By Victor Davis Hanson
Tuesday, April 05, 2016
Deterrence is lost through lax foreign policy, an erosion
of military readiness, and failed supreme command — often insidiously, over
time, rather than dramatically, at once. The following random events over the
seven years that Barack Obama has been in office have led to the idea abroad
that the U.S. is no longer the world’s leader and that regional hegemonies have
a golden opportunity to redraw regional maps and spheres of influence — to the
disadvantage of the West — in the ten months remaining before the next
president is inaugurated.
The otherwise disparate Boston Marathon, Fort Hood, and
San Bernardino Islamist bombers had three things in common: First, the killers
had all communicated on social media with radical jihadists, or had come to the
attention of both U.S. and foreign intelligence, or had expressed jihadist
beliefs. Second, their attacks were followed by administration warnings about
not embracing Islamophobia, as Obama doubled down on his administration’s taboo
against the use of terms such as “jihadist,” “radical Islamist,” and “Islamic
terrorist.” Third, after each of these incidents, there was no stepped-up
administration vigilance; instead, there was a flurry of sermons about not
blaming Islam for inciting such killers. The greatest check on ISIS terrorism
may lie in the hands of ISIS itself: If its operatives continue to cull the
Western herd by a few dozen murders every few months, the U.S. will likely
continue to do little. If they get greedy and seek a repeat of something on the
scale of 9/11, then the American public will force this administration to act.
Unfortunately, ISIS may not be so much energized by anger over supposed
Islamophobia as buoyed by the administration’s inability to say “radical
Islam.”
The Bowe Bergdahl swap for five Taliban terrorists — and
National Security Adviser Susan Rice’s praise of the deserter Bergdahl’s
service — reinforced the global message that the Obama administration did not
necessarily see Taliban killers as killers or American deserters as deserters,
apparently because such definitions are anachronistically absolute concepts.
After all, who would willingly swap five killers for one deserter? Apparently
everything is negotiable and political, given that the U.S. does not feel
deeply about either terrorist killers or those who have renounced their duty to
thwart them.
On the diplomatic front, Hillary Clinton’s praise of
Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi — a member of the radical Muslim Brotherhood —
reversed postwar U.S. policy in Egypt and put America on the side of “one
election, one time” radical Islamicization. We are now in a truly 1984 scenario in which the current
Egyptian head of state, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, warns the West of radical Islam,
while Obama objects that Westerners, the target of such Islamists, have
exaggerated the threat: so much so that the White House recently, in an
official video, edited out French President François Hollande’s reference to
“Islamic terrorism” — though the passage was restored after the gap was widely
remarked.
The bombing of Libya not only violated U.N. resolutions
(no-fly zones and humanitarian aid only), but also destroyed the government of
the monster-in-rehabilitation Moammar Qaddafi, leaving nothing in its place but
a terrorist badland. The logical follow-up was the attack on the American
consulate in Benghazi. Almost everything the administration then said about
Libya was crude or simply a lie. Secretary Clinton was especially immoral in
her chortles about “We came, we saw, he [Qaddafi] died,” “What difference does
it make?” and, more recently, “No Americans died in Libya” — bookended by her
face-to-face lies to the families of the men who died, whom she told that a
videomaker, not al-Qaeda, had prompted the attacks. Note that Susan Rice (wrong
about Egypt, wrong about Libya, wrong about Bergdahl) spoke misleadingly quite
often on the Sunday talk shows, attempting to protect the Obama reelection
narrative that al-Qaeda was “on the run” and incapable of such attacks. Long
live “Bin Laden is dead, GM is alive.”
Just as the failure to get in on the ground floor when
Mubarak was deposed in Egypt had sparked Obama’s interest in preempting in
Libya, so too it is probably Libya’s implosion that paralyzed Obama into doing
nothing when violence overwhelmed Syria. The administration somehow then
managed to achieve almost every negative result imaginable during the Syrian
mess: Obama issued red lines about WMD use, did not enforce them, and then
denied that he had ever issued them at all — eroding not just U.S. credibility
but the very idea that a U.S. president should tell the truth. He failed to arm
Syrian “moderates”; eventually they disappeared and Syria became a war between
Bashar Assad and ISIS. In pre-reelection panic, Obama then invited Vladimir
Putin into the Middle East and outsourced to him Assad’s WMD program. Refugees
swamping Europe, a quarter-million dead in Syria, Putin’s bombing, and the end
to the Christian community in Syria sum up the result.
Iraq’s fate was in some ways worse, because the present
destruction of that country was likely preventable. Obama and Vice President
Biden had until 2011 praised the quiet in Iraq — which they had inherited from
the Bush administration — as their own, only to squander it by needlessly
pulling out all U.S. peacekeepers for the price of another cheap reelection
talking point. Now, when it is too late, we are quietly sending back in U.S.
troops, who might as well have stayed where they were when it was not too late.
