Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts

Monday, July 13, 2026

Is Erdoğan NATO’s New Heavyweight?

By Hannah Lucinda Smith

Monday, July 13, 2026

 

Turkey’s broadcasting censor recently issued a new directive to the country’s television channels: There was to be no criticism of NATO on the airwaves. In the run-up to the alliance’s landmark summit, which was held in the Turkish capital of Ankara last week, good vibes were state-mandated, and Turkish journalists were warned that all reports should “fit in with the national security perspective.”

 

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was duly hailed, both at home and abroad, as the leader who managed to bring a reluctant Donald Trump to the summit, and Turkey’s defense industry was touted as the possible answer to Europe’s weapons procurement quandary. On Wednesday, after a brief bout of petulance over his European allies’ criticisms of his attacks on Iran, Trump exited the meeting apparently full of renewed enthusiasm for the alliance that, on multiple occasions, he seemed determined to undermine. NATO’s bureaucrats will be exhaling in relief.

 

There is, of course, a deep irony in the fact that criticism of an organization whose founding principles are the defense of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law was banned by a state diktat. But observers of Turkey will not be surprised: Under Erdoğan, who has been in power since 2003, the country has descended into near-total autocracy, with opposition figures and critical journalists jailed, media outlets shuttered, and the courts and state institutions wholly politicized.

 

For a period, that illiberal trajectory took Turkey to the outskirts of the NATO alliance, where it was spoken of as an unreliable ally and excluded from the F-35 fighter jet program. Today, because of global circumstances and Erdoğan’s skill in navigating them, it is back at the center. The censor’s decree is a sign of the total foreign policy swivel that has taken place in Ankara over recent years, turning it back toward Europe after a decade in which Erdoğan appeared far more interested in building links with Russia and China.

 

For much of his tenure, Erdoğan was largely uninterested in foreign policy. In the early years, he left international strategy to his chief adviser and foreign minister from 2009 to 2014, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who pursued a policy of “zero problems with neighbors” by building ties with countries in the Middle East and Africa while maintaining Turkey’s traditional alliances in the West. That changed with the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions in the early 2010s, when Erdoğan began patronizing Islamist movements, mirroring his lurch toward overt religiosity in domestic politics. For a decade after that, and particularly after ousting Davutoğlu in 2016, he used foreign relations primarily to further his own agenda. In the lead-up to elections, he stoked rows with Europe and launched military campaigns in Syria and the Aegean Sea to ignite and then feed off nationalist sentiments, and to present himself as a strongman who could stand up for Turkey on the world stage.

 

The turning point was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, said Gönül Tol, a founding director of the Turkey program at the Middle East Institute, a Washington D.C.-based think tank. The conflict has allowed Erdoğan to offer his relationship with Vladimir Putin, once a serious concern for NATO, as a mediating tool. It has also refocused the alliance’s attention—away from the domestic behavior of its allies and toward the external threat now facing Europe. Magnifying both of those factors is Trump, whose own wavering commitment to European security has left NATO with few other options.

 

“The international context is in Erdoğan’s favor, and he is playing his cards well,” Tol said. “If you look at the new world we are in, there are conflicts in Ukraine, Iran, the Caucasus, North Africa, and Turkey sits at the center of all that.”

 

Turkey also occupies a strengthened position in the Middle East following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. When the dictator fled Damascus on December 8, 2024, Russia’s influence in the region collapsed. Where Erdoğan had once been the weaker partner in his relationship with Putin, often forced to concede to the Russian leader, he is now able to exert far greater influence in Moscow. The new Syrian government is ideologically and politically close to Ankara, and it is through Turkey’s support that Russia has been able to maintain a reduced military presence at its base in the Syrian port of Tartus. The war in Ukraine, too, has turned Turkey into an economic lifeline for Putin; the country has served as a transit hub for restricted goods moving in and out of Russia.

 

These developments have allowed Erdoğan to pursue an independent policy on Iran amid the U.S. and Israeli attacks on that country. While Trump and Erdoğan currently enjoy a warm relationship, and Turkey itself was targeted by Iranian missiles in the first weeks of the conflict, the Turkish leader has kept a distance that has prevented him from being sucked into another regional war, and blocked Israel’s plans for Kurdish-led regime change in Tehran. (Syria, too, has resisted Trump’s attempts to bring it into the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.)

 

Diplomats who dealt with Erdoğan in his early years recall how he used to defer to his foreign ministry and seemed ill at ease in international settings: Foreign policy was never his natural forte. More recently, though, Erdoğan has “learned how to exploit international crises and provide Turkey’s services,” Tol said.

 

He has also been extremely lucky. Today, there is far less of a focus on democracy and human rights in Brussels; it has been overtaken by concerns over European security and efforts to fill the gaps left by Trump’s prevaricating Washington. Turkey, as the second biggest military in NATO and the country occupying the alliance’s eastern flank, has become central to that question.

 

Alienating Erdoğan is no longer an option. He has already proved that he is willing to stall the work of the alliance if he feels it is of benefit to him; in 2022, after the invasion of Ukraine, he used his veto power to stall Sweden and Finland’s accession to the bloc. Such a move could be fatal to NATO in 2026. Whatever Erdoğan is doing domestically, and however that clashes with NATO’s enshrined values, he is guaranteed a warm welcome in Brussels. In the immediate term, that is realpolitik. In the longer term, however, welcoming an autocrat could undermine the alliance: The test will come when Erdoğan’s aims inevitably diverge from NATO’s once again.

Wednesday, July 8, 2026

Don’t Sell F-35s to Turkey

National Review Online

Wednesday, July 08, 2026

 

Despite all the challenges that NATO faces from outside the alliance, the controversy that may come to dominate the ongoing Atlantic Alliance summit in Turkey this week has come from within it.

 

“We’re going to be taking the sanctions off,” President Trump said of Recep Erdoğan’s Turkey on Tuesday. “It’s time to do that, okay? We don’t want to sanction friends.”

 

The sanctions Trump referred to are those that were imposed on Turkey under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Trump himself signed that act into law in 2017 and applied it to Ankara in 2020 after Ankara agreed to purchase advanced Russian anti-aircraft batteries. Those sanctions ejected Turkey from a program that rendered it eligible to purchase America’s most advanced fighter aircraft, the F-35.

 

Ankara hasn’t abandoned the behaviors that resulted in its sanctioning in the first place. Nevertheless, Trump seems determined to sell F-35s to Turkey, and those sanctions are in his way. On Tuesday, the president said he intends to “consider” allowing Turkey back into the fold. But to hear his administration officials tell it, Trump has already made up his mind.

