By Noah Rothman
Wednesday, April 22, 2020
Like a bolt from the blue on Wednesday morning, President
Donald Trump announced on Twitter that he would instruct U.S. Navy vessels in
the Persian Gulf to “shoot down and destroy” any Iranian boats that make a
menacingly close approach to their American counterparts.
Trump’s “order,” if it amounts to that, follows what the
Pentagon called the “dangerous
and harassing approaches” of 11 Iranian fast boats on six American warships
in the region. Maybe Trump just wanted to signal to Tehran that destabilizing
behavior like this won’t be tolerated. Perhaps this was a response to the news
that Iran had successfully launched a satellite into orbit, demonstrating
increased ballistic missile capabilities. Or it might just have been an errant
response to a segment that had just aired on “Fox & Friends.” Regardless of
the origins of this presidential pronouncement, critics of the administration’s
confrontational approach toward Iran instantly leveraged Trump’s directive to
declare his Iran policies a failure.
The deterrence that had been reestablished following the
January strike on Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Kasim Soleimani
had broken down, we were told. The administration’s “maximum-pressure”
campaign, we heard, is an abject failure. These and other familiar refrains are
reliable pillars of stability in an all-too-dynamic world. It is unclear,
though, why the president would lend credence to those who are politically
invested in the failure of his White House’s strategic approach to containing
Iran. The behavior of these Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps fast boats,
while destabilizing, is not at all unprecedented. In fact, it’s much closer to
the status quo that prevailed before the escalating tensions that culminated in
the Soleimani strike.
Provocative, behavior-testing close approaches are a
relatively common—albeit unsafe—practice by adversarial militaries in proximity
to one another. American assets are regularly targeted for such actions by
Chinese and Russian air and naval forces, but the IRGC has made such a habit of
this practice that it has become relatively routine.
As early as 2008, Iranian fast boats could be found
making aggressive maneuvers toward American ships, but this tactic became far
more common in the last decade. The pace of those incidents increased near the
end of Barack Obama’s second term in office, including behaviors as reckless as
the capture of U.S. sailors. From 2016 to 2018, U.S. and British patrols were
regularly harassed by Iranian air and navy assets. On occasion, the episodes
were so dangerous that they compelled American commanders to fire
warning shots across the bows of their Iranian tormentors.
Even if these approaches are careless and fraught, their
regularity renders them manageable. That stands in stark contrast to the kind
of unprecedented behaviors in which Iran engaged over the course of 2019 that
put the American and Iranian conventional militaries on a collision course.
The Islamic Republic spent much of 2019 engaging in
unprecedentedly provocative acts of war: seizing and sabotaging commercial
shipping vessels in the critical Strait of Hormuz, downing an unarmed American
surveillance drone, and executing a brazen multi-drone strike on the world’s
largest petroleum processing facility deep inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
In the final two months of last year, the pace and precision of Iranian proxy
attacks on U.S. positions in Iraq increased. In December, one such attack
killed an American contractor and wounded three uniformed service personnel. To
this, the U.S. responded as it had in the past, with a proportionate strike on
the militia responsible for the attack.
But Iranian provocations did not end there. That militia,
with the logistical support of its Iranian commanders, laid siege to the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad. A mob breached the outer wall of the compound, set the
facility on fire, and sent the U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq into safe rooms
for the next 24 hours. The siege was only lifted after 100 U.S. Marines
dispatched to the embassy. The episode sent a clear signal that Iran was
undeterred. Its escalatory and confrontational conduct would continue until it
had crossed a line that would necessitate an overwhelming response from Western
nations against Iranian military and government targets. In short, war.
The balance was tentatively restored after the Soleimani
strike and a face-saving retaliatory missile volley targeting U.S. positions in
Iraq from inside Iranian territory, but Iran was not suddenly transformed into
a placid and responsible international actor. Iranian proxies in Iraq continued
to execute sporadic missile attacks on U.S. positions and, as we’ve seen, IRGC
boats still harass Western ships in the Gulf. This is suboptimal, but it’s also
the status quo ante.
The Iranian regime is a rogue entity. It will forever
need to be reminded of the Western resolve to contain it until and unless the
regime abandons its destabilizing activities. That is the essential nature of
deterrence; it is a dance that does not end. Capabilities evolve. Strategic
considerations shift. Windows of opportunity open and close. Deterrence doesn’t
maintain itself, and one day Iran will once again threaten the balance in
intolerable ways. But this particular IRGC harassment campaign doesn’t cross
that threshold.
It’s perfectly within the character of the
administration’s critics to overinterpret the implications of this event if
only to undermine the administration’s claim to be a competent manager of the
adversarial relationship with Iran. But why would the president give his
critics ammunition by lending credence to their criticisms? That’s a true
mystery.
No comments:
Post a Comment