Tuesday, June 25, 2024

Vivek Murthy Can’t Depoliticize Gun Policy, Actually

By Charles C. W. Cooke

Tuesday, June 25, 2024

 

Here is the New York Timesreporting credulously on one of the more sinister habits that the modern progressive movement exhibits:

 

The U.S. surgeon general, Dr. Vivek Murthy, on Tuesday declared gun violence in America a public health crisis, recommending an array of preventive measures that he compared to past campaigns against smoking and traffic safety.

 

That’s the soft version. As we soon learn, what Murthy actually means is this:

 

“I’ve long believed this is a public health issue,” he said in an interview. “This issue has been politicized, has been polarized over time. But I think when we understand that this is a public health issue, we have the opportunity to take it out of the realm of politics and put it into the realm of public health.”

 

We hear a lot these days about “Our Democracy.” I would invite the people who talk that way to step back for a moment and consider the above paragraph. Shed your personal preferences, puncture your partisan bubble, suppress the fuzzy feelings that the abstractions in Murthy’s rhetoric convey, and really stare at that argument for a while. Think about its meaning. Imagine its implications. Ruminate on its consequences. And, when you’ve done that, answer me this: What the hell is “take it out of the realm of politics and put it into the realm of public health” supposed to mean in these United States?

 

Lest anyone wonder, that is not some stray line from Murthy. He says it often, and, as the Times records, so do those who agree with him:

 

The step follows years of calls by health officials to view firearm deaths through the lens of health rather than politics.

 

My question obtains here, too: What does “rather than politics” mean in this context? Straightforward answers only, please.

 

Plainly put, Vivek Murthy has a gun-control plan. His aim is to change the law. His goal is to bind American citizens to a set of new — criminally punishable — government regulations. Per the Times:

 

Dr. Murthy’s 32-page advisory calls for an increase in funding for firearm violence prevention research; advises health workers to discuss firearm storage with patients during routine medical visits; and recommends safe storage laws, universal background checks, “red flag” laws and an assault weapons ban, among other measures.

 

In America, we call these “policies” — a word that, funnily enough, shares a root with “politics” but not with “public health.” Murthy claims that the “realm” into which he is wading has “been politicized.” But that’s nonsense. That realm, like the rest of them, is already political, always has been political, and always will be political. Murthy doesn’t have an “advisory,” he has an agenda; he’s not “recommending,” he’s proselytizing; he’s not diagnosing, he’s campaigning. In our system of government, the “funding” that Murthy covets would come from legislatures whose representatives had been voted in by the people, not from some mythical “public health” universe into which a subset of our political debates had been magically transferred. The same is true of his desired “safe storage laws,” “universal background checks,” “‘red flag’ laws,” and “assault weapon ban.” And, if those legislatures were to act, their handiwork would be checked against the original public meaning of the Second and 14th Amendments to the Constitution, which were ratified by the people in 1791 and 1868, respectively. There is no getting around this — and there ought to be no getting around it. In free countries, political proposals are inextricable from the political process and to advance a political plan is to become a political actor. One may favor this fact, or one may disfavor it, but, irrespective of one’s predilections, one cannot alter it by repeating the words “public health” as if they were a Druid incantation.

 

Presumably, this is all rather annoying for Vivek Murthy, who evidently has strong opinions about how the country should be run and no commensurate desire to wrestle with his critics. But, frankly, who cares? Whether he likes it or not, there exists no “public health” exemption to our constitutional order, and the surgeon general enjoys no powers that do not already inhere in Article II. American firearms law is decided by Congress and the state legislatures, and it is checked by the Bill of the Rights. To take it “out of the realm of politics” would be to bypass those institutions completely and to elude the democratic process that undergirds them. That will not do. If he so wishes, Murthy can dress up his ambitions in voguish language, pretend that his opinions have been plucked from the unsullied domain of pure reason that is “public health,” and attempt to bluster past our highest law by maintaining that urgency requires circumvention. He cannot, however, escape the fact that, by James Madison’s definition, he is not offering up a remedy or a salve, but gesturing heedlessly toward tyranny.

DeSantis’s Chance to Stop Woke Teachers at the Source

By Daniel Buck

Tuesday, June 25, 2024

 

Last month, Governor Ron DeSantis signed Florida House Bill 1291 to prohibit teacher-prep programs from grounding themselves in “theories that systemic racism, sexism, oppression, and privilege are inherent in the institutions of the United States.” It goes into effect July 1 and sets up DeSantis to bludgeon the University of Florida’s school of education like he did K–12 public schools and Disney.

 

If DeSantis swings this sledgehammer, it could represent the most significant, state-level education reform since Scott Walker used Act 10 to kneecap the unions over a decade ago. As I’ve stressed in National Review a number of times, university teacher-prep programs are the primary source of the ubiquitous progressivism in American schools. Critical race theory, gender ideology, teachers treating their lectern like a political pulpit — it all makes its way into the classroom via schools of education.

 

Recent conservative legislation overlooks this reality. When governors ban the instruction of concepts, it’s all too easy for advocates to shift language such that today’s “diversity, equity, and inclusion” could be tomorrow’s “belonging, compassion, and understanding.” Similarly, while school-choice laws are a welcome structural change, if personnel is policy — and all school personnel go through reeducation programs at universities — then any parent or family looking to choose a non-woke, non-progressive school will have few actual choices.

 

A recent report from Boise State University professor Scott Yenor reveals that the teacher-prep program at the University of Florida is subject to the same ideological capture as others. In 2020, the program removed a number of classes that focused on the practicalities of instruction such as classroom management or core teaching strategies to instead implement a four-course series on “equity pedagogy.”

 

Throughout, course readings betray a near obsession with “critical pedagogy,” a theory of education where schools are transformed from traditional academic training grounds to institutions of social change. Teachers are not pedagogues but change agents, there to raise the “critical consciousness” of their students and spur them toward activism and advocacy.

 

Course readings include KimberlĂ© Crenshaw (a founding scholar of critical race theory), Peggy McIntosh (who coined the term “white privilege”), Gloria Ladson-Billings (her most notable academic achievement was the introduction of CRT into educational discourse in the 1990s), and countless books and articles on gender, critical race theory, whiteness theory, and other progressive neuroses.