 

In advance of this week’s NATO summit, Trump lavished Erdoğan with praise. He’s a “friend” and a “respected leader,” the president insisted, neither of which, we hope, despite some evidence to the contrary, he actually believes. Moreover, according to administration officials, deepening America’s defense ties with Turkey is a geopolitical necessity given its proximity to the Russian menace. Trump “really likes Erdoğan,” onetime U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James Jeffrey told Fox News. But beyond their personal rapport, Trump recognizes that Turkey is “essential to maintaining the U.S. perimeter around Eurasia.”

 

The New York Times is hearing the same thing. “The past few years have led to a new appreciation of what Turkey brings to the alliance,” its reporters contended. Ankara has “broad diplomatic relations” with geopolitical actors, good and bad. It “leveraged” its relationship with Hamas to facilitate a cease-fire in Gaza. It has become a “conduit” through which NATO members communicate with Iranian and Russian officials. And Ankara is building up an intimidating indigenous defense industry that it has deployed via proxies to great effect in places like Syria.

 

All those conditions have convinced the Trump administration to keep Erdoğan’s Turkey close, but there is a limit to the extent to which we can rely on our “closeness” to a country or, more specifically, a leader, who has made it clear for years, in word and in deed, that he is no friend of the West. It’s not just that Erdoğan’s Turkey has developed a working relationship with America’s enemies as well as its allies. It is arguably in violation of its NATO commitments by having provided material support to terrorist organizations like Hamas.

 

Israeli security officials have produced evidence of the Turkish government’s efforts to fund Hamas’s activities as well as to give it the means to improve the accuracy of the rockets it fires on Israeli civilian targets. That support continued even after the October 7 massacre.

 

“In December 2023, as the war in Gaza escalated, Israeli authorities again seized illicit goods from a Turkish ship at the port of Ashdod. Inspectors found weapons and components hidden inside an industrial weaving machine destined for the West Bank,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies Executive Director Jonathan Schanzer wrote last year. In March 2024, he added, Israeli security services broke up a Hamas terror plot planned by Hamas operatives inside Turkey.

 

In addition to its illicit support for Islamist terrorists, Turkey’s warm relationship with America’s near-peer competitors should bar it from accessing America’s most technologically advanced weapons platforms.

 

Turkey’s “partnership with Russia includes security and economic dimensions,” observed Isabelle Terranova, an analyst with the Canadian Macdonald–Laurier Institute. Ankara’s commercial relations with Moscow increased following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and Turkey has refused to participate in the sanctions regime imposed on the Kremlin in response to its land grab. Erdoğan’s “partnership with China has also grown, particularly through its participation in the Belt and Road Initiative,” Terranova added.

 

All this should be enough to persuade the Trump administration that providing Turkey with F-35s would needlessly jeopardize American security and the lives of its service personnel. Granting Ankara access to that technology “would enable Moscow to potentially gain valuable intelligence helpful for shooting down F-35s flown by Americans or our allies,” Schanzer’s FDD colleagues observed. “If that were to happen, given growing security cooperation among the four Axis of Aggressors adversaries, we should not be surprised if Moscow shares sensitive technological details of the F-35 with Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang. That would not only endanger American national security and pilots, but also U.S. partners who fly the aircraft.”

 

In other words, such a transfer would undermine not only U.S. security but also that of our allies. It would diminish the platform’s value. After all, what good is the F-35 if it cannot continue to beat Russian air defenses and Chinese stealth radar, as it has in the skies over Iran and Venezuela?

 

Trump may have some special affinity for his Turkish counterpart, but he should not place his faith in his own character judgment over the observable fact that Erdoğan is, at best, duplicitous and, at worst, hostile to American interests. Ensuring that Turkey does not gravitate further away from the West and into our enemies’ camp is certainly a strategic American interest. But there are other ways to reward a country that is, on its best days, a frenemy than by giving it access to our most sensitive military assets.

Thursday, April 23, 2026

Turkey Is the Weak Link in Trump’s Economic War on Iran

By Sinan Ciddi & Ahmad Sharawi

Thursday, April 23, 2026

 

With a military blockade in place in the Strait of Hormuz, the Trump administration is pivoting toward economic warfare against the Islamic Republic. The Treasury Department has provided the United Arab Emirates and Oman with a list of banks in their jurisdictions that enable Iranian illicit activity. This early warning — extended to China and Hong Kong — is intended to make clear that any financial support for Tehran will trigger U.S. repercussions. The key challenge now is inconsistent enforcement, particularly regarding Turkey.

 

The Turkish regulatory and commercial environment remains a critical conduit for Tehran’s access to hard currency and for sustaining global financial channels.

 

A network of Iranian-linked exchange houses operates outside the formal banking system in major cities such as Istanbul and Ankara. These entities often allow users to transfer funds without opening bank accounts, offering near-instant settlement with minimal documentation — hallmarks of Iran’s shadow banking architecture. Because Iran is barred from the global SWIFT financial messaging system, these currency exchange houses have become highly attractive tools for evading sanctions with limited regulatory oversight.

 

Washington has targeted some of these networks under counterterrorism authorities. In 2024, the Treasury Department designated Seyyed Mohammad Mosanna’i Najibi, an Iranian-Turkish national who managed currency exchange businesses in both countries, as a terrorist. According to Treasury, Najibi used these entities to circumvent U.S. sanctions — holding funds for Iran’s Ministry of Defense in accounts outside Iran, facilitating revenue from Iranian oil sales, and transferring money to suppliers tied to the Ministry of Defense and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Israel also sanctioned two Turkish entities in 2025 for providing and facilitating millions of dollars to the IRGC-Quds Force.

 

Even more alarming is that Turkey continues to host a U.S.-sanctioned Iranian bank, Bank Mellat, on its own soil. Bank Mellat is an institution linked to financing the Basij, the IRGC’s paramilitary arm. Rather than forcing its closure, Turkish authorities treat the bank as a legitimate, supervised entity, allowing it to remain operational despite it being sanctioned, indicating that Ankara’s regulatory framework permits entities tied to Iran to persist despite their violations of U.S. sanctions.

 

Bank Mellat’s lending largely stays in Iran, so its branches in Turkey act as extensions of the Iranian system. The bank holds deposits linked to its Tehran headquarters and the sanctioned Central Bank of Iran. Its 2024 annual report states it can rely on capital support from Iran. Turkey’s permissive environment allows Bank Mellat to operate, weakening U.S. sanctions enforcement.

 

The pass that Turkey has seemingly received is worse when one considers the Trump administration’s decision not to punish other Turkish financial entities that have helped Iran evade U.S. sanctions, which were supported and facilitated by the government of Turkey.

