National Review Online
Wednesday, October 23, 2019
Turkey and Russia carved up northeastern Syria with the
U.S. standing on the sidelines.
This was the inevitable result of President Trump’s
decision to pull our troops from the Turkey–Syria border to make way for a
Turkish incursion. The Turks long had wanted to clear Kurdish fighters — the
so-called Syrian Democratic Forces, which had allied with us against ISIS —
from their border, in keeping with their general enmity toward the Kurds and
opposition to any sort of Kurdish autonomous region.
We had held the Turks back, until Trump agreed on-the-fly
in a phone call with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan to make way for the
invasion.
The process was atrocious. Trump didn’t consult with the
military and foreign-policy professionals around him or those on the ground,
leading to a chaotic U.S. response as events unfolded. More important, cutting
loose the Kurds who had recently sacrificed so much to be our front-line
fighters in the successful campaign against the ISIS caliphate was
dishonorable. Turkish and Turkish-allied forces immediately pushed civilians
from border areas and engaged in atrocities, most notably the assassination of
the Kurdish politician and activist Hevrin Khalaf.
The defenses made of Trump’s pullback don’t hold up very
well. One is that we only had about 100 troops on the Turkish border, not
enough to stop an invasion. True, but such minimal trip-wire forces have stayed
the hand of much more formidable adversaries, namely the Eastern Bloc at the
Berlin Wall and North Korea on the DMZ. Another is that Turkey is a NATO ally
that we didn’t want to skirmish with on the ground. Yes, but this logic would
have acted even more powerfully on Turkey, which would have had much more to
lose if it killed any of our troops. The fact is that Trump could have held the
Turks back if he hadn’t been motivated by a long-standing desire to begin
liquidating our commitments in the Middle East — even the smallest, safest, and
most useful commitments.
He wants to bring a conclusion to “endless wars.” This
may be an understandable reaction to the long American interventions in Iraq
and Afghanistan, but the Syria operation wasn’t anything like those wars at
their height, when we had 150,000 or more troops engaged. We leveraged a very
small force to help muster the Kurds for a fight that even Trump thought
necessary, smashing the caliphate. It’s true that our situational alliance with
the Kurds didn’t commit us to defending them forevermore or creating and
protecting an autonomous region for them. But other potential proxy forces in
the future will remember how quickly we tossed the Kurds aside.
The move weakens our position across the board. The Kurds
have thrown in with Bashar al-Assad, who is allied with the Russians and
Iranians. Meanwhile, there is no countervailing benefit to us with Turkey. We
extracted no concessions in exchange for opening up Syria to them, and the
harsh congressional reaction to the Turkish move will alienate Ankara from us
further. The chief victor is Russia — along with Assad and Iran — which will
solidify its position in Syria and gain more influence with all players. It is
telling that Erdogan decided the immediate dispensation of northeastern Syria
with Vladimir Putin at a meeting in Sochi.
The biggest downside is that, in the wake of our victory
against the caliphate, we are essentially depending on Russia to keep up the
pressure on ISIS, and there is no guarantee of that. Trump may want to be done
with Syria, but Syria may not be done with him.
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