By Daniel W. Drezner
Monday, April 25, 2016
When it comes to foreign policy, Donald Trump and Barack
Obama do not have that much in common. But as Spoiler
Alerts noted previously, one area of agreement is resentment at NATO’s
European members “free riding” off the United States. Trump has repeatedly
complained about NATO with statements like, “countries in NATO that are getting
a free ride and it’s unfair, it’s very unfair.” Obama has said similar things
to the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg:
[Obama] is the rare president who
seems at times to resent indispensability, rather than embrace it. “Free riders
aggravate me,” he told me. Recently, Obama warned that Great Britain would no
longer be able to claim a “special relationship” with the United States if it
did not commit to spending at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense. “You have
to pay your fair share,” Obama told David Cameron, who subsequently met the 2
percent threshold.
The similarity of complaints was close enough for
Bloomberg View’s Eli Lake to dub it “The Obama-Trump Doctrine.” But this lament
is hardly unique to those two men. Andrew Bacevich told the Post’s Glenn
Kessler, “Are Europeans free-riders when it comes to security, counting on the
U.S. to pick up the slack? Yes, without
a doubt.” Nor is this complaint all that new. Indeed, as one Forbes columnist
noted last week, “Our post-war alliances are riddled with American whining about
how our allies are slacking off.”
As these complaints have been voiced, one chart has
inevitably been used to explain the problem. This variant by DefenseOne’s Kedar
Pavgi will do the job:
As the chart shows, the United States spends more than
3.5 percent of GDP on defense. Even though NATO members have pledged to spend 2
percent of GDP on defense, only four non-U.S. countries met that target last
year.
So this looks bad for European members of NATO. But
before the “free rider” thing calcifies into an accepted story told around the
foreign policy campfire, it’s worth considering two small complications to this
narrative.
The first complication is that European defense spending
is starting to turn around. Indeed, in 2015, U.S. defense spending fell far
faster than European defense spending. As Bloomberg View’s Toby Harshaw noted,
numerous European countries are ramping up their defense spending in response
to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. French diplomat Simond de Galbert wrote in the
Atlantic last month: “Although it is very unlikely that all European NATO
countries will soon be spending as much as 2 percent of their GDP on defense,
as required by NATO, the main European powers are at the threshold (like the
United Kingdom and Poland), closely approaching it (France), or taking steps to
increase resources allocated to defense (Germany).”
The second and more significant complication is that
while the United States does bear a disproportionate cost of military spending,
our European allies have borne a disproportionate burden on other aspects of
the Western alliance. Consider, for example, the cost of imposing economic
sanctions. As de Galbert notes:
Washington pushed Europeans to put
harsh sanctions on Iran, but the United States itself had little leverage on
the Iranian economy, having had virtually no trade with the country since 1979.
In many ways, it was the European choice to back sanctions that made them so
effective —and it was the Europeans who bore many of the costs.
The Iran sanctions are insignificant compared to the
joint U.S.-E.U. sanctions against Russia, however. Prior to the imposition of
sanctions, European trade with Russia was 10 times the level of American trade.
Estimates of the costs of the sanctions to Europe’s economy have ranged as high
as $700 billion and 2 million lost jobs. Those estimates are on the very high
end; more sober estimates up the cost at roughly 0.4 percent of GDP in 2015.
Still, that is a damn sight more than the United States will suffer from
sanctions. Oh, and by the way, if you think that Europe paying a greater price
for sanctioning Russia is a new phenomenon, go read Michael Mastanduno’s
“Economic Containment” for some historical background. Spoiler alert: Europe paid a higher price to enforce the Cold War
strategic embargo too.
Despite the cost, E.U. members, particularly Germany,
have continued to support the policy.
In the Atlantic, Stephen Sestanovich notes that the Obama
administration has done a little free riding of its own:
There is, as Goldberg tells us,
just about no foreign leader the president respects more than Angela Merkel.
Nor is there one who has done more to help him. (Were it not for Merkel’s
support on sanctions against Russia, Obama’s Ukraine policy would barely
exist.) No European leader has tried harder to articulate a tolerant,
Obama-style approach to the Syrian refugee crisis. Nor has anyone paid a
greater price for doing so. Merkel faces both the possible end of her political
career and the possible collapse of the European Union.
White House aides acknowledge the
problem. “If Europe has a 2016 anything like 2015,” one of them has told me,
“there won’t be much of Europe left to talk about.” So what has the leader whom
Obama respects most, who has done the most for him, who has set out a vision
most like his, and who has had the most trouble implementing it, gotten from
him in return? The U.S. has admitted a trickle of refugees, NATO-member navies
have begun to regulate the migrant flow in Greek and Turkish waters, the
Pentagon continues to study the problem of a “safe zone” in Syria — and the
White House continues to express doubts about it. Measured against the
“existential” crisis facing America’s most important allies, this isn’t much.
So as the president apologizes for some of the things
he said out loud to Goldberg wraps up his Europe trip, remember that both
sides of the Atlantic have legitimate gripes. For as long as the United States
has complained about European shirking on defense spending, Europeans have had
to bear a disproportionate burden when it comes to Western economic statecraft.
No comments:
Post a Comment