 

In 2019, Turkish public lender Halkbank was indicted in the U.S. for running a brazen sanctions evasion scheme. At least two of the bank’s employees were convicted during Trump’s first term for their involvement in efforts to purchase illicit Iranian natural gas, paid for with gold. By March 2026, Trump’s Justice Department decided to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with Halkbank — one of the largest violators of U.S. sanctions on Iran.

 

According to findings by the U.S. Treasury Department and the Justice Department, Halkbank facilitated at least $13 billion in transactions on behalf of Iran between March 2012 and July 2013, with some estimates placing the total closer to $20 billion. A portion of those funds is believed to have supported Tehran’s regional proxy network.

 

Congressional reports suggest that, from 2012 to 2018, Iran spent about $16 billion each year to back militant clients across the Middle East. Treasury guidelines allow civil penalties up to twice the value of illicit proceeds, which could expose Halkbank to fines of up to $40 billion. Separately, Kuveyt Türk Bank is now facing litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York over allegations that it routed Hamas-linked dollar transactions through U.S. banks.

 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has pursued direct policies to promote the survival of Iran’s regime. This is somewhat understandable: There is little doubt that the Iran war is placing a severe strain on the foundations of Turkey’s economy. Every $10 increase in global oil prices is estimated to widen the country’s current account deficit by roughly $3 to $5.1 billion. Turkey already grapples with one of the highest inflation rates in the world — currently exceeding 30 percent annually — intensifying pressure on Erdoğan’s government to rein in rising consumer prices. Additionally, Ankara is justifiably concerned about a potential for Iranian refugee flows, which would heighten existing levels of frustration for the Erdoğan government.

 

Legitimate worries aside, however, Erdoğan prefers the survival of the Tehran regime. For him, a weakened but still Islamist regime in Tehran may be more strategically useful than a democratic government that could realign Iran with the West.

 

Iran’s network of regional proxies has long shaped the balance of power in the Middle East. As long as groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza remain armed and active, Israel faces persistent security pressure.

 

In this environment, a perpetually threatened Israel creates space for Erdoğan to cast Turkey as a central diplomatic and political actor. By inserting itself into moments of crisis, Ankara can seek to elevate its role as a regional power broker.

 

Washington should intensify enforcement against Iran-linked financial networks in Turkey. This includes targeting exchange houses, front companies, and urging Ankara to shut down sanctioned entities, such as Bank Mellat. The Treasury and Justice departments should be prepared to invoke Section 311 of the Patriot Act to designate institutions like Kuveyt Türk as primary money-laundering concerns. This would cut them off from the U.S. financial system and send a clear signal: No bank — Turkish or otherwise — can use American financial channels to fund Iranian terror without consequence.

Tuesday, September 3, 2024

How Crypto and U.S. Allies Ensure Hamas Remains Well-Funded

Jim Geraghty

Tuesday, September 03, 2024

 

About two weeks ago, Jonathan Polin and Rachel Goldberg-Polin, parents of 23-year-old Israeli-American hostage Hersh Goldberg-Polin, gave a speech on the third night of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago:

 

Among the hostages are eight American citizens. One of those Americans is our only son. His name is Hersh. He’s 23 years old, and like Vice President Kamala Harris, Hersh was born in Oakland, California.

 

On Oct. 7, Hersh and his best friend, Honor, went to a music festival in the south of Israel. It was advertised as celebrating peace, love, and unity. They also went to celebrate Hersh’s 23rd birthday. As rockets began to fall, Hersh, Honor, and 27 other young festival-goers took refuge in a 5-foot-by-8-foot bomb shelter. Terrorists began to throw grenades into the shelter.

 

Hersh’s left forearm — his dominant arm — was blown off before he was loaded onto a pick-up truck and stolen from his life, and me, and Jon, into Gaza. And that was 320 days ago.

 

Last Thursday night, the Democratic presidential nominee briefly addressed the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, and emphasized that no matter what, “We have got to get a deal done”:

 

BASH: President Biden has tried unsuccessfully to end the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. He’s been doing it for months and months, along with you. Would you do anything differently? For example, would you withhold some U.S. weapons shipments to Israel? That’s what a lot of people on the progressive left want you to do.

 

HARRIS: Let me be very clear. I’m unequivocal and — and unwavering in my commitment to Israel’s defense and its ability to defend itself. And that’s not gonna change. But let’s take a step back. October 7, 1,200 people are massacred, many young people who are simply attending a musical festival. Women were horribly raped. As I said then, I say today, Israel had a right — has a right to defend itself. We would. And how it does so matters. Far too many innocent Palestinians have been killed. And we have got to get a deal done. We — we were in Doha. We have to get a deal done. This war must end—

 

BASH: And in the meantime—

 

HARRIS: And we must get a deal that is about getting the hostages out. I’ve met with the families of the American hostages. Let’s get the hostages out. Let’s get the ceasefire done.

 

BASH: But no change in policy in terms of arms and — and so forth?

 

HARRIS: No. I — we have to get a deal done. Dan — Dana, we have to get a deal done. When you look at the significance of this to the families, to the people who are living in that region — it — a deal is not only the right thing to do to end this war but will unlock so much of what must happen next. I remain committed since I’ve been on October 8 to what we must do to work toward a two-state solution where Israel is secure and in equal measure the Palestin — the Palestinians have security and self-determination and — and dignity.

 

That interview was taped Thursday afternoon and aired that evening. Sometime between Thursday and Friday, Hamas took six of the hostages, including Hersh Goldberg-Polin, and executed them “using multiple close-range gunshots,” according to Israel’s Ministry of Health. A Hamas spokesman said that in the aftermath of a successful hostage rescue in Nuseirat, “new instructions were issued to the Mujahideen assigned to guard the prisoners regarding dealing with them if the occupation army approached their place of detention.” In other words, if Hamas operatives believe a rescue attempt is imminent, they are instructed to execute the hostages.

 

“I’ve worked tirelessly to bring Hersh home,” President Biden said in a released statement from his Rehoboth Beach house.

 

Harris’s released statement Saturday was better and angrier, a quiet call for regime change in the Gaza Strip:

 

Hamas is an evil terrorist organization. With these murders, Hamas has even more American blood on its hands. I strongly condemn Hamas’ continued brutality, and so must the entire world. From its massacre of 1,200 people to sexual violence, taking of hostages, and these murders, Hamas’ depravity is evident and horrifying. The threat Hamas poses to the people of Israel — and American citizens in Israel — must be eliminated and Hamas cannot control Gaza. The Palestinian people too have suffered under Hamas’ rule for nearly two decades.

