By Nick Catoggio
Friday, April 05, 2024
Imagine how baffled the casual American voter must have
felt on Thursday when the country’s best hope for a centrist third-party
presidential option officially threw
in the towel on the campaign.
In this year of all years.
The story of why No Labels believed it could mount a
credible independent candidacy is so simple that it can be told entirely with
numbers. First: Both major-party nominees are below
43 percent in favorability.
Second: The share of Americans who identify as
independent stands at
43 percent, a solid plurality of the total electorate and tied for an
all-time high.
Third: 63
percent of adults now say that the two major parties do such a poor
job of representing their interests that a third party is needed. That’s the
highest figure recorded by Gallup since it began asking the question in 2003.
There’s nothing complicated about this. The Democratic
incumbent is senescent, saddled with high inflation, and bizarrely indifferent
to a crisis at the border that’s dragged on for years. A majority of his own
voters think he’s too
old to serve effectively in a second term. The Republican challenger
is a coup-plotting lunatic so unbalanced that a judge in Manhattan had to formally
order him to stop obliquely threatening the judge’s own
daughter. Chances are fair that he’ll have a felony criminal record by
Election Day.
In this year of all years, there’s high demand
potentially for a serious third-party candidate. And where there’s high demand,
there should be an ample supply of ambitious politicians willing to satisfy it.
Even if the No Labels project were doomed to also-ran status, its nominee would
enjoy six months of steady national media coverage and the distinction of
having mounted the most formidable independent campaign since Ross Perot in
1992.
Instead, the group couldn’t persuade anyone to become its
candidate.
We’ve considered once before why
No Labels was doomed to failure, the fondest wishes of casual American
voters notwithstanding. But with 10 months of further reflection since then,
it’s worth revisiting the subject. How did this project fall so far short of
its ambitions that it failed to find a willing recipient for a gift-wrapped
spot on the national presidential ballot?
I think they misunderstood why Americans are drawn to
third parties in the first place.
***
There are certain prosaic reasons for why a third party
will always underperform in American elections. Some are structural: As my
colleagues at Dispatch Politics noted today,
our winner-take-all system makes it almost impossible for independent
presidential candidates to win electoral votes.
Others are psychological. Everyone loves the idea of a
third party in the abstract, when they’re free to ascribe their own pet policy
preferences to it. But once a candidate is chosen and proposes a platform of
his or her own, making the choice before voters concrete, the romance is
troubled. That platform will inevitably prove unacceptably right-wing to some
left-leaning voters and unacceptably left-wing to some right-leaning ones.
There’s nowhere to go in polling but down.
Name recognition is also a problem. Donald Trump and Joe
Biden are perhaps the two most famous men on Earth; unless a third party
recruits a mega-celebrity to run, its nominee is destined to seem obscure by
comparison and accordingly less worthy of the presidency. I admire Geoff
Duncan, the former lieutenant governor of Georgia, for his principled
conservative opposition to Trump, but as an independent candidate he would have
been little more than a generic receptacle for centrist malcontents to park protest
votes. And
he knew it.
What was strange and unique about No Labels as a
third-party effort, though, was that the group wasn’t primarily offering voters
a policy vision or even a feel-good populist vehicle. What it was offering
was normalcy, writ large. If you miss the days when the leaders of
the two parties got along, more or less, and felt obliged to try to compromise
for the sake of solving major problems as a matter of civic duty, boy, did they
have the ticket for you.
That pitch is understandable in light of the data I
presented earlier. But it’s also an odd place to be for a third party, which
typically presents itself as a break from normalcy.
“No more business as usual” is the standard rallying cry
for independents, underscoring their outsider status. That’s how Perot got
traction in 1992. In an election that pitted a Yale-educated centrist who
leaned right against a Yale-educated centrist who leaned left, Perot was the
brash Texan populist upstart who wanted to shake things up. He had his hobby
horses on policy, but I think he captured the public’s imagination mainly due
to—for lack of a better word—his anti-establishment vibes. There
would be no more business as usual under plain-spoken President Perot. A vote
for him was a vote for a pox on both the major parties’ houses.
Contrast that with the No Labels rallying cry, which was,
essentially, “let’s get back to business as usual.” Instead of seeking
outsiders to carry their message, they looked to seasoned insiders like Joe
Manchin and Larry Hogan. For them, bipartisanship in how the government is run
seemed to be as much an end in itself as the policies that such a bipartisan
government might produce. We don’t need a pox on both their houses, No Labels
seemed to be saying, we need to bring the two houses together.
That’s an unusual posture for a third party. The
Libertarian Party, for instance, has a very distinct policy vision that
motivates it to place a candidate on the ballot every four years. And with
respect to the two houses, they’re emphatically pro-pox.
In fairness, one can understand how “let’s get back to
business as usual” might sound anti-establishmentarian in an era dominated by
wacky populism and the reaction to it. If you want to shake things up in 2024,
preaching bipartisanship, compromise, and Third Way policies arguably radiates
stronger countercultural vibes than whatever the two parties
are offering. Now that abnormalcy has become business as usual in American
politics, a return to normalcy is the only way to break from it.
It’s a nice idea. But so long as voters’ appetite for
Trump remains high, there’s no space electorally for that sort of thing.
The reason No Labels could never find someone willing to
be its nominee is because each recruit came to recognize that competing for
“normalcy” votes meant competing chiefly with Joe Biden, not with Donald Trump.
A third-party campaign can gain traction when the stakes of an election are
low, as they were in 1992, since the cost of the other party winning is
minimal. If you liked Perot’s moxie, you could vote for him secure in the
knowledge that centrist Republican George H.W. Bush or centrist Democrat Bill
Clinton would end up running the country if your guy didn’t win.