 

Notably lacking is anything on instruction, curriculum, or behavior management. Instead, it’s a glorified degree in progressive views on race and gender masquerading as a bachelor’s program for teachers. This reality means that come July 1, the University of Florida will run afoul of the legislation and risk decertification. With Ben Sasse at the helm of the university, DeSantis could create a model for conservatives across the country interested in reforming these institutions.

 

The governor and Sasse have several potential courses of action to build on this legislation.

 

First, they could dismantle the school of education at the University of Florida. Such an action is not without precedent. The University of Chicago shut down its school of education in 1997, with the New York Times describing its scholarship as “unworthy of Chicago’s standards” and “too costly to correct.”

 

Instead, DeSantis could continue a policy path that Jeb Bush began, funding alternative training programs and easing licensure regulations. Many programs, such as Teach For America, or pathways that ease the licensure for teacher aides and other school personnel have produced educators with equal or even better outcomes than traditional schools of education.

 

Second, Sasse could modify UF’s school of education to refocus it on practical training. Florida’s House Bill 1291 includes the provision that schools of education “must afford candidates the opportunity to think critically, achieve mastery of academic program content, learn instructional strategies, and demonstrate competence.”

 

There’s an abundance of teacher training manuals and research on practical instructional techniques that could fill syllabi instead of esoteric readings on Marxist educational theory. Moreover, UF’s newly established Hamilton Center could include an institute on liberal-arts education for creating a corps of teachers trained in the theories of classical education to staff schools, administrations, curriculum companies, and other educational institutions. Change the personnel; change the policy.

 

Finally, DeSantis and Sasse could entirely reconstruct teacher education as we know it. As I detailed at length in the recent issue of National Affairs, teachers who attend traditional teacher-prep programs perform no better than alternatively licensed or even unlicensed teachers. Only experience and content knowledge improve instructional quality. Following such evidence, they could remake teacher prep entirely. Instead of asking undergrads to huddle together for seminars in university basements to talk about theory, put a greater emphasis on the practicum and student teaching.

 

Schools of education are one of the most noxious forces in American education — rivaling even the unions — while teachers are the most important school-level factor for student academic success. Whichever route is chosen, if he reforms the University of Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis may very well reform schools across the Sunshine State — and be a model for governors across the country to follow.

Jamaal Bowman Must Go

National Review Online

Tuesday, June 25, 2024

 

Jamaal Bowman, representative of New York’s 16th congressional district (including Westchester County and parts of the Bronx), rallied in the South Bronx ahead of Tuesday’s Democratic primary. Swinging a barstool onstage with a visibly twitchy anxiety meant to simulate political conviction, he stood alongside his fellow Democratic “Squad” member Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and screamed, “We are gonna show f***in’ AIPAC the power of the motherf***ing South Bronx! People ask me why I got a foul mouth. What am I supposed to do? You comin’ after me! . . . We gonna show them who the f*** we are.” He then performed spastic jumping jacks whilst wearing a lemon yellow T-shirt to try and hype the (small) crowd to cheer louder at what he said.

 

It did not work, and it does not deserve to. Bowman’s vulgar, quasi-paranoid tirade — delivered now, at the end of an embarrassing campaign — is merely the final, tired wheeze of an intellectually bankrupt progressive who thoroughly deserves to lose his race on Tuesday when the Democratic voters of New York’s 16th district register their votes. Bowman faces longstanding Westchester County executive George Latimer in his Democratic primary — and as an incumbent underdog, if current polling is to be believed — and while National Review holds no brief for Latimer or his reliably Democratic politics, we do know this: Jamaal Bowman must go.

 

We are fully aware that the world of Democratic politics is well-stocked with fools. But Bowman’s behavior has been far worse than mere comic folly. First of all, he ranks uniquely in the annals of United States Congress as the only member to be charged, to have pled out, and to later be censured by the House for yanking a fire alarm in order to delay a key vote in Congress. In late September of last year, then-speaker Kevin McCarthy was trying to pass a funding bill at the last minute to avoid a government shutdown. McCarthy, having counted his numbers, called a surprise vote. Bowman, for reasons that can remain known only to him, first tried to trigger a fire alarm to prevent the vote by pushing open a door; when that failed, he yanked a nearby fire alarm. He denied all of this initially; next, he claimed it was an accident; then, he quietly admitted guilt and answered all further questions about the incident by saying, “We’ve talked about this already.”

 

But as disgracefully juvenile as this is, it pales in comparison to the antisemitic rhetoric that has poured forth freely from Bowman’s mouth ever since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel. He has revealed himself to be a staunch friend of Hamas and an opponent of the Israeli state’s right to exist. Little more than a month after October 7, Bowman appeared with Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib to call for a “cease-fire now,” informing his Jewish constituents who might object that “by me calling for a cease-fire with my colleagues and centering humanity, I am uplifting deeply what it actually means to be Jewish.” During one pro-Hamas rally, Bowman denied that the terrorist group raped Israeli women, claiming the well-documented atrocities were a “lie” and “propaganda” — a statement which he ham-handedly apologized for only recently. In an interview with Politico, he lamented that in his district, “There’s certain places where the Jews live and concentrate” — ignoring their need to be near synagogues, Kosher supermarkets, and other institutions essential to practicing Judaism. Now, in his final electoral agony, he is shrieking obscenities in public about AIPAC, fulminating about shadowy conspiracies against him and his family. It is a disgraceful denouement.

 

In an age when Congress is increasingly a repository for publicity-seeking fools and venal pocket-liners rather than legislators, the Democratic voters of New York’s 16th congressional district have a rare opportunity to exchange a clown and antisemite for a more standard-issue liberal. We encourage them to do so. We know the district will not be represented by someone aligned with us politically. All we ask for is simple decency, of which Jamaal Bowman has proven himself incapable.

How Trump Can Win the Debate

By Rich Lowry

Tuesday, June 25, 2024

 

Donald Trump may be a real estate guy, but his ethic in the first presidential debate should be the familiar rule from the medical profession: First, do no harm.

 

Trump was rejected by the voters and is getting a second chance — not after turning over a new leaf, not after disappearing on an image-boosting world tour, not after starting a new philanthropy. Trump has simply remained himself, while Biden has made people yearn for the pre-Biden years.