 

The administration’s position is that “Hamas must be eliminated” and “Hamas cannot control Gaza,” but Israeli military forces must not enter Rafah and the administration has been negotiating with Hamas, fruitlessly, since the beginning of the year. Apparently, the idea is that the Palestinian people in Gaza are supposed to desire new leadership, while the U.S. pressures Israel to give Hamas a better deal. Why would the Palestinians want to get rid of Hamas, when Hamas has figured out how to get the Biden administration to act as its agent, negotiating on its behalf with Israel?

 

There is no deal to be reached with Hamas.

 

I don’t doubt that Biden and Harris want the hostages released. But they have this blind faith that some combination of incentives and Israeli concessions will get the leaders of Hamas to see reason and release the hostages. They imagine a Hamas leadership that is full of rational, good-faith negotiators.

 

The evidence that we have indicates that the leaders of Hamas are sadistic maniacs who cannot be cajoled into ceasing barbaric behavior that comes as naturally to them as breathing.

 

Hamas runs, in significant part, on foreign money — some from Iran that is difficult to block, but also some from donors in other countries, some knowingly, some unknowingly financing terrorism.

 

From the Treasury Department’s assessment of foreign terrorism financing, published in February:

 

The group’s primary external funding comes from Iran, which has provided it roughly $100 million per year. Hamas also generates of revenue from an expansive and sophisticated international investment portfolio, previously estimated to be worth at least $500 million. This investment portfolio has invested in companies and assets located across the world, including in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Türkiye, and the UAE, and is managed by Hamas’ Investment Office In addition, Hamas relies on a global fundraising network to raise funds for its nefarious activities. Hamas is prolific in soliciting donations from witting and unwitting donors worldwide in both fiat and virtual assets.

 

Hamas facilitators have used numerous methods to collect and transfer funds into the Gaza Strip. These include crowdfunding websites and sham charities, where in some cases, the destination of the funds was concealed under the guise of humanitarian efforts. In other cases, they solicited funds directly for their cause from sympathetic donors. Hamas has also used complicit VASPs [virtual asset service providers – basically, digital asset banks] and money transmitters throughout the globe to move funds. In the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks, Treasury designated a Gaza-based VASP called Buy Cash Money and Money Transfer Company for serving as a key node in Hamas’s virtual asset fundraising schemes. The same entity has also been identified as being involved with funds transfers on behalf of other terrorist groups.

 

Hamas’s global financial footprint and use of the regulated international financial system means that its facilitators likely have access to the U.S. financial system, particularly as Hamas has sought to raise funds from international supporters. U.S. persons have been convicted of providing or conspiring to provide material support to Hamas from the United States in recent years. After the October 2023 terrorist attacks, Hamas supporters around the world mobilized global fundraising efforts on behalf of the group. These online fundraisers took various forms, often seeking to collect money on crowdfunding sites under the guise of charitable donations for Gaza.

 

Hamas is not designated a terrorist group in Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Turkey, or the United Nations. This gives the group quite a few banking and financial options. (In case you’re wondering if this is part of Switzerland’s longstanding neutrality, note that the country does designate al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as terrorist organizations.) The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and the UAE) also do not consider Hamas a terrorist organization, but back in 2016, the GCC countries did designate Hezbollah as a terrorist group.

 

The Biden administration could do some more arm-twisting of these allies, pointing out that they’re willing to classify Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as terrorists, but not Hamas.

 

In particular, The Economist noted last November that one of the key countries for financing Hamas’s operations is our NATO ally, Turkey:

 

Israel’s declared goal of destroying Hamas for good requires its financial base to be dismantled, too. Very little of this sits in Gaza. Instead, it is overseas in friendly countries. Furnished with money-launderers, mining companies and much else, Hamas’s financial empire is reckoned to bring in more than $1bn a year. Having been painstakingly crafted to avoid Western sanctions, it may be out of reach for Israel and its allies. . . .

 

Today, while Hamas’s politicians favor Doha, the capital of Qatar, and its companies range from Algeria and Sudan to the UAE, its financiers live in Istanbul. Zaher Jabarin, accused by Israel of running Hamas’s finances (which he denies), is based there, as are several other individuals under sanctions by America for funding the organization. Eager to garner regional influence by supporting the Palestinian cause, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, offers shelter. Israel says that the Turkish government hands out passports (which it denies) and lets Hamas keep an office in the country.

 

Meanwhile, Turkey’s banking system helps Hamas dodge American sanctions by conducting complex transactions across the world. A booming, lightly regulated crypto market makes things even easier. Many of Turkey’s biggest banks, including Kuveyt Turk, have been accused by Israel and America of knowingly storing Hamas’s cash. Some murmur that Mr Erdogan quietly approves. In 2021 the Financial Action Task Force, a G7 watchdog, placed Turkey on its “grey list” of countries doing too little to freeze terrorists’ assets.

 

Last year, the U.S provided $196 million in assistance to Turkey, mostly humanitarian assistance. This is separate from the $23 billion sale of new F-16s and upgrades to existing jets that also went to Turkey.

 

In April, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan addressed his country’s parliament and declared, “While everyone else remained silent, we defined Hamas as a resistance movement, not a terror group.” The audience responded with chants of “death to Israel.”

 

President Biden invited Erdoğan to the White House this spring, but the visit was postponed. At the NATO summit in July, Biden greeted Erdoğan, and was effusive about the Turkish government dropping its opposition to admitting Sweden to NATO:

 

Mr. President, it’s good to see you again — delighted to be with you. And, you know, we’re at this historic summit meeting. We’re resolving a lot of things, I hope.

 

And you made — you made all the more historic by the agreement you reached yesterday in the admission of Sweden and how you’re going to proceed. I want to thank you for your diplomacy and your courage to take that on. And I want to thank you for your leadership, Mr. President.

 

Also in July, in an interview with Newsweek at the NATO summit, Erdoğan accused the U.S. of being complicit in Israeli human-rights violations.

 

Turkey has always been a complicated U.S. ally, but its ability to encompass so many contradictions — to be the home base of Hamas’s financiers and to get nine-figure sums in foreign aid and to denounce the U.S. as complicit in genocide and to get sweet U.S arms-sales deals is amazing.

Tuesday, January 16, 2024

‘Footballing While Jewish’ and Other Crimes

By Seth Mandel

Monday, January 15, 2024

 

The aftermath of Oct. 7 has cured the Jewish community of any expectation of “solidarity,” but even by our new and extremely low standards, the fact that the world is retaliating against all things Jewish or Israeli ought to elicit a bit more outrage. It calls into question whether there really is such a concept as “the least someone can do” if we just expect everyone to do nothing.

 

Last week the International Ice Hockey Federation announced that Israel’s under-20 men’s team would be barred from its upcoming tournament in Bulgaria over “security concerns.” Meaning: The IIHF knows that Jews are targets and it does not have the desire to protect them or other players from potential attacks. All that cost, paperwork, you know how it is.

