By Robert D. Atkinson
Thursday, July 25, 2019
For most of our history Americans have supported
increased productivity, even if it led to economic disruption and worker
displacement. Unfortunately, over the last decade that support has weakened.
Productivity gains are now portrayed as a tool for greedy corporations to jack
up their profits at the expense of workers. Moreover, workers are now seen as
so fragile that all automation must be feared. So, rather than support
productivity, the dominant narrative favors redistribution and protection from
change.
The emergence of this new “productivity doesn’t benefit
workers” narrative matters because government policies in a wide array of areas
— from taxation to science to regulation — affect productivity growth for good
or ill. And if the view is that productivity gains are no longer widely shared
and that society should oppose job-displacing automation, support for growth
and progress will wither and be replaced by a focus on redistribution and
stasis.
Let’s start with the claim that productivity growth no
longer benefits workers. Thomas A. Kochan and Barbara Dyer write: “Productivity
growth — where workers produce increasing amounts of goods or services per work
hour — no longer drives pay.” American
Prospect editor David Dayen agrees: “Increased productivity and tight labor
markets should lead to higher wages. But in the U.S., wages for the typical
worker have been flat for four decades.”
This gloomy view can trace its source to work by
economists Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, who purported to show in 2014 that
U.S. median real-income growth declined by 8 percent between 1979 and 2014, a
period when labor productivity doubled. If this were true, people would be well
justified in turning their back on productivity.
But as labor economist Stephen Rose notes in a study for
the Urban Institute, the original Piketty and Saez work (2013) and its 2014
update suffer from a number of serious methodological problems, including
looking at individual tax files rather than those of households and not
including the value of rapidly growing employer-sponsored health care. It turns
out that measuring real-income growth is fraught with difficulties and
chock-full of assumptions. As Rose notes, different studies get different
answers because they use different definitions of income, adjustments for
inflation, and units of analysis. However, there is a methodology developed by
an international group of experts to measure the growth of income (the Canberra
method), and while no U.S. study has exactly met this standard, some have come
close. When Rose adjusts for these methodological differences he estimates that
real median income grew 43 percent over this period. The Congressional Budget
Office’s estimate is even higher, 51 percent. Even Piketty and Saez (with
co-author Gabriel Zucman) found in 2018 that using a more appropriate
methodology showed that median income grew by 33 percent. To be sure, this does
not mean that income inequality did not grow — it did — but 33 to 51 percent
growth in worker incomes is a far cry from an 8 percent decline.
One would expect the current narrative on this issue to
reflect updates from Piketty and Saez, and numerous other studies, that have
shown that the median worker still benefits from productivity growth. As John
Maynard Keynes famously stated after someone accused him of changing his view,
“When the facts change, I change my mind.” Apparently we are not all Keynesians
today. Consider David Leonhardt, a New
York Times economic columnist, who this year wrote that before the 1970s
workers enjoyed consistently rising wages but that now “profits have soared at
the expense of worker pay.” He adds: “The wealth of the median family today is
lower than two decades ago.” Leonhardt is not an outlier. Despite solid
evidence to the contrary, many people have made up their mind that productivity
doesn’t benefit most Americans and have turned to redistribution as the only
valid economic-policy goal.
If productivity still benefits the average worker, what
should government do to boost productivity growth, particularly in ways that
benefit the bottom half of earners?
Let’s start with what probably won’t work. Doing nothing
and leaving it only up to firms, as some on the right would counsel, won’t
work. To be sure, preventing regulation from squashing productivity-enhancing
innovations is important. But as I have written, when it comes to productivity
a host of market failures require smart government-policy responses. For
example, when firms buy new machinery and equipment they don’t capture all of
the benefits; some “spill over” to other firms and society. Consequently,
absent a tax code that incentivizes investment in new capital equipment and
software, firms will invest less than is societally optimal. Likewise, federal
funding for scientific and engineering research is a public good that can boost
productivity.
But focusing only on redistributing income — as many on
the left would counsel, in the mistaken belief that there is nothing government
can do to boost productivity — will also not work.
Neo-Keynesian economist Frank Levy argues: “We cannot
legislate the rate of productivity growth. . . . That is why equalizing
institutions are so important.” Such views are why so many on the left default
to a redistribution strategy, grounded in policies such as reducing taxes paid
by the bottom 80 percent of Americans while supporting more overtime pay,
profit-sharing, unionization, and subsidization of goods and services (from
housing to infrastructure to education). These Huey Long Democrats want to
govern on a share-the-wealth agenda, not a grow-the-pie agenda.
It’s time to break this stalemate and forge a bipartisan
consensus that holds that productivity is the most important goal of economic
policy and that the federal government should do more to spur productivity
growth. This should include more-generous tax incentives for investing in
research and development, capital equipment, and worker training; as well as
significant funding increases for research and development focused on areas
that will likely have high productivity payoffs (e.g., material sciences,
artificial intelligence, and robotics).
But while America desperately needs faster productivity
growth, if we want faster wage growth, especially for low- and moderate-income
workers, those who point to the growth of inequality are not completely wrong.
Policymakers do need to pay more attention to improving the earnings of these
workers. But automation, rather than being an obstacle, is a key to achieving
that goal. Here’s why.
Many agree that the emerging wave of technological
innovation in fields including robotics and artificial intelligence holds the
promise of boosting productivity. But this next wave will likely have
differential impacts on occupations. Estimates of the impact of these
technologies on occupations show that there is a significant negative
correlation between the average wage of an occupation and its risk of
automation. In other words, this next wave of innovation is more likely to
automate low-wage jobs than middle- and upper-wage jobs. If true, this means
that there will be a larger proportion of middle- and upper-wage jobs as
lower-wage jobs are automated at higher rates and therefore employ fewer
people. This would have the beneficial result of there being fewer lower-paying
jobs and more better-paying jobs — a plus for many workers now employed in
occupations whose productivity and wages remain low and stagnant. This means
that rather than protect lower-wage cashiers and toll-takers from automation we
should encourage more and faster automation so that we get more middle-wage
carpenters and sales reps.
But while automation is likely to be a progressive force,
policy can and should do more to ensure that lower-wage workers gain, including
increasing the federal minimum wage (which will have the added benefit of
spurring more automation of low-wage jobs), shifting support away from
four-year colleges that serve higher-income households and toward two-year
technical schools and other kinds of occupational training, and expanding
apprenticeship programs nationally.
Finally, what about job loss? Shouldn’t we be worried
about individuals’ losing their jobs, or even about the massive unemployment
that some have warned of? No, no, a thousand times no! No matter how many times
a purported expert claims we are facing an epochal technology revolution that
will destroy tens of millions of jobs and leave large swathes of human workers
permanently unemployed, it still isn’t true. The simple reason is that when
companies invest in robots, they usually cut costs and pass a significant share
of those savings to consumers in the form of lower prices (with some going to
workers as higher wages and to shareholders in the form of higher profits).
These savings are not buried, but rather are recycled. As they are spent or
invested, they create additional jobs.
While we won’t run out of work, a faster pace of
technological innovation and productivity will likely lead to increased
labor-market churn as some occupations decline (e.g., truck-driving) and others
grow (e.g., health-care work). This means that the challenge for policymakers
is not to slow down change or enact a wasteful universal-basic-income scheme,
but to put in place a more robust system to help workers make employment
transitions.
Still, at the end of the day, higher productivity is the
worker’s friend.
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