 

Trump’s goal should be to continue to feed the Trump nostalgia that has been the defining feature of the early stages of the race.

 

Warren Harding once said, “I have no trouble with my enemies. I can take care of my enemies in a fight. But my friends, my goddamned friends, they’re the ones who keep me walking the floor at nights!”

 

By the same token, what should worry supporters of Biden and Trump is what they each can do to themselves.

 

If Biden wanders off, is obviously confused, or repeatedly lapses into mumbly incoherence, it could lose him whatever ground he has made up in the race and perhaps much more.

 

If Trump, meanwhile, reminds voters of what they disliked about him by November 2020, he risks kicking away the second look he is getting from the American public.

 

Trump doesn’t need a knockout blow against Biden, assuming one is even possible this early in a campaign involving the tectonic plates of American politics that don’t easily budge based on any one event. A victory by decision, or split decision, would suit his purposes just fine.

 

Trump is in the rare position of a challenger who doesn’t need to take down the incumbent president. People are ready to fire Biden. The question is whether they are readying to hire the other guy.

 

Trump doesn’t need to tell voters that Joe Biden is old or that Hunter is a drug addict. He doesn’t need to insult or interrupt him. He needs to keep himself under control because the most important message he can send the public is about himself.

 

Trump’s persona is the biggest reason that he grabbed Republican politics by the throat and hasn’t let go since 2015. It’s also the reason he has been a precarious electoral bet — narrowly winning in 2016, narrowly losing in 2020, and narrowly leading today.

 

The Covid briefings that Trump used as a free-floating communications platform in 2020 hurt him, and his first debate performance in 2020 hurt him, too.

 

The Democrats hope that the public hasn’t truly absorbed that Trump is on the cusp of the presidency again. Presumably, people have gotten the memo by now. But they might not be focused on the japery and provocations with which Trump routinely entertains and energizes his most devoted followers at his rallies, and the Republican would be well-served by leaving all the rally material off the debate stage.

 

Trump is not going to fade into the background, nor should he. There’s a reason that voters think that he’s more tough, energetic, and effective than Biden. Trump should be forceful in defense of himself and aggressive in prosecuting the substantive case against Biden. But bombast, anger, cross talk, and idle boastfulness will make the debate about Trump, which is exactly what the Biden team wants.

 

A CBS/YouGov poll from a couple of weeks ago asked Biden supporters why they were with him, and 54 percent said they opposed Trump and only 27 percent because they liked Biden. The incumbent’s job approval is atrocious, and he’s trailing badly on most of the issues. He can only win if people who disapprove of his job performance — and think he’s too old for a second term — vote for him anyway for fear of something worse.

 

So it’s in Biden’s interest to make the race about Trump, and it’s Trump the showman’s natural instinct to also make the race about him. For one night, at least, he should play against type.

Populism Without the Populism

By Nick Catoggio

Friday, June 21, 2024

 

Life is unpredictable, my friends.

 

One day you’re worried about foreigners “poisoning the blood” of the country, the next you’re stapling green cards to their American diplomas.



“The State Department estimated that the United States hosted roughly one million international students in the academic year that ended in 2022—a majority of whom came from China and India,” the New York Times noted in a story on Trump’s comments. That’s about equal to the number of immigrants in total who were granted permanent residency that same year. 

 

Technically there’s no contradiction in building mass deportation camps for illegal migrants while vastly expanding green cards for those here legally, but … it’s a weird look for a populist demagogue. Especially one who didn’t spare legal immigrants from his efforts to reduce the national “blood-poisoning” during his first term as president.

 

And whose base normally isn’t prone to seeing special value in college graduates.

 

As news of Donald Trump’s apparent awakening on the virtues of highly skilled immigration spread last night, one of my editors messaged me to propose it as a topic for today’s newsletter. “What issue will Trump flip-flop on to his populist base’s chagrin next?” he wondered.

 

The thing is, this isn’t really a flip-flop. And the reaction among his base doesn’t quite reach the level of “chagrined.”

 

Note the date on this tweet:



At a primary debate in 2016, he was asked about the fact that his campaign website derided H-1B visas for skilled foreign labor as a threat that would “decimate American workers.” His response: “I’m changing. I’m changing. We need highly skilled people in this country, and if we can’t do it, we’ll get them in…. I’m softening the position because we have to have talented people in this country.”

 

That’s not how he ended up governing as president. During his term in office, he once described H-1B visas as a “theft of American prosperity.” But as a candidate, he’s paid lip service to letting American-educated foreign students stay put in the U.S. from the very beginning of his political career.

 

Which may help explain why, while it’s not hard to find grumbling on right-wing social media today, there’s no uproar over what Trump said. No one who was prepared to support him in November is threatening to withhold their vote in protest of his quasi-new position on foreign students. They’re used to this by now.

 

That’s because, as Trumpism has evolved over the last eight years, Republican expectations have evolved with it. In 2016 he prevailed in the primary by proving that the grassroots right would support populist conservatism without the conservatism. In 2024 he’s proving that it’ll support populism without the populism.

 

***

 

The splashiest policy plan to come out of the Trump campaign in the last few months was reportedly offered by the candidate himself in a private meeting last week with Republican senators. What if we replaced the federal income tax with tariffs, Trump proposed?

 

My colleagues Kevin Williamson and Scott Lincicome have since slashed that idea to bits as an economic and budgetary catastrophe, but it can’t be stressed enough how bizarre it is coming from a so-called populist like Trump. The tax system he imagines would be enormously regressive, crushing the lower and middle classes by grossly inflating the price of goods and services. The big winners would be the rich, who would see their 37 percent income tax burden vanish overnight.

 

Left-wing populism at least has some political logic to it in seeking to capture the wealth of the upper class via higher taxes and to redistribute that wealth below. Trump, the alleged working-class hero, is essentially thinking of doing the opposite—during a campaign dominated by the already high cost of goods and services, no less.

 

That’s not all. He told an audience of wealthy donors recently that extending the tax cuts he signed into law in 2017 will be a priority for him if he’s reelected. The rich would reap most of the windfall from that, with 40 percent of the benefits accruing to the top 5 percent of taxpayers according to one analysis. Some are understandably excited about it. Like, very excited.