 

The NHL, North America’s pro league, had some concerns:  “As we understand it, the decision is intended to be temporary in nature and rests solely on the IIHF’s overriding concern for the safety and security of all of its stakeholders, including both the Israeli National Team and other participating teams. Importantly, we also have been assured that the decision is not intended to be a sanction against the Israeli Federation and will not affect the Israeli Federation’s status as a full member in good standing with the IIHF.”

 

Ah, well, in that case, gee, how wonderful. I mean, if it’s not intended to be a sanction, and banning the Jews is only temporary, we can all rest easy. Come March and April, Israel’s teams may very well be permitted to again play international hockey. We’ll see how it goes.

 

On Monday, Israeli-born soccer star Sagiv Jehezkel returned home to Israel to great fanfare. He had been playing for a Turkish professional team before he suddenly had to flee the country after scoring a goal. Usually that’s a good thing in soccer. But Jehezkel showed the camera that he’d written “100 days” with a Star of David on his wrist, to let the hostages know he hasn’t forgotten them. He was immediately arrested. Perhaps the Hamas-backing Turkish government might have arrested and deported him for his own safety? Surely Recep Erdogan deserves the same benefit of the doubt we clearly reserve for the International Ice Hockey Federation.

 

David Teeger wasn’t arrested or deported. But the under-19 captain of South Africa’s cricket team is no longer the captain. Cricket South Africa “has decided that David should be relieved of the captaincy for the tournament.” Why? Because he’s Jewish, and you know how people can be about the Jews: “We have been advised that protests related to the war in Gaza can be anticipated at the venues for the tournament. We have also been advised that they are likely to focus on … David Teeger.”

 

South Africa, you’ll note, is the country currently prosecuting Israel for genocide. Perhaps the country hasn’t come as far as some thought.

 

You’d be surprised how sensitive people can be about the possibility they or their family will accidentally see or hear a Jewish person. Last month the Telegraph reported that British Airways had decided to “pause” a plan to include the Jewish sitcom Hapless in its in-flight entertainment offerings just after Oct. 7. The airline didn’t want to “take sides.” The Telegraph had seen the internal messages confirming the airline’s decision.

 

The series they chose not to show is about a Jewish newspaper in London. I don’t know how to pretend this decision isn’t completely insane.

 

“Pause” is a word that comes up a lot these days in the post-Oct. 7 entertainment industry. Haaretz reports that “Netflix has hit the pause button on broadcasting several Israeli series. One of them is the action drama ‘Border Patrol,’ which it acquired in September following its premiere on the Hot cable TV channel. Another is the original Israeli comedy drama ‘Through Fire and Water,’ created by Hanan Savion and Guy Amir, which was scheduled to premiere on Netflix in early November but was postponed.” A third series was put on ice by Netflix shortly after.

 

Producers told Haaretz that European companies were more easily spooked by their association with Israel than American ones were. Some told Israeli producers, “we have to stop and wait for better days.”

 

Perhaps after some time has gone by, everyone will be more comfortable watching actors portray Jewish characters, or playing hockey or soccer or cricket with Jewish athletes. I don’t think we have much to worry about, though: No one seems particularly bothered by it all, at all.

Friday, April 14, 2023

Erdoğan Faces an Electoral Abyss

By Charlotte Lawson

Thursday, April 13, 2023

 

ISTANBUL—Millions of young Turkish voters heading to the polls next month will face a momentous question: Should they fire the only national leader they’ve ever known? President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is staring down his biggest political challenge in 20 years, and his opponents quietly worry that if they don’t prevail in the upcoming election, the window of opportunity will close for good.

 

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu—a soft-spoken, 74-year-old former bureaucrat—at first glance seems like an unlikely political revolutionary, but he currently leads the polls, even if by a razor-thin margin. Backed by a six-party alliance, the longtime head of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) hopes to restore Turkey’s parliamentary system and reverse Erdoğan’s effective one-man rule. It’s a tall order, even with Erdoğan facing myriad domestic crises and a reinvigorated opposition.

 

Erdoğan took power in 2003, winning over Turkey’s conservative masses with promises to promote Islam and alleviate poverty. Ambitious infrastructure projects and sweeping social welfare programs solidified the popularity of his Justice and Development Party (AKP) early on. Nationalist fervor—with its focus on external enemies—helped the embattled president recover in popularity more recently. But as more Turks look inward for the source of their troubles, the government has responded by rolling back political freedoms.

 

First as Turkey’s prime minister and later as its president, Erdoğan has been at the forefront of this democratic backslide. A failed coup in 2016 allowed him to seize wide-ranging emergency powers and jail political rivals, and, a year later, push a constitutional amendment through parliament to dissolve the already-weakened premiership. As the country’s sole executive, Erdoğan has exercised nearly unbridled control over the country’s media outlets, central bank, courts, and, crucially, election officials. 

 

The main alliance challenging Erdoğan’s reign—the so-called “table of six”—is incredibly diverse, including liberals, Islamists, nationalists, and conservatives. That ideological diversity is both a strength and a weakness. 

 

Debates over who to champion the shaky coalition nearly sank it last month, when the head of the nationalist IYI party withdrew from the table before being reluctantly called back hours before Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy was announced. Many opposition officials and supporters worried about the diminutive opposition leader’s electability, pointing to the popular mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, Ekrem Imamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, as stronger contenders. The alliance ultimately settled on running the mayors as vice presidential candidates.

 

Sneeringly branded “Mr. Kemal” by Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu is now embracing the modest public image that nearly kept him off the ticket. Speaking directly to voters from his kitchen, Kılıçdaroğlu presents himself as the foil to his charismatic, populist opponent, merging bread-and-butter issues with broader concerns over the fate of Turkey’s democracy. Rather than promoting efficient governance, he argues, Erdoğan’s consolidated leadership has given way to economic disrepair and widespread corruption. 

 

February’s earthquakes strengthened the case against the hyper-centralized system. In the aftermath of the disaster, which killed at least 50,000 people and displaced millions, critics blamed the government for the shoddy construction that led to the sky-high death toll and the slow response time of rescue teams that left thousands trapped beneath the rubble. Erdoğan’s popularity took a dip. 

 

But the structure of Turkey’s elections make dislodging Erdoğan more difficult, even at this point of relative weakness. A recent survey by Turkey Report, an Istanbul-based polling firm, put Kılıçdaroğlu at a more than 8-point advantage over the incumbent in a head-to-head race. “He’s faring well, particularly because he has the two mayors on the ticket as VPs,” Can Selcuki, Turkey Report’s director, said in an interview. 