At least Putin had assumed in 2008 that a divided United
States and an unpopular George W. Bush would address Russia’s annexation of
South Ossetia and its bullying of Georgia. When the Bush administration leveled
some mild punishments, the deterioration in the region became an Obama campaign
talking point of blaming the Bush administration and promising to reset the reset. Obama kept
the reset promise, but the new reset failed, and meanwhile Obama had sent the
message that he blamed the U.S. more than Russia for rocky relations — and a
delighted Putin green-lighted further aggression in Crimea and Ukraine. Now the
administration is reduced to insulting Putin rather than deterring him.
Dismantling joint strategic-missile-defense initiatives
with Poland and the Czech Republic did not win over Putin, but it did confirm
that Obama was ambivalent about our allies, and did not care much for any
nation naïve enough to believe that the United States’ foreign policy of
deterrence going back seven decades was still in force. The mullahs in Tehran
noticed that the administration had embarrassed America’s friends, did not
believe in expanded missile defense, and had kept quiet when a million
dissidents hit the streets in protest against their dictatorship, and concluded
that it was time to formalize a pathway to an eventual nuclear weapon. They
guessed rightly that a legacy-hungry Obama would circumvent the Senate by
saying the proposed treaty was not really a treaty, and blasting Republican
skeptics while speaking far more respectfully of anti-American Iranian
theocrats.
Central to Obama’s foreign policy was a redefinition of
allies, enemies, and neutrals, as if such distinctions were fossilized Cold War
relics. Obama reached out to regimes, like the ones in Iran and Cuba, that had
long despised the United States. Yet even if they were to become friendly
toward us, neither could offer America any strategic benefits — and both have
lots of downsides given their rank oppression of their own people and their
propensity to undermine their neighbors. After such outreach, both Fidel Castro
and the Iranian theocrats gratuitously defamed the United States and Obama in
particular. Allies like Britain, France, and Israel have been snubbed, as Obama
and his aides leaked disdain for their leaders via interviews and open-mike
slurs.
All of these lapses could be seen as haphazard, but, in
fact, in aggregate, they reflect a coherent worldview, as articulated, for
example, in Obama’s Al Arabiya interview, his Cairo speech, and his recent
lengthy Atlantic Monthly exegesis.
What most Americans have assumed was a successful bipartisan 70-year foreign
policy — which led to unchecked affluence and security for Western and
Westernized nations in Europe, the former British Commonwealth, North America,
and the Far East (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) — Obama instead believes was a
carry-over of Western imperialism and colonialism that had shorted Africa,
Asia, and Latin America, and that was propped up by inordinate U.S. defense
spending that diverted investments at home from underfunded social programs.
In Obama’s sophomoric view of the world, there is no
connection between the 21st-century appurtenances that he takes for granted as
president — trips on state-of-the-art Western planes, predicated on a global
air-traffic-control system, run on sophisticated Western gadgets and all
underwritten by Western free-market capitalism — and an established postwar
Western order led by the United States. He will see no contradiction between
his rhetoric and his own looming lucrative, hyper-capitalist post-presidency
and the sources of capital that will fuel it. Instead, capitalism, national
security, and globalization are seen as occurrences that just arose out of
nowhere (cf. his recent advice to Argentina to adopt tenets of either Communism
or capitalism, as if they were simply morally neutral choices), as if Nairobi
designs new smartphones, Lima offers the world new ideas in municipal sewage
treatment, China’s pharmaceuticals are superior to Western counterparts — or
Islam taught us about medicine, navigation, and religious tolerance.
Add to the above the radical cuts in the U.S. military,
the use of the Pentagon to implement by fiat gay and feminist agendas, the
restrictive new rules of engagement in Afghanistan, the slapdowns of David
Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, and iconic episodes such as the Iranian capture of
a U.S. boat in the Persian Gulf and an Iranian missile striking near a U.S.
carrier, and we come to a growing sense not that Obama can afford to dispense
with traditional U.S. foreign policy because his isolationism rests on an
overwhelming military force. Rather, his foreign policy reflects the
increasingly more obvious fact that the American military is eroding and is
simply unable to meet even its shrinking responsibilities abroad. Just as
Ronald Reagan believed that tax cuts might starve the federal entitlement
beast, so Obama trusts that cuts and redefining the military will choke off
traditional foreign policy — thus giving others, who have been too long
silenced, overdue roles in the ensuing vacuum.
All of the above was put in some context recently by a
few emblematic gestures: Obama, in that Atlantic
interview, blamed the “sh–storm” in Libya on uninspired and pompous French and
British leadership, and he bragged about issuing and then not meeting his red
line in Syria — and then later he flashed a hippie peace sign, 1960s-style, at
a formal photo-op of world leaders convening to discuss nuclear-security
issues. He alone of Western leaders can act so adolescently, because he is no
longer invested in the traditional postwar role of a U.S. president — and has
become a cooler version of Jimmy Carter, without the latter’s 1980s second
thoughts over the consequences of his appeasement. It is only April, and the
bills from the last seven years are going to come due thick and fast in the
next ten months. What most see as chaos and danger, Obama welcomes as a brave
new world.
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