crews, lower
sensor-system and weapons complexity, and lower costs so that navies can
purchase them in larger numbers to perform day-to-day presence, escort,
surveillance, and interdiction missions. British admiral Horatio Nelson
referred to frigates as the “eyes” of the fleet, and historically corvettes
were designed to be small enough to operate in an enemy’s close-to-shore
littoral regions. By this standard the U.S. Navy’s littoral-combat ships would
normally be considered corvettes. Although the Navy has purchased 30 of them,
these ships have not been as effective as the Navy had hoped, with nearly all
of them presenting difficulties with their combat systems. To fulfill the
counter-drug mission described by the president and his team, what the Navy and
the Southern Command really need is frigates, and fortunately, they should be
coming soon.
The Navy had the option, as some have previously
suggested, to recall some of its Oliver Hazard Perry–class frigates now in the
“Ghost” reserve fleet at the former Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, but it has
consistently bypassed that option as being too expensive. In coming months —
hopefully sooner rather than later — the Navy is set to announce its selection
of a new frigate design and will then issue a contract for the first ship’s
construction this fall. In its last 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Navy
expressed its interest in buying 20 of these new ships. Analysis suggests that
it will need around 55 of them for a well-balanced 355-ship fleet. These ships,
with a combat suite of medium complexity, requiring smaller crews, and each
costing less than $1 billion, should be purchased in sufficiently large numbers
to free the Navy’s larger, more complex, and much more expensive combatants to
focus on the readiness of their combat systems to win wars. Should the Navy
also choose to purchase large and medium unmanned platforms equipped with
either weapons or sensors to operate with its new frigates in a distributed
network, then those frigates would only be more effective in their traditional
role as the “eyes” of the fleet.
To meet persistent requests and requirements, the Navy
keeps about 110 ships deployed at any given moment — out of a total of only 296
ships. Normally a ship should spend about six months in maintenance and then
six months in training before deploying for six months; it then returns home to
spend another six months in a ready-surge status before beginning the cycle
again. The Navy’s current 110-to-296 ratio means that compromises have been
made throughout the cycle — truncated training or maintenance, or extended
deployments, or ships unready for crisis surges. As the Navy charts its course
to 355 ships, new frigates will offer a solution to the problem. For now,
however, it must assign the high-end, and highly expensive, destroyers to
perform counter-drug patrols off the shores of Central and South America, as
well as to put additional pressures on Maduro.
It is undoubtedly the right course of action for the
president and his team to counter the damaging effect of narcotics on American
life, and to isolate the corrupt regime in Venezuela. But it is also
undoubtedly the case that they were forced to pick the wrong tools for the
task. The U.S. should ensure that the Navy will soon be able to provide the
commander-in-chief with a better option to defend the nation’s day-to-day
interests at sea.
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