 

Yet Turkey’s presidential elections use a runoff voting system wherein winning the first round requires Kılıçdaroğlu to garner more than 50 percent of the total vote—a requirement complicated by two splinter candidates, Muharrem İnce and Sinan Oğan. Rumors abound about their alleged AKP funding or social media support. 

 

Taking into account undecideds, splinter candidates, and protests votes, the Ankara-based Metropoll gave Kılıçdaroğlu a slim 1.5 lead over Erdoğan in the first round of voting. This margin is “not safe,” Metropoll chief Ozer Sencar told The Dispatch. “We can’t know what kind of irregularities might happen.”

 

Erdoğan’s opponents worry that a tight race will open the door to government interference, as it appeared to during the 2019 municipal elections. After Imamoğlu narrowly beat Erdoğan’s handpicked candidate for Istanbul mayor in 2019, for example, a partisan election commission canceled the results and called a repeat election, which Imamoğlu won by nearly ten points. A similar story played out the same year in the municipality of Honaz, where CHP-backed Yüksel Kepenek saw his mayoral victory overturned before winning in a repeat race.

 

“In Turkey we have democracy, so 50 percent plus one should be enough to win the elections. But now we have to open the gap, it seems,” Kepenek said. “If something like this happens again, it would really hurt democracy.” 

 

The opposition is now focused on reassuring voters going into Election Day and plans to deploy monitors to voting stations across Turkey. Worries about voter intimidation and fraud remain, but Erdoğan’s opponents know better than to play them up. “If we say that it won’t be fair elections, people lose their hope and don’t go to vote,” said Selçuk Sarıyar, Istanbul’s deputy mayor. “Of course we know that the current ruling party will play all his cards, in legal or illegal ways or in ethical or unethical ways.”

 

This is of particular concern in heavily Kurdish areas, where Turkey’s largest ethnic minority has long faced varying degrees of voter suppression. Kurds account for roughly 20 percent of the country’s population, making them a crucial swing vote in any Turkish election but particularly in the tight presidential race next month. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) typically runs its own presidential candidate, but recently decided not to put forth a contender in a huge boon to the opposition’s first-round chances. 

 

“In the presidential elections, we will carry out our responsibility against the one-man rule,” HDP co-leader Pervin Buldan said last month in announcing the decision, though she stopped short of explicitly backing the table of six. 

 

Despite casting the AKP as peacemaker in Turkey’s longstanding conflict with its Kurdish population at the start of his presidency, Erdoğan has all but lost the support of the minority group. He’s jailed thousands of Kurdish political figures, including HDP co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş, in what critics decry as politically-motivated detentions. There’s also an ongoing legal case to bar the HDP, the Turkish parliament’s third-largest party, from national elections entirely. The main opposition hopes it can pull in the large Kurdish voter base in the presidential race—but it needs to tread lightly to avoid losing the support of nationalists in the mainstream Turkish electorate.

 

Because Kılıçdaroğlu hails from the Alevi community—another persecuted minority group—some political analysts consider him uniquely suited to bridge the ethnic divides. He recently visited Urfa to meet Emine Senyasar, a Kurdish woman who claims her family members were killed by people close to the AKP but says she’s unable to get legal recourse in the AKP-controlled judicial system. Erdoğan, meanwhile, has attacked Kılıçdaroğlu’s six-party alliance for having what he says is a seventh partner “hiding under the table”—the HDP, which he and other Turkish politicians accuse of working with the militant Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). 

 

Going after Turkey’s Kurds is one way Erdoğan stirs up nationalist sentiment to win over voters. The other is taking shots at the West.

 

Erdoğan this month urged his supporters to “teach America a lesson” by voting AKP in the upcoming election following a meeting between Kılıçdaroğlu and U.S. Amb. Jeff Flake, adding: “Our doors are now closed to him. You cannot see [me] anymore.” In February, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu accused Flake of trying to stage a coup, telling him to “get your dirty hands off Turkey.” 

 

This anti-Western rhetoric makes its way into Turkey’s foreign policymaking, where Erdoğan continues to block Sweden’s NATO bid over its alleged support for the PKK and picks fights with its neighbor and fellow NATO member Greece. At the same time, he’s forged close bonds with President Vladimir Putin and helped Russia get around Western-led sanctions. 

 

“This is a very consequential election, for Turkey but also for the global balance of power. Erdoğan has led Turkey for 20 years, increasingly positioning Turkey as a non-aligned country that pursues its strategic autonomy,” Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, told The Dispatch. “He’s not shy about it. He believes that Turkey should have a foot in each camp.”

 

The opposition promises better relations with the West, or, at the very least, more predictability in its approach to foreign policymaking. Ünal Çeviköz, Kılıçdaroğlu’s main foreign policy adviser, hopes to revive Turkey’s bid to join the European Union and clear the way for Sweden’s entry into NATO if the six-party alliance prevails next month. But Kılıçdaroğlu’s promise to respect human rights and political freedoms at home is perhaps the most encouraging signal to the U.S. and its international allies. 

 

“Washington is increasingly seeing the current systemic competition with China and Russia as the fight between autocracies and democracies. On this, just as it is on other geopolitical issues, Turkey is in the middle,” Aydıntaşbaş said. “A return to rule of law, a return to democracy would provide Turkish citizens a little more breathing space, but it would also give the world a huge win in this struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.”

 

Of the 62 million Turkish citizens who will be eligible to vote next month, some 6 million of them will be casting ballots for the first time. For some, it could also be the last time, as young people in cities and towns across Turkey quietly discuss plans to leave the country if Erdoğan wins again.

 

Sarıyar, the Istanbul deputy mayor, hopes they’ll exercise their political freedom next month before resigning to life without it: “We’ll select if we want to live in democracy or under autocracy.”

Wednesday, February 1, 2023

Last Call in Brussels

By Kevin D. Williamson

Monday, January 30, 2023

 

Sweden and Finland want to be in NATO. NATO mostly likes this idea, but Turkey is standing in the way. Which raises the obvious question:

 

Why is Turkey still in NATO? 

 

In a very diplomatic column for Bloomberg, former NATO Supreme Commander James Stavridis writes:

 

Sweden has a high-tech military and produces the fifth-generation Saab Gripen fighters, which I was thrilled to have in our operations over Libya. The Finns, a nation of only five million, can put hundreds of thousands of well-trained and fully equipped ground combat forces in the field in a matter of weeks. We want them on our team.

 

At some point soon, some NATO members are going to begin asking, “If it is a choice between Sweden/Finland and Turkey, maybe we should look at our options.” That would be a mistake. Turkey boasts the second-largest army in NATO, has important facilities including Incirlik Air Base, and hosts NATO’s overall land-warfare command in Izmir.