A third-party campaign can’t get traction when the stakes of an election are high, though, as they are this year. The civic threat from the right is so great and so unusual that many voters who might have gambled on No Labels in a lower-stakes contest will default to Biden to maximize their chances of stopping it. He’s the normalcy candidate, unavoidably—as even the group’s executive director recognizes:
And insofar as Biden isn’t the normalcy candidate because his own presidency has led to some very abnormal economic developments in the context of recent American history, Trump is the normalcy candidate.
Getting back to “business as usual,” in short, means
either restoring the economy of 2019 or the pre-Trump constitutional baseline.
There’s no room for No Labels’ bipartisan version of the concept. By mounting a
campaign anyway, they would have guaranteed defeat for Biden and victory for
the most abnormal presidential figure in American history, a man overtly vowing
“retribution” against his political enemies upon his return to office.
Which would have been a weird legacy for a group
ostensibly dedicated to normalcy.
***
There was another problem for No Labels, an unexpected
one given how polarized Americans are over Trump and Biden. In theory that
polarization should have given the group a wide lane to run up the middle on
policy, staking out centrist positions to woo moderates alienated by the two
major-party nominees.
But in practice, the two major-party nominees are pretty
centrist themselves.
The great exception is immigration, of course, where the
divide is vast. But on many other issues, Trump has begun tacking
opportunistically toward the middle to court swing voters.
With respect to Israel, he’s moved toward the center by
supporting the counteroffensive in Gaza while taking care to
broadcast his discomfort with it.
With respect to abortion, he’s moved toward the center by
denouncing Florida’s six-week ban as a “terrible
thing” and appears poised to embrace a national 15-week
ban that would leave practically all terminations federally protected.
With respect to Obamacare, he’s moved toward the center
by abandoning the goal of repeal from his first term, now
hoping to make the law “much better, stronger, and far less expensive”
in his second.
With respect to entitlement reform and the federal debt,
Trump has been in the center since 2016. He won’t touch
either, a few mutterings about
waste, fraud, and abuse aside.
There are a handful of issues he won’t compromise on,
like the border, tariffs, making nice with autocrats, and the aforementioned
“retribution.” But practically everything else on the policy menu is fair game
for maneuvering, and why not? He commands his party with cultish authority,
which will minimize defections among his base over his new ideological
direction. And his turn to the middle appears to be earning him support from
disaffected working-class Democrats who are tired of their own party’s
ideological drift.
Trump’s brand of populism has triggered a national
realignment within the electorate that very plausibly might end up netting the
GOP votes on balance. As a matter of electoral self-interest, it’s not
irrational for him to follow his instincts toward the center by transacting
away traditional Republican orthodoxy on policies that aren’t dear to his
heart.
So the allegedly wide lane No Labels had in the middle on
policy is narrower than it might have anticipated originally. And it might yet
shrink further as Biden himself begins pivoting
toward the center as the campaign wears on.
Even if Trump and Biden had left room for the group to
distinguish itself with a moderate agenda, though, I’m skeptical that that
agenda would have gotten traction. Voters—at least the sort who might consider
voting third-party—don’t seem to be driven primarily by policy. Consider the
fact that Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has cracked
double digits in the five-way national average, a rare achievement for an
independent candidate (especially one running against two presidents), and ask
yourself: What policy positions have propelled him to this exalted state,
exactly?
Skepticism of vaccines? Sure, partly, but vaccines are an
awfully boutique issue to serve as a centerpiece in a national election.
Harsh criticism of Israel on Gaza? That’s fertile ground
for an independent candidacy, certainly—but it’s
not Kennedy’s position.
To the extent his appeal isn’t due entirely to voters
mistaking his politics with his father’s, I think he’s succeeding in the fine
tradition of third parties by running mostly on “no more business as
usual” vibes. On the one hand, he’s pandering to disaffected
leftists in claiming persecution by “the Democrat
Political machine” and naming a
wealthy ex-Democrat as his running mate. On the other hand, he’s
playing footsie with right-wing populists by complaining about the
“harsh treatment” of January 6 convicts and accusing Biden of being “a much worse
threat to democracy” than Trump.
None of that has anything to do with policy but it all
fits comfortably under the header of “anti-establishment.” RFK is the guy you
vote for when you’re keen to send the strongest possible signal of radical
resistance to Washington and to conventional wisdom more generally, not because
you’ve carefully considered his environmental policy or whatever and are hoping
to see it implemented. He’s a middle finger to the powers-that-be, the choice
for those who embrace abnormalcy; no wonder Trump supplicants are
worried about him stealing their guy’s
thunder.
I suspect that’s how it’ll always be in American
elections, too. Most centrist voters, offered a centrist third-party
alternative, will ultimately talk themselves into sticking with the two major
parties for strategic reasons. It’s the fringers who feel they have nothing to
gain or lose by sustaining the two-party duopoly who are most willing to
consider wasting their vote on a protest candidate.
That made No Labels’ prospects for success bleak. There’s
a fair chance that their candidate, had they fielded one, would have finished
behind Kennedy this fall.
With or without them, we’re left with an election in
which policy differences seem to matter little despite the outcome of the
election mattering momentously. Immigration will move votes, of course, as will
the state of the economy come fall, but for millions of voters across the
spectrum the race will be treated as a referendum on the question of “What kind
of country do we want to be?” Ironically, that’s precisely the question No
Labels itself had hoped to ask by mounting a campaign. The dynamics of the race
made it impossible for it to be the answer.
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