By Kevin
D. Williamson
Friday, February
02, 2018
I’ve
been thinking a lot about infrastructure the past couple of weeks, mainly about
airports and seaports and the ways in which they are (or fail to be) integrated
into our cities and factories. Infrastructure is, among other things, what many
people imagine to be the dividing line between things done by free enterprise
and things done by the government: Businesses build the factories and produce
the widgets, and government builds the highways, utilities, and other
infrastructure that make it possible to move products, raw materials, and
workers around to make that all happen.
That
line gets blurry pretty quickly. The Constitution charges the federal
government with building postal roads — for many years, lines of physical
transit and lines of communication were practically synonymous (the term
“communicating rooms” lives on in some of the more old-fashioned quarters of
the hotel business) — but the first paved intercity road in the United States
was a privately built, for-profit toll road, the Lancaster Turnpike, which
remains in use to this day. The Port of Los Angeles was begun in earnest by
Phineas Banning, who owned a stagecoach line and later built the first railroad
connecting San Pedro with Los Angeles, and much important work on the facility
was undertaken by private firms such as Southern Pacific Railroad. (The
railroad’s communication subsidiary, the Southern Pacific Railroad Internal
Networking Telephony Co. — Sprint — remains in business today.) But much of the
most consequential work done at the port beginning in the early 20th century
was undertaken by the federal government. The New York City subways began as
private competing lines before they were reorganized into a government
monopoly.
“But who will build the roads?” That’s an
old libertarian joke about the habitual response to the idea that we can rely
on free markets for critical infrastructure. But what’s with the free-market
fetish, anyway? Why it is that libertarians and free-market conservatives are
always going on about the wonders of the market? Many people who have had
interactions with credit-card companies, cable providers, or airlines are considerably
less enthused about free markets. Why entrust our critical national
infrastructure — or education, or health care, or anything important — to the
same process that produced Comcast and Spirit Air? Free-market enthusiasts may
respond that the same process produced the iPhone and Amazon, at which point
things often break down into a not especially fruitful discussion of the
relative importance of the private and public sector in the creation of the
modern Internet.
The
“why” of free markets is the same as the “how”—in short: brainpower.
People
have problems. For a couple of hundred thousand years, the main ones were
finding things to eat and finding ways to keep from being eaten. Yes, Comcast
and Apple, Whole Foods and Walmart, Coca-Cola and those $36.99 bottles of “raw
water” that Silicon Valley types with too much money are shelling out for all
are the products of the same consumer-driven capitalism — but, love it or hate
it, most of our ancestors would have considered themselves rich beyond imagining
if they came into ownership of the contents of a 7-Eleven. Life before
capitalism was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, short, and lacking in avocado
toast.
But we
still have problems. People make a moral case for free markets — that people
have a moral right to be left free to pursue their own interests as they see
fit — and there’s something to that, but it’s easy to make too much of the
moral case, too. The case for free markets is mostly instrumental: The
possibility of profit causes people to self-organize in such a way as to focus
the maximum human attention on solving the problems that people care the most
about. Notice there is no should in
that sentence: People in the communication business wryly observe that every
major advance in communication technology in the past hundred years has been
driven at least in part by pornography. That’s a joke, but it isn’t just a
joke. There’s what people want, and what you or I think or Senator Snout thinks
people should want. They aren’t the
same thing. If you want to figure out what people think they should want, give
them a survey. If you want to figure out what people actually do want, try
selling them something. Vast amounts of capital — including human intelligence,
the most valuable of all resources — have gone into making food plentiful,
automobiles safer and more reliable, housing more affordable and more
comfortable . . . and reality-television shows, artificial-intelligence–enabled
face-swapping porn, the Super Bowl, and any number of things that do not strike
me as obviously valuable. People value what they value.
It’s a
neat trick, and it works. What’s interesting is that it actually is getting
more effective. For years, big, profitable firms such as Ford and IBM have
thrown off enough profits to invest in sideline projects with no immediate
short-term commercial application, but now American technology firms such as
Alphabet (which is what they expect us to call Google now) can do that sort of
thing on a truly unprecedented scale. When Elon Musk dreamed up his hyperloop,
he decided he didn’t have time to run a hyperloop company on top of running a
car company, a solar-power company, and a space-exploration company, so he just
threw his work out there and invited the geniuses of the world to join in and
make of it what they could. (Spare me the emails about how Musk’s various
enterprises have benefited from government subsidies and hence do not
constitute “pure” free-market action. We’re talking about how the world
actually works here, not about some sophomoric attempt at moral philosophy.)
Now, there are several firms and more casual projects dedicated to solving, one
by one, the engineering challenges associated with the concept.
Sometimes,
somebody decides that some intelligence should be directed at a problem so far
removed from the prospect of profit that it is ignored by free-market actors.
