By Kevin D. Williamson
Thursday, September 21, 2017
Republicans want to cut taxes by $1.5 trillion — while
the government already is running a deficit — and they propose to offset those
cuts with wishful thinking.
In control of both houses of Congress with a nominally
Republican president in the White House, they are pursuing the dead opposite of
the immigration policy touted by Donald Trump on the campaign trail, and
considering something close to the opposite of their longstanding promises on
health care. They are embarrassed by their inability to execute any proposal of
great consequence, and have retreated into that great Republican safe space:
tax cuts, the more irresponsible the better.
Congressional Republicans argue that they can in good
conscience pass these tax cuts without any corresponding spending cuts or other
countervailing measures on the theory that the tax cuts will produce economic
growth, and that this economic growth will be so substantial that it will
entirely offset the revenue theoretically lost to the tax cuts. There is very
little evidence to support this theory, but Republicans remain fond of it.
Taxes are not especially high just at the moment. Federal
revenue amounted to 17.6 percent of GDP in 2016; by way of comparison, consider
that in the balanced-budget year of 2000, federal revenue was 19.7 percent of
GDP — and 2.1 percentage points is a heck of a lot in an economy the size of
ours.
Taxes were 18.7 percent of GDP in 1981, when the Reagan
tax cuts were passed. The free-lunch theory of taxation holds that strategic,
pro-growth tax cuts allow the government to increase its revenue by taking a
smaller share of a larger GDP. But that isn’t what happened after the Reagan
tax cuts: In constant dollars, federal revenue shrank, and by 1983 revenue was
in real terms $153 billion lower than it had been. There was a recession, and
revenue in constant dollars declined along with revenue as a share of GDP. It would
not make sense to blame the tax cuts for that recession — nor would it make
sense to credit them for all the growth that came after. By the end of the
Reagan years, tax revenue as a share of GDP was right back around where it was
at the end of the Carter years — and right about where it is now. The deficit
as a share of GDP doubled between
1981 and 1985, then declined — and began to climb again in 1990. As usual, the
main variable was spending.
In economic terms, there are two things going on with
those revenue and deficit numbers. One is the structural issue, i.e., tax policy, spending, etc. The other is the
cyclical issue, i.e., the ups and
down in the economy. Both structural and cyclical factors have an effect on
growth, revenue, and deficits — and they both have an effect on each other,
too. Disaggregating those is a complicated business, one
that does not necessarily provide any clear answers. But if you want to
stick with the naïve supply-siders’ story, then you have to credit essentially
all of the economic growth following their favorite tax cuts (Reagan’s in the
1980s, Kennedy’s in the 1960s) to tax policy in order to arrive at the
conclusion that these tax cuts not only paid for themselves but actually added
to federal revenue. Given the fact that the economy is growing right now, that
is not a very plausible story.
It also is not the story that the designers of the
Reagan-era tax cuts told themselves. Bruce Bartlett may have become an
insufferable crank in his dotage, but there is no reason to doubt that he knows
his own mind. Bartlett, one of the architects of the 1981 tax plan, did in fact
have the Kennedy-era cuts in mind, and did expect there to be offsetting growth
effects. But he and the other designers of the 1981 tax bill expected those
growth effects to amount to only about one-third of the lost revenue, which was
what studies at the time had found to be the case with the Kennedy cuts.
“Contrary to common belief,” Bartlett writes, “neither
Jack Kemp nor William Roth nor Ronald Reagan ever said that there would be no
revenue loss associated with an across-the-board cut in tax rates. We just
thought it wouldn’t lose as much revenue as predicted by the standard revenue
forecasting models, which were based on Keynesian principles. Furthermore, our
belief that we might get back a third of the revenue loss was always a long-run
proposition. Even the most rabid supply-sider knew we would lose $1 of revenue
for $1 of tax cut in the short term, because it took time for incentives to
work and for people to change their behavior.”
The Kennedy tax cuts saw the top individual income-tax
rate reduced from 91 percent to 70 percent, and the Reagan cuts saw it reduced
from 70 percent to 50 percent. The current top rate is 39.6 percent, which
kicks in at $470,700 for a married couple. President Trump’s preferred policy
would reduce the top rate to 35 percent, while congressional Republicans have
aimed at 33 percent, along with modest reductions in other brackets and,
possibly, a large reduction in the corporate tax rate. Our corporate tax rate
is one of the world’s highest on paper, but the effective rate — what
corporations actually pay — is on average unexceptional, though it varies
significantly from industry to industry and firm to firm.
If coming down from 91 percent to 70 percent was not
expected to be a self-financing proposition, and if coming down from 70 percent
to 50 percent wasn’t, either, then why should we expect a relatively small
change to produce such radical results?
We shouldn’t.
Tax cuts can contribute to economic growth by putting
more money into the pockets of consumers and investors. In the free-lunch
version of the story, that extra money produces so much new economic activity
that the resulting growth in corporate and individual incomes offsets the
reduction in tax rates. If that sounds like Keynesian stimulus theory standing
on its head, it is. There is a multiplier effect — and politicians looking to
sell you a bill of goods always assume that the multiplier is >1, even when
there’s no reason to believe this to be the case.
Tax cuts can have anti-growth effects as well as
pro-growth effects. Deficits and public debt are a drag on the economy,
hoovering up investable capital and putting upward pressure on interest rates.
If you want to eventually eliminate those deficits and pay down that debt, then
you either have to raise taxes in the future, cut spending, or do both, i.e.,
you have to invert today’s stimulus measures at some point in the future. (“At
some point in the future” is every politician’s favorite timeframe, of course —
they all assume they’ll be dead or retired by the time the music stops.)
Republicans are right about the existence of growth effects, but they are fooling themselves about
the scale of those effects. There is
nothing wrong in principle with “dynamic scoring,” the Republican-favored
policy of incorporating growth effects into the Congressional Budget Office’s
evaluation of the fiscal effects of legislation. But that should be done
responsibly. The current pie-in-the-sky Republican attitude toward taxes is
something else entirely. On the other hand, there’s a good conservative case
for ignoring dynamic scoring, too: If we cut a dollar in spending for every
dollar in tax cuts and find out 20 years from now that we could have gotten
away with only cutting 70 cents in spending on the dollar, then that will be a
happy surprise. Sobriety in expectations and caution about future developments
was, once upon a time, considered “conservative.”
There are many things that Congress should be doing to
improve our national economic performance. Blindly hacking away at the tax code
with a meat ax isn’t one of them.