 

NATO needs Turkey to continue being an active and positive member. It also needs to add Finland and Sweden. No one wants to have to choose between them. It’s up to Erdogan to ensure that doesn’t have to happen.

 

This is partly sensible and risk-averse thinking, which is to be encouraged. But it also is partly wishful thinking. Reread these sentences: “At some point soon, some NATO members are going to begin asking, ‘If it is a choice between Sweden/Finland and Turkey, maybe we should look at our options.’ That would be a mistake.” 

 

What, exactly, is the mistake? Is the mistake suggesting that “we should look at our options,” or is the mistake asking if it is a choice between Sweden/Finland and Turkey? I cannot see how either of those is a mistake. This isn’t a lark on Turkey’s part—Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been pursuing this NATO-hamstringing policy for a good long while now, and there is no reason at this point to suppose he doesn’t mean to keep it up. It is entirely sensible to ask the question of whether Turkey is going to make this an “us or them” issue. In fact, one might reasonably make the case that, in acting as it has, Turkey already has put NATO in that position, effectively. And if Turkey is putting NATO in that position, then it cannot be a mistake to “look at our options.” 

 

James Stavridis holds a doctorate from the Fletcher School and presumably is capable of writing just what he means. So, whence these meaningless proclamations? It is difficult to believe that he has not thought this through—he is a very intelligent and capable man. One suspects that he is having some trouble saying what he means because he does not wish to say what is plain, what everybody knows: If Turkey is going to make this a choice between the Nordic candidates and the backsliding autocracy of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then the right thing for NATO—and for the world—is to let Turkey be Turkey and let NATO be NATO. 

 

One of the things NATO is, or is supposed to be, is an alliance that “promotes democratic values.” Turkey under Erdoğan can hardly be said to be a country that “promotes democratic values”—Erdoğan is, in fact, one of the world’s most important enemies of democratic values and liberal norms, in his way a more significant enemy of these than the rulers of Russia or China, from whom no one has ever expected anything else. Turkey once was a liberal-democratic success story, albeit one with some important limitations. It is today a liberal-democratic cautionary tale, the moral of which is that there are no permanent victories for liberty or democracy. 

 

NATO has serious challenges in front of it—now, not at some distant point in a hypothetical future. The last thing it needs is to be held hostage by a regime that has a lot more in common with the one in Moscow than it does with the ones in Washington or London—or in Helsinki or Stockholm. As Stavridis writes, this is, ultimately, a choice for Erdoğan. But NATO should make it clear to Turkey exactly what the stakes here are. There is no formal mechanism for expelling a NATO member, but, as a practical matter, there are ways to show Turkey the door. It may not yet be time for last call in Brussels, but the clock is ticking.  

 

Economics for English Majors: Marj in Charge

 

Whose deficits? 

 

Of all the superstitions and legends that infest U.S. politics—that foreign aid is a big item on the federal budget, that tax cuts or infrastructure spending “pay for themselves,” that the Social Security “trust fund” is something other than a figure of speech—the most destructive may be the myth that the president, in addition to being responsible for the overall state of the economy, has some special responsibility for budget deficits. We hear about the “Reagan deficits” and the “Clinton surplus,” and we talk about how the debt grew this much under Barack Obama and that much under Donald Trump, and then will grow by x under Joe Biden. 

 

This is, of course, pure nonsense. Presidents deliver budgets to Congress, Congress laughs at them, and then goes about exercising its own constitutional duty and power of appropriating spending and collecting taxes. It doesn’t do that in the right way—meaning “regular order”—but it does it nonetheless, through omnibus bills and continuing resolutions and whatnot. Even when presidents are members of the party that controls Congress, the actual package of taxes and spending rarely looks anything like what the president submitted to Congress, usually with great fanfare. Donald Trump’s budget, for example, called for the elimination of spending on several agencies and projects, including the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Appalachian Regional Commission, and the Neighborhood Investment Corporation—all of which are still truckin’ along, doing what they do. 

 

It would be interesting, if only as an exercise, for Kevin McCarthy and the House Republicans to pretend to believe the things they say, if only for a day, and draw up a real, honest-to-goodness balanced budget. Even better, they could pretend, if only for a day, to be mentally mature, responsible, patriotic adults who can account for the fact that there is a Democratic president and a Democrat-controlled Senate, that Democrats are not going away, and that any real, meaningful, stable, long-term fiscal reform is going to have to be a genuinely bipartisan compromise with broad buy-in on both sides of the aisle. 

 

Impossible, you say? 

 

Consider the case of Ronald Reagan. President Reagan did not hand Congress a budget that Congress then enacted—and, unlike Trump, he never had a Republican-controlled Congress to grease the legislative skids for his agenda. Reagan had a Republican Senate at the beginning of his term and a Democratic Senate at the end, but, more important, he had a Democratic House under the speakership of Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, a vicious partisan and a canny politician who enjoyed the longest continuous tenure of any speaker (only Sam Rayburn and Henry Clay served more total years in their multiple terms; “Mister Sam,” as Rayburn was known, was still speaker at the time of his death.) You’ll sometimes hear the Reagan-O’Neill relationship held up as an example of how Washington used to be a less dysfunctional place than it is now, some twaddle about two Irish-American pols who could do battle all day and then have a friendly drink together. Don’t believe a word of it: They hated each other—and Reagan, a famously aloof man even among his friends, wasn’t a friendly-drink kind of guy. Jay Nordlinger has the receipts, as the kids say.

 

The thing is, that relationship did produce some reasonably good policy results. In spite of what you hear about “Reagan deficits,” in 1982 the deficit had been 3.9 percent of GDP, but by 1989 it was down to 2.7 percent of GDP. Federal spending was 22.5 percent of GDP in 1982 and 20.6 percent in 1989—a measly 1.9-percent reduction may not look like a lot, but it is a lot when you are talking about the GDP of the United States. Taxes as a share of GDP went down a bit during that time (from 18.6 percent in 1982 to 17.8 percent in 1989) but stayed within the usual range of the postwar era—for all the talk of Reagan’s purportedly savage tax cuts (and who writes the tax bills?) taxes as a share of GDP in 1989 were higher than they were in the Eisenhower years, famous for that 91-percent top rate. 

 

Federal spending went up during those years, from $745.7 billion in 1982 to $1.143 trillion in 1989, but the modest reforms that were worked out during those years put the country on a better fiscal path than it had been and encouraged solid economic growth—which makes every other economic burden easier to bear. 

 

(Figures here.)

 

It wasn’t economic nirvana, by any stretch, and some of those reforms happened in spite of Reagan’s best efforts—for example, Reagan agreed to a modest tax increase in exchange for future spending cuts that never came. 