Those aren’t unimportant problems, necessarily. Some of them have to do with
what economists call “public goods” — which is not synonymous with “stuff
that’s good for the public” or “stuff the public thinks is good and wants” —
which are for various reasons hard to package and sell for a profit. Public
goods are, as the economists put it, “non-excludable in consumption,” meaning
that you can’t build a missile-defense system over San Francisco that protects
only paying customers from North Korean nukes: Either you have it or you don’t.
Public goods also are “non-rivalrous in consumption,” as in the case of a
street light whose light isn’t used up for the next guy because it illuminated
the sidewalk for you. It’s hard to charge people direct prices for goods that
are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, but of course the real world is complex:
The guys who first built the Lancaster Turnpike could keep non-payers off the
road, but the sidewalks, the paved streets of a city, and the interstate
highway system are in some ways more valuable because they are mainly free at
the point of use. There are both private and public parks, but public parks
serve a different civic function than do private ones — and the existence of
one does not tell us very much about the usefulness or desirability of the
other.
There
are useful ways to focus intelligence on problems outside of market
competition. A great many scientists and other big thinkers are not natural
entrepreneurs, and they often are most interested in working on problems that
do not have immediate commercial applications. They may not be looking to
become billionaires, but they do value prestige. (And the little bit of money
that comes with a Nobel Prize or a MacArthur grant doesn’t hurt, either.) Musk
has made use of that from time to time, holding contests for student engineers
related to SpaceX and hyperloop challenges. The John Bates Clark Medal in
economics, the Pritzker Prize in architecture, the Man Booker prizes in
literature all work to incentivize the application of creative intelligence
beyond the profit motive as such.
In some
ways, that’s the easy part. In his recent hyperloop conspectus in Wired, Alex Davies writes: “The tubes
and pods should be easy enough to build, but making hyperloop a reality takes
more than a few good engineers and a small fortune or two. It will require a
whole lot of legal maneuvering, regulatory wrestling, and a massive amount of
political will and public buy-in. Infrastructure, you should know, is hard.”
That’s all true, and too often those of us in the free-market camp lament that
legal maneuvering and regulatory wrestling, all that wrangling of political
will, as nothing more than a burden, a series of hoops that lesser men set up
for the pleasure of watching greater men being obliged to jump through them.
But if you think building a hyperloop is hard with the law, try building one
without it. Not that our only choice is between the regulatory state as
currently constituted and Rothbardian anarcho-capitalism — there’s a lot of
room for reform short of abolishing regulation categorically. But there is a
kind of distilled intelligence in the law, too, and in regulation, imperfect as
it may be. These are the result of experience — the intelligence of the current
moment is not the only intelligence from which we may derive benefit. Our
political institutions need our careful attention, not our fruitless hostility.
What’s
most needed, especially in the matter of infrastructure, is a better and more
enlightened understanding of which kind of intelligence-focusing tool to use
for which challenge. For instance, our airport authorities are defective,
impotent, and corrupt. Privatizing the airports could bring market competition
to bear on the ongoing problems related to airport failures — especially in
places such as southern California and greater New York City, which are served
by multiple airports. Replacing the current old-fashioned system of assigning
landing and takeoff slots to airlines with an auction system would also bring
competitive forces to bear. Current Republican plans to reform air-traffic
control (reorganizing the service in a private, nonprofit corporation) probably
would not bring anything in the way of competition, but might provide
opportunities to streamline management and encourage innovation. Does that mean
abolishing the FAA? Of course not. No more than the existence of privately
managed turnpikes implies the wholesale abandonment of the concept of public
roads. Getting passengers onto airplanes in a timely fashion is a job for
free-market competition. Keeping terrorists off them is the sort of thing we
traditionally have entrusted to government, with good reason.
Much of
our discussion of these matters is distorted by public-sector/private-sector
turf-war-by-proxy. The Democrats see the public sector and its employees
simultaneously as client and patron, and they are not entirely wrong to do so.
Anything that reduces the scope of the public sector — especially reforms that
introduce competition where there had been monopolies — is seen by the
Democrats as an assault on their political interests. There’s an ideological
component, but it’s mostly naked self-interest: Nobody really believes the
Cleveland public schools are worth a damn, but the only kind of reform
Democrats will support is “reform” that gives their allies more money and power
and less accountability. Republicans take roughly the opposite view: They see
public-sector employees, and especially their unions, as enemies, and sometimes
take the opportunity to poke them in the eye even when doing so does not serve
the public interest. Like most disputes in politics, it comes down to
tribalism: a philosophy of Government Can
Do No Wrong contesting with a philosophy of Government Can Do No Right.
What I
know about this for sure is that New York is a very different city when the
subways are working, a happier and better and more productive one. I know that
Hurricane Katrina was as much a political failure as a natural disaster, that
the Long Island Railroad is a goat rodeo, and that I think Elon Musk probably
has better ideas about how to turn this sort of thing around than Peter DeFazio
probably does.
There’s
a lot more to this than fixing potholes and doling out federal grants. But
we’re talking about fixing potholes and doling out federal grants. Time for a
different approach.
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