 

Yet if there’s been any meaningful “chagrin” among right-wing populists over any of this, I’m unaware of it.

 

The closest thing to a truly populist economic idea Trump has offered lately was when he called for eliminating taxes on tips earned by service workers. That would benefit working class Americans, at least, but at the cost of blowing a new $250 billion hole in the federal budget over 10 years that might or might not be plugged with new taxes on less favored groups. Economist Brian Riedl was left counting the ways such a plan would be irresponsible: “It complicates the tax code. It induces income shifting (reclassify[ing wages] as tips). It serves no national purpose. It adds to the debt. These workers already pay almost no income taxes.”

 

There’s no economic logic to it—but there isn’t supposed to be. Trump introduced the plan at a rally in Nevada, not coincidentally, where he stands a real chance in November of flipping a reliably blue state. Making tips tax-free is, plain and simple, a blatant pander to the huge number of voters who work in Las Vegas’ hospitality industry. Bribing influential constituencies with indefensible tax breaks is as “principled” as Trumpy economic populism gets in 2024.

 

Again, though, there’s no evidence of the right feeling “chagrined” by it. On the contrary, a group of Republican senators (most of them up for reelection this year, unsurprisingly) celebrated Trump’s idea by hurriedly writing and introducing the “No Tax on Tips Act.” Among them was supposed fiscal conservative Ted Cruz.

 

This is what populism has become after eight years of Trump. Day by day, any ideological content it ever might have had has slowly drained away, replaced by the candidate’s personal political needs and hobby horses. Regressive taxes, payoffs to the rich, handouts to special interests, green cards for elite foreign workers coveted by corporate plutocrats—“populism” increasingly means whatever Trump wants rather than what “the forgotten man” needs.

 

There are other examples. Look at TikTok, which he once sought to ban as president because of the influence the Chinese government wields over its content. China hawkery is a hallmark of modern right-wing populism, yet Trump has since reversed himself on the ban even as Democrats have come around to his previous position. Maybe that’s because certain billionaire donors with a stake in the platform have whispered in his ear, or maybe it’s because he realized that protecting TikTok is fertile soil in which to grow his support with young voters.

 

Either way, Trumpy populism now means supporting TikTok. Don’t ask for it to make sense.

 

How about abortion? The pro-life position isn’t populist per se but a solid majority of the populist-in-chief’s party supports a federal abortion ban after 16 weeks of pregnancy. No matter: Despite the wishes of his voters, Trump has ruled out signing an outright ban and has repeatedly called for leaving the matter legislatively to the states. Lately he’s steered away from the topic entirely in public appearances, even before Christian groups. There’s chatter that the GOP platform might be tweaked to downplay abortion at this summer’s convention.

 

There’s no mystery as to why Trump is doing that and it has nothing to do with ideology. Many pro-life populists have been left “chagrined” by their leader’s reluctance to defend life with all the powers at his disposal, but once again, that chagrin seemingly hasn’t done anything to reduce his support.

 

With few exceptions, MAGA populism no longer means much of anything with respect to policy. Even Ukraine’s survival remains an important U.S. interest according to Trump, pitting him squarely against the post-liberal pro-Putin faction of his base. “Trump has given the GOP a Chomsky foreign policy, Gephardt trade policy, LBJ spending policy, and Clinton personal morality,” Riedl wrote on Wednesday. “Now, he has convinced GOP voters to support drastic, regressive tax hikes on themselves by calling them tariffs.”

 

What’s left of populism once most of the actual populism has withered away?

 

***

 

Another way of framing that question is this: To an unsettling degree, no one has any idea what a second Trump term will look like policy-wise.

 

Which seems insane. He’s been president for four years and on television yakking about politics for more or less every waking moment since 2015. By this point, we should know with crystal clarity what his agenda will look like over the next four. But apart from a concerted effort to deport illegal immigrants, we don’t.

 

The nature of the man is such that pinning him down on policy commitments is impossible. He’s a compulsive liar, for one thing. He’s also easily influenced by those around him: Any foreign-born college students dreaming today of a green card should remember that Stephen Miller will have his say on all this behind closed doors. Trump’s campaign has already partially walked back his statement, in fact, by clarifying that the green-card policy will “exclude all communists, radical Islamists, Hamas supporters, America haters, and public charges” and will apply only to the “most skilled graduates who can make significant contributions to America.”

 

I find it significant that he made his comment about granting permanent residency to college-educated immigrants on the podcast All-In, hosted by four mega-rich tech bros, two of whom recently held a fundraiser for him. Trump’s need to be liked by his audience has created in him a notorious habit of telling the people in a room with him what he thinks they want to hear. The All-In gang plainly wanted to hear that their industry’s access to skilled foreign tech workers will continue, so they did.

 

But once Trump has left the room, all bets are off. “Take him seriously, not literally,” we were told in 2016; eight years later, that’s code for “it’s anyone’s guess what he’ll do.” No wonder his fans aren’t bothered by his chatter about doling out green cards to foreign students. Why would anyone believe anything he says?

 

Other factors further complicate the task of trying to predict policy in his second term. Much depends, for instance, on whether Republicans regain control of both houses of Congress and, if they do, what their margins are. A 51-49 Senate in which moderates Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski are the deciding votes looks very different from a 54-46 one in which they don’t matter.

 

Trump’s personnel choices also will carry unusual weight. Because he doesn’t hold firm views about most areas of policy, whether he chooses an establishment moderate or a radical populist to fill a given vacancy may come down to how much he personally likes them. Yet those choices will hold momentous consequences for how his administration operates: We could get drastically different policies on abortion medication, for instance, depending on who lands at the Food and Drug Administration.

 

We might see a constitutional showdown with Congress over executive budgetary authority, or not. Christian nationalism might fill the ideological vacuum in the White House left by populism, or not. Trump might be talked out of his insane idea of replacing the federal income tax with tariffs, or he might not. It all comes down to how nutty—or not—his menagerie of deputies ends up being, yet there’s no way to predict how they’ll be selected and which of them will have his ear.

 

Never has it been less certain which direction he’ll take in governing. And yet, across three election cycles, never has he polled higher in national surveys than he has at points this year. Why?