 

Which is to say: Reagan never got the budget he wanted, but he did get some good outcomes even though the House of Representatives was at the time run by a guy who would make Nancy Pelosi look like Paul Ryan. (That’s kind of a hard comparison to write, inasmuch as Trump-era Republicans despise Paul Ryan with more urgent intensity than anything they could work up for Nancy Pelosi. But you know what I mean.) And that wasn’t because Reagan had a lot of gooey good feelings about bipartisanship and compromise and such—he was a conservative and, as such, felt obliged to deal with the world as it is rather than as he wished it might be. 

 

Republicans currently control the most important budget-control organ in Washington: the House of Representatives. 

 

House Republicans are demanding spending cuts. Alrighty—what? “I haven’t really formulated an exact list,” said Cletus the Slack-Jawed Yokel Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, the manic QAnon kook from Georgia. Surprise. Somebody remind the gentlewoman from Georgia that her job is precisely this stuff—not being a Fox News panelist. The people of this republic have, for whatever reason, entrusted the national purse strings to such creatures as Kevin McCarthy and Marjorie Taylor Greene—fine, whatever, democracy can be a bitch. These people say they want spending cuts—also, fine, great, better than great: I want spending cuts, too. 

 

What did you have in mind, Republicans? 

 

So far, their answer is that they’ll cut spending as long as that doesn’t mean cutting spending: They say that cuts to defense spending and entitlements are off the table—i.e., the great majority of spending is off the table. Add in the politically untouchable expenditures for veterans’ benefits and the one bill that actually does have to be paid—interest on the existing debt—and you have taken enough spending off the table that you couldn’t balance the budget even if you cut everything else to $0.00. 

 

“Put up or shut up,” they say. But I am a dreamer, and I say we can have both: Put up and shut up—stop with the ridiculous Fox News posturing and do your damned jobs. 

 

Words About Words: Doom and Gloom

 

Yes, we are doomed. And that’s okay!

 

Doom in our time has taken on the connotation of something dreadful, final, and ruinous. Naturally, this has its roots in the tax code. 

 

Doom comes from a very ancient set of words meaning something like “right order” or “put in its proper place.” From this, doom came to mean rules, laws, the administration of justice, that sort of thing. A law book in Old English is a domboc. To doom someone was to subject them to judgment, particularly judgment under law—the sense of judgment survives in the modern English deem. The sense of fateful finality comes from the use of the word doom in its sense of judgment in the Last Judgment of Christian belief. 

 

And it is here that the taxman enters the story—you can have the end of the world, sure, but not until the taxman gets his cut. 

 

When William the Conqueror came to power (Battle of Hastings, 1066 and all that) one of his first orders of business was putting together a comprehensive list of property for his tax rolls. The resulting volume (two volumes, actually) was known as the Liber de Wintonia, or “Book of Winchester,” named for the location of the royal treasury. Because the judgments in the book were deemed (deemed!) as final and unalterable as God’s pronouncements at the Last Judgment, the register was nicknamed the Domesday Book (the two volumes were the Greater Domesday and the Little Domesday) though probably not until a century or so after it was compiled. A great deal of what we know about life in England and Wales at that time is thanks to the Domesday Book—in fact, no comparably ambitious inventory was attempted again until the 19th century. 

 

So doom, then, is associated with the two inevitabilities: death and taxes. But doom need not mean something terrible–only one’s fate. It could be a good fate–a happy doom, even though the words sound weird put together that way. 

 

Some of the saintlier people among us will be all too happy to go to their doom, to their judgment. “Justice is what you are threatened with!” thunders Thomas Cromwell in A Man for All Seasons, to which the sainted Thomas More responds: “Then I am not threatened.” That confidence is admirable. As for me—I will be glad to have an Advocate when the time comes. 

 

But, in any case, I am not eager to sit in judgment over anybody—I just went to some trouble to get out of jury duty. I may be in the gloom business, but I am not in the doom business. 

 

In other language bidness, a reader writes:

 

The following sentence appeared in a Boston Globe article this morning. From the context, it’s clear that the writer meant to praise New England Patriot QB Brian Hoyer by pointing out that “his leadership as a veteran voice can’t be understated,” which, of course, means precisely the opposite of what was intended. You see this mistake made all the time. Is there a name for it? Why is this so hard to get right?

 

I don’t know if there is a name for this trouble—I’m going to call it the “Kantian backflip,” the conflation of ought with can. “Ought implies can,” the proverb goes, meaning that to say somebody ought to do something implies that they can do that thing, the converse being that it is meaningless to insist that somebody should do something that he cannot do. 

 

What the Boston Globe writer meant to say was that Hoyer’s leadership ought not be understated, not that it cannot be understated. Meaning that it is significant and considerable to such an extent that we might hyperbolically claim that it is impossible to overstate how important it is—i.e., no description of its importance, no matter how grandiose or superlative, would amount to an overstatement of the facts. 

 

When I taught writing, one of the things I always told my students was—obvious as it sounds—to read the words they have written, as they are written, literally. This will save a great deal of trouble: For example, you will not write “I could care less” when you mean “I could not care less” if you will take the time to read the words and think about what they actually mean. Students would sometimes ask me about writing style, and some would insist, in their delusion, that they had one. My advice to them was (and is) that they should learn to write sentences in which the words they write, in the order they are written, mean exactly what they wish to say. 

 

An additional thought: “Can’t be overstated” and “shouldn’t be understated” are kind of dumb constructions, certainly hackneyed. In most cases, there will be a better way to say what is intended, in part because “can’t be overstated” is rarely true. One might write, “Hayek’s contributions to the social sciences were enormously consequential,” but it would, in fact, be overstatement to write, “Hayek was obviously and unquestionably the most important thinker of the 20th century.” Top 10, I’d say, but there were some heavy hitters in those years! Einstein, Feynman, Planck, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Eliot, Coase, Buchanan. 

 

In Closing

 

History is very short, if you look at it the right way. Today on the liturgical calendar there are observances for several martyrs, including Saint Martina, the daughter of a Roman consul, martyred in A.D. 228, and Blessed Zygmunt Pisarski, who lived long enough to be photographed—he was one of the many Christian victims of the Nazis. Father Zygmunt was the priest of a Polish parish that had been persecuted by communists before the war, and, when the Germans arrived, the Gestapo wanted to know who these communists were. Father Zygmunt, knowing that the communists would be murdered if he named them, refused to tell the Germans what they wanted to know, and so they shot him—he died to save the lives of those who hated and reviled him, who would have done to him what the Gestapo did and worse had they been given half a chance. Who could be expected—who could expect himself—to do such a thing? I always cringe a little bit when people talk about what a “comforting” faith Christianity is.