 

The answer, I think, is that Trump’s version of “populism without the populism” has made spite and retribution rather than policy the heart of Republican politics, just like the man himself keeps saying. And the American right is quite comfortable with a politics of spite and retribution.

 

Many of Trump’s supporters seem enthusiastic about it. Ask them if they’re more excited about replacing the federal income tax with tariffs or about prosecuting Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg and what do you suppose they’d say? If you sat them down and explained that his economic policies will almost certainly deepen the agony they’ve experienced from inflation, how many would desert him?

 

In other countries, voters might lurch toward post-liberalism because there are certain policies they want implemented that normal politics can’t deliver. There’s always been an element of that in Trump’s support too (“build the wall!”), but over time the impulse to re-empower him has become less a means to an end among his fans than an end in itself. They want revenge on Democrats for winning the “rigged election” of 2020 and for daring to hold their man accountable for the crimes he’s committed, and only by reelecting him will they achieve that. Apart from a tighter southern border, there’s no particular policy they seek from an authoritarian Trump administration; what they desire is for him to have a free hand to persecute their enemies, “owning the libs” with the gloves off.

 

And they’re willing to make almost limitless compromises on policy toward that end.

 

Trump knows it too. Lately friendly interviewers like Sean Hannity have tried steering him toward a more forward-looking agenda during their conversations, but despite their best efforts he refuses to let go of revanchism. When Phil McGraw pressed him on forgiving his political enemies, Trump replied starkly, “Well, revenge does take time, I will say that. And sometimes revenge can be justified.”

 

How could the movement he leads have turned out any other way under his influence except as disinterested in policy and consumed by grievances, more intent on using political power to harm its enemies than to better its own lives?

 

The controversy happening right now over Louisiana’s new “Ten Commandments” law plays like a parody of modern Republican priorities. While Trump goes about dragging the party toward centrism on abortion, Christian populists are rejoicing over a symbolic gesture that almost certainly won’t survive constitutional scrutiny. Why? Because they know it’ll make Democrats mad for a little while. It’s revenge for the victory the left won decades ago when the Supreme Court ordered church and state to be separated in public institutions. Even if the new law doesn’t stand up, the libs have been owned temporarily.

 

Spite and retribution, nothing more or less. “How easily the base is distracted by shiny objects and how easily are the young jackasses of social media worked up to defend the shiny objects as wins when the things we could win and make permanent are snatched away by our own side’s political leaders,” Erick Erickson wrote on Friday in frustration about Louisiana. The cherry on the sundae was Trump himself celebrating the new law in a Truth Social post, as if his entire life hasn’t been dedicated to seeing how many commandments he can break in any given 24-hour period.

 

***

 

Here’s my prediction, then, for Trump’s otherwise unpredictable second term: Republicans who still care about policy will get just enough from him on the policies they care about to ensure their loyalty as he goes about doing the things he really wants to do in office.

 

Old-school conservatives like Mitch McConnell who are prepared to sacrifice classical liberalism for more tax cuts will get those tax cuts. Pro-lifers who require some federal restrictions on abortion in exchange for betraying the constitutional order will receive them. The tech bros at All-In who need an uptick in H-1B visas before they sign onto authoritarianism also will get their wish.

 

Policy will be traded for quiescence toward Trump’s attempts to consolidate power. As with the hospitality workers in Las Vegas, he’s going to bribe various right-wing stakeholders into looking the other way when he fires half the Justice Department or ignores a court order or directs U.S. soldiers to confront left-wing protesters. He’s a transactional guy, famously. And eight years of Republican politics have shown him that almost everyone has their price.

 

The only sure thing in a second Trump term is that there will be many constitutional crises and fewer “conservatives” than you might expect who have any moral qualms about them. It used to be that the parties broadly agreed on civic fundamentals but fought over policy; as Trump’s brand of populism veers leftward, increasingly the parties will agree on policy but fight over civic fundamentals.

Monday, June 24, 2024

Something Is Wrong

By Michael Walzer

Friday, June 14, 2024

 

Something is seriously wrong with the Left today (or, at least, with large parts of the Left—I recognise that exceptions apply). Described abstractly, what’s wrong is the triumph of the ideological project and its slogans over the interests of people on the ground. Old leftists will remember Lenin’s distinction between revolutionary consciousness and trade-union consciousness—between militants who sought to create a communist society at any cost and workers who were looking for higher wages and a decent workplace. Or consider a much older but similar distinction in the biblical story of the exodus from Egypt—between the future priests hoping to raise up a “holy nation” and the ordinary Israelites dreaming of milk and honey. I want to reverse the values assigned to these two groups by the biblical writers and by Lenin. Leftists go badly wrong when they forget about milk and honey, about higher wages, and about the people on the ground.

 

Right now, this error is most clearly expressed by those left-wing militants who defend Hamas in the name of “resistance,” anti-colonialism, and liberation (or who imagine slaughter as a necessary means to liberation). They take this position without regard for the Israelis murdered on 7 October and without any serious interest in the people of Gaza. I know that many of the participants in the campus demonstrations are thinking of the hungry refugees, the shattered apartment buildings, and the rising count of dead and injured. But these concerns don’t determine the slogans the protesters shout or the politics those slogans promote. 

 

As the protests continued, the government of Iran, Hamas’s chief supporter, was engaged in a brutal crackdown on Iranian women and girls seeking nothing more than minimal freedom. Here was a model of a future Palestine that the protesters didn’t dare look at. In truth, they didn’t want to think about the Palestinians who had lived for years under a brutally repressive Hamas regime, or about the women who would be subject to Islamist discipline in a fully developed Hamas state—let alone about the Jews who would be murdered or displaced if Hamas achieved its stated goal of annihilating Israel.

 

Even the Gazans suffering today—the necessary focus of any left-wing politics—are little more than emblems of Israeli cruelty in much leftist discourse. It is as if they have been conscripted for a political purpose: the elimination of the Jewish state. Leftist militants refuse to address Hamas’s military strategy of embedding its fighters and weapons in the civilian population. Nor will they acknowledge the extensive tunnel network Hamas has constructed beneath Gaza, in which its fighters shelter during Israeli bombardment but to which civilians are denied admittance. Nor is there much leftist interest in Palestinian wellbeing after the war or, more concretely, in how a regime of reconstruction might be organised in Gaza.

 

Not long after 7 October, when the Israeli counteroffensive was just beginning, Hamas supporters decided to bring the war home—perhaps in the belief that everything is finally determined here in the US, the great imperial power. The most readily available space for battle is the university campus, hence the protests that soon involved students and police in an ironic version of the class war (the students represent the bourgeoisie and the police officers are working class). Now the immediate issues are freedom of speech (for the protesters, but not necessarily for anyone else), financial divestment from companies doing business in Israel, and an end to all academic cooperation with Israeli universities. The goal is to turn Israel into a pariah state, isolated and alone.

 

The preeminent issue for American leftists is the American commitment to Israel and the ongoing supply of weapons. So, from the beginning, leftists demanded that a ceasefire be imposed by the US, assumed to be Israel’s puppet-master, and enforced by an immediate end to US military aid. That this would have meant a decisive victory for Hamas was rarely acknowledged, but that was surely the intention of those who organised the campaign. Perhaps they imagined a double victory: ending the Zionist project and furthering the decline of the American empire.

 

There is another war at home, directed not at American support for Israel but at American supporters of Israel—that is, at Zionists or at Jews assumed to be Zionists. This is mostly a matter of low-level harassment and exclusion not organised violence (yet), but it draws upon a long history of left-wing antisemitism, and it consumes a lot of the energy of the pro-Hamas Left. Though this hostility is ideological, directed at those considered privileged white supporters of Israeli settler-colonialism, it is also mindless—a kind of left-wing know-nothingism that begins by knowing nothing about the actual population of Israel. Intense ideological commitment often leads to a politics of focused hatred against enemies of the cause. I am old enough to remember Maoist propaganda campaigns against the “running dogs of imperialism.”

 

There are precedents for this triumph of ideological commitment over political engagement with ordinary people, and I want to look closely at one example in which I was personally involved. But first a question: Isn’t it strange to call this triumph “leftist”? Hasn’t it always been the purpose of the Left, and the honour of many leftists, to fight for the well-being of men and women in trouble; to build a mass movement that includes everyone willing to join? Sometimes, yes, but not always. Ideological radicalism and revolutionary wish-fulfilment have had an extraordinary hold on generations of leftists.

 

Leftists out of power often assume that leftists in power are ideologically faithful—that they live by the doctrines they proclaim. If the Soviet Union calls itself a “workers’ state,” and if factories are nationalised and farms collectivised, then almost nothing else matters—not starving Ukrainians, not dissidents sent to Siberian labour camps, not murdered Jewish writers and artists, not old revolutionaries brought to trial on trumped-up charges and shot. In fact, crimes like these can’t have happened. Any leftists who criticise the regime’s brutality are enemies of the workers—“social fascists,” as German social democrats were called during the 1930s in an early example of focused hatred.

 

The Hamasniks in America today are the descendants of those leftists who defended Stalinism. But they also have more recent American ancestors.

 

***

 

Student protesters on our campuses these last months often invoke the example of the anti-war movement in the late 1960s, and that is indeed a useful example. In fact, there were two different anti-war movements back then, or two groups of activists motivated in different ways. The two overlapped and sometimes worked together. But one group was ideologically driven, while the other, if I can coin a phrase, was people-driven. One was focused on the matter of US imperialism, the other on the images of burning villages in Vietnam; one looked forward to a communist victory, the other, while still opposing the American war, dreaded it.

 

In 1967, I was co-chair of the Cambridge Neighborhood Committee on Vietnam (CNCV)—a position I won by talking too much at the founding meetings. My co-chair wasn’t a professional leftist or an academic, she was a young woman who worked in film and turned out to be an extremely competent manager of the Committee’s daily work. I was in charge of political argument. The work was community organising against the war, of the kind modelled by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Our activists, most of whom were students, went door to door looking for someone who would host a block meeting at which one of us could explain our political position. At the same time, we were collecting signatures to force a referendum on the war in the city of Cambridge, MA. 

 

Ours was a modest politics, so people with different views could easily cooperate. We did not organise marches through the city, so I did not have to argue against carrying VietCong flags, as many of our activists would have wanted to do. Around the country, the flags were an early sign of the coming divisions. I did have to argue with people from the sectarian Left who thought that the referendum was altogether too modest a project. They wanted to start the revolution—as, later on, some of our activists, or people like them, wanted to bring the war home.

 

What were the differences, not yet fully apparent, in CNCV? I had better begin with my own position, which was muddled, to say the least. I was then (and for many years after) closely associated with the magazine Dissent, the founders and editors of which were my political mentors. They were mostly ex-Trotskyists, now democratic socialists and internationalists, and some of them had travelled a lot, meeting comrades abroad. They literally knew the names of all the independent leftists that the Vietnamese communists had murdered. This made it difficult for them to support an anti-war movement whose work, objectively considered, would lead to a communist victory. They would probably have endorsed the American intervention if only a government had emerged in Saigon to defend democracy, end corruption, and win hearts and minds in the countryside.

 

Alas, there was no such government. The VietCong won the battle for hearts and minds, and the American war became a war against the rural population of Vietnam. I was one of the youngest dissentniks and probably the first to join the call for an American withdrawal. But I didn’t long for a communist victory. I knew, and I had been told by my fellow editors and writers, that cruelty and repression would follow. I just thought that the immediate cruelties of the war, above all, the burning villages, required a political response. In CNCV, there were people like me—activists without an ideology, living in the present. But there were many others who thought that they were engaged in a world-historical struggle against American imperialism: they are the nearest ancestors of today’s pro-Hamas militants.

 

CNCV eventually obtained enough petition signatures (and pro-bono legal assistance) to force the city council to authorise a city-wide referendum on the war in November ’67. Some 40 percent of the people of Cambridge voted against the war, which was a victory of sorts. But we lost every working-class neighbourhood and swept only Harvard Square and its surroundings, which was not what our activists had hoped for. It was, however, what we should have expected by sending mostly draft-exempt college students to knock on the doors of people whose kids were serving in the army, some in Vietnam. We hadn’t thought much about how to address the men and women we aimed to convince. It was community organising without a basic respect for the community. So we probably contributed to the rightward drift of the working class in the decades that followed.

 

After the referendum, CNCV broke apart. Some of our activists moved into draft resistance, while others joined the various fragments of the 1960s Left: Maoists, Weathermen, or what remained of SDS. The activists I call people-driven turned to electoral politics in the belief that political campaigns like those of Eugene McCarthy (whom I supported) or Robert Kennedy might actually end the war. In the summer of 1968, we were at the Chicago convention, nominating McCarthy (after Kennedy was murdered), while the ideologically driven leftists were in the streets fighting with the police and helping Nixon to win the November election.

 

After that, the war dragged on for years, though with declining popular support. A new organisation, Veterans Against the War, helped a lot, I think, to convince Americans that there was something radically wrong with our engagement in Vietnam. Theirs was the most concrete and least ideological opposition movement—they talked about their experience in Vietnam, and they didn’t talk about imperialism. 

 

When the war finally ended, the communists in power behaved exactly as my Dissent colleagues had predicted they would. Thousands of Vietnamese men and women were sent to “re-education” camps where they were beaten, tortured, and killed. Fearing the camps, tens of thousands fled the country by sea. The exodus of “boat people” continued for almost ten years; about 25 percent of their number—as many as 200,000 men, women, and children—drowned trying to reach distant shores. The ideological Left, with a few exceptions, found that it had nothing to say on behalf of these victims of the regime it had helped bring to power. The victims were invisible or unimportant, given that American imperialism had been defeated.

 

My friends—the people-driven activists who had also helped to make the communist victory possible—were at least critical of the new government in Saigon and ready to help its fleeing citizens. Still, ours was a difficult politics: condemning the war while acknowledging the repression to come if the war was lost, and then condemning the repression. But I think we did better than those leftists who rushed to Hanoi to celebrate the communist victory, without any thought for the people in the South.

 

***

 

What would a better politics—or what I described as a decent Left after 9/11—look like today? It would have to oppose both Hamas and the current government of Israel; it would have to be people-centred, equally concerned with the wellbeing of Palestinians and Israelis. For the Palestinians, this requires, first, a plan for the reconstruction of Gaza and, second, the opening of a path toward self-determination. For Israelis, it requires the re-establishment of physical security after the trauma of 7 October. But these requirements have a crucial precondition: the defeat of religious and ideological zealots on both sides.

 

Hamas’s Islamist zealots are a threat to ordinary Israelis—to their state and to their lives. And messianic irredentists and ultra-nationalists in Israel are a threat to ordinary Palestinians—to their already constricted living space and to their lives. These groups also threaten their own people, whom they want to discipline and mobilise for a holy war.

 

A decent left-wing politics shouldn’t be hard to figure out: support anyone, Palestinian or Israeli, who aims to secure freedom and security for both nations. An ideological focus on American imperialism and Israeli “settler-colonialism” isn’t just a diversion from a people-centred politics, it is actually a program for a war against the Israelis—a war that holds no promise of freedom for the Palestinians. The call for total victory “from the river to the sea” in both its Hamas and its messianic Zionist versions is, similarly, a program for war, each zealotry against the other. It is time for leftists to forego ideology and think only of a life of safety and comfort for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

The Superstition of Warning Labels

By Kevin D. Williamson

Monday, June 24, 2024

 

There was a time when the biggest name in censorious pop-culture scolds was a Democrat: Tipper Gore, at the time Mrs. Al Gore, one of the “Washington Wives” behind the Parents Music Resource Center. PMRC is now known mainly as a retro-’80s Trivial Pursuit answer, but it was once emblematic of a certain kind of well-heeled evangelical hysteria and the force behind the effort to put warning labels on music and video games with sexual, violent, or otherwise objectionable themes. 

 

You have to use a little bit of historical imagination here. In the 1980s, the Democratic Party did not count drag queens as a major constituency. Social conservatism was more or less the norm in Washington, and a bipartisan norm at that: Al Gore was, at the time, a pro-lifer, albeit a generally mild one, as had been a great many prominent and soon-to-be-prominent figures in the Democratic Party such as Bill Clinton (“I am opposed to abortion and to government funding of abortions”). See also: the Rev. Jesse Jackson (“It takes three to make a baby: a man, a woman and the Holy Spirit”), Gov. Robert Casey of Pennsylvania (infamously shut out of the 1992 convention lest he say something nonconforming on the issue), and Democratic Majority Leader Rep. Dick Gephardt (“I believe that the life of the unborn should be protected at all costs”), whose promise to remain “steadfast” on the issue lasted right up until he decided to run for president.*

 

Socially speaking, those were more conservative times. But much more relevant is the fact that those were extraordinarily paranoid times. (The conservatism and the paranoia do go together, at times, though not in the way our progressive friends suggest in their efforts to pathologize political disagreement.) My own theory is that the divorce boom of the late 1960s and 1970s left a great many fractured families in its wake, with parents—both the one doing the raising and the estranged one—having seen by the early 1980s that they had made a terrible mistake and done their children a terrible disservice, that these children being raised by single parents (single mothers, overwhelmingly) or in so-called blended families were going to be a troubled generation, suffering radically higher rates of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse than children raised in homes with two married parents. All that abuse and neglect was interacting with headlines screaming about elevated crime rates (the U.S. homicide rate hit a record in 1980, while New York City had 2,605 murders in 1990, compared to 386 in 2023), the explosion of crack cocaine use, etc. As is always the case in such times, there was one obvious imperative, one thing the American people needed above all else: someone to blame. 

 

When you are looking for a scapegoat, you need a combination of things: They have to have enough cultural status and cachet to be credible as a villain, but they cannot have any real power, lest they fight back. You need someone who is easy to hate—or at least easy to mistrust—which makes members of racial, religious, political, and sexual minorities attractive candidates. You need someone or something recognizable, preferably instantly recognizable the way a celebrity or someone who wears distinctive religious garb is recognizable, and it doesn’t matter if it makes any sense. (After 9/11, a few angry Americans turned their rage on Sikhs, whose religion was founded in part as an escape from Islam, but one turban is evidently as good as another.) And so Tipper Gore et al. settled on musicians, especially rappers and heavy-metal performers. 

 

It was a matter of aesthetics, not one of morals. Dee Snider of Twisted Sister was a literal Christian choirboy (all-state chorus in high school, no less!) and doesn’t seem to have been much of a sexual deviant (he has been faithfully married to the same woman since 1981), but he sure looked like a class-A weirdo back in the day. Most of the infamous gangster rappers of the 1990s either exaggerated their criminal rĂ©sumĂ©s or invented them outright, ingeniously repackaging white America’s racial paranoia to sell it back to them at a tidy profit; they were writers and actors of the stage, part of an ancient tradition, but, in spite of their fundamentally literary character, they were very useful stand-ins for the actual crime wave that was happening in American cities. 

 

Black hoodlums and degenerate boys in lipstick and eye-shadow: Plus ça change, plus c’est la mĂŞme chose.

 

(People often expect performers such as Ice-T to be real-life versions of the characters they invent and lambaste them when they move on to other things, as Ice-T did taking up his career as a television cop; but, as I have noted before, nobody gets bent out of shape when Anthony Hopkins doesn’t eat people. Nobody ever thought Mick Jagger was actually a street-fighting man—he was a middle-class kid from Dartford studying accounting at the London School of Economics when the Rolling Stones started to blow up. When Rob Halford of Judas Priest was dragged into court as part of a ridiculous trial about whether supposed subliminal messages in his songs had led a teenager to kill himself, people were shocked when the man who showed up in the courtroom was the real-life Rob Halford, a mild-mannered, articulate, balding Englishman in a natty suit, rather than the leather-daddy maniac he plays on stage, like he would just walk around in the sunlight festooned with ten-penny nails and a cast-iron codpiece or whatever it was he was wearing for shows back then. It’s a funny old world.) 

 

It was a weird moment. America’s marital chaos came to a head as the divorce rate peaked in 1981, with Ronald Reagan newly installed in the White House (in spite of weirdly persistent rumors that he might be the Antichrist) and Moscow’s stooges declaring martial law in Poland and sending inconvenient trade unionists to internment camps. In 1983, nearly one-half of all U.S. households tuned into The Day After, a made-for-TV movie about nuclear war between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and, apparently, a fair number of viewers thought it was real. In autumn of that year, the Soviets shot down Korean Air Lines 007, a commercial flight from New York to Seoul via Anchorage, Pershing II missiles were deployed in what was still then known as West Germany, the United States went to DefCon 1 and narrowly avoided war with the Soviet Union when U.S. exercises were mistaken for an attack, and the Soviets angrily walked out of arms-control negotiations in Geneva

 

When the big things feel like they have spun into chaos, it is tempting to try to really clamp down on some of the little things, as a way of giving yourself a false sense of being in control. (I knew a guy who quit smoking after being diagnosed with some terrible health problems that had nothing to do with smoking—he just needed to feel like something about his well-being was within his own powers.) That’s what we did with the warning labels on NWA albums in the Age of Tipper Gore: The chaos in our families had led to chaos on the streets (in that much, I am a Confucian), and the weakness of the United States in the 1970s had emboldened the idealistic socialists in the East—the worst mass murderers on the world scene since the Nazis were done in and arguably worse than them, if we’re talking sheer numbers—to act up from Afghanistan to Poland to Central America.

 

When I was in elementary school, once a month or so we were made to practice hiding under our desks in the event of a nuclear attack—an attack that, as one teacher laconically explained to a roomful of 8-year-olds, we surely would not survive, given our proximity to an Air Force base that trained bomber pilots and hence presumably was high on the Soviet hit list. (In much the same way that every third family in the South or Southwest is descended from a “Cherokee princess”—of which there is no such thing—in the Cold War, every other town was somewhere around No. 4 on the Soviet nuclear-strike list. People talked about their towns’ rankings as though they had firsthand knowledge of Kremlin war-planning. It was a thing.) At the end of the Carter years, we were subjected to gasoline rationing while in sight of the oil wells that were pumping crude out of the ground and sending it to be refined into gasoline. Inflation was out of control, and mortgage rates exceeded 16 percent by 1982. And then there was a kind of broad resurgence of conservatism that led to Reagan’s election in 1980, which, after a rocky start to his presidency, bloomed into a kind of conservative triumphalism. Maybe we couldn’t get the Russians out of Afghanistan, but we could exercise some control over … rap albums with a lot of shocking lyrics, or rock albums made by young suburban men with suspiciously androgynous hairdos. 

 

And that was something. It didn’t lead to anything worthwhile, of course. Pop song lyrics today are a lot raunchier than they were in 1983, video games are as bad as they ever were, and we have a lot of 11-year-olds walking around with what amounts to the world’s entire supply of pornography in their pockets. Twisted Sister’s “We’re Not Gonna Take It” is, from the vantage point of anno Domini 2024, about as edgy as “The Way You Look Tonight.” 

 

When we experience a lack of control—when we are buffeted about by forces that are many orders of magnitude more powerful than we are—we feel fear and anxiety, and, perhaps more important, we feel that our dignity has been injured. And injuries to dignity can be powerful motivators: What we call, for lack of a better word, globalization has made us wealthier and more free, providing us with both material resources and opportunities for enriching experiences that were reserved, if they were available at all, to the very rich and powerful only a generation ago. (Hence the once-evocative phrase “jet set,” words fused together by people who did not imagine Spirit Airlines and the deeply unglamorous experience of 21st-century air travel.) But globalization also exposes us to different kinds of risks and reveals interdependencies that we might not have comprehended otherwise, or might not have had. As the COVID-era supply chain disruptions illustrated so dramatically, we have all sorts of complicated dependencies on far-flung parties, many of whom are beyond the political control of our own government. Washington can huff and puff all day, but the orange juice situation in Brazil is going to be what it is going to be. 

 

This is a very long way of getting around to Dr. Vivek Murthy, the U.S. surgeon general, who has a fairly dopey proposal for putting PMRC-style warning labels on social-media platforms. It’s a pretty simple thing he wants, a little advertisement reading: “Social media is associated with significant mental health harms for adolescents.” But, wait, say the experts. (Oh, the experts!) That “stretches and oversimplifies the scientific evidence,” according to the New York Times

 

For many years, researchers have tried to determine whether the amount of time a child spent on social media contributed to poor mental health, and “the results have been really mixed, with probably the consensus being that no, it’s not related,” said Dr. Mitch Prinstein, the chief science officer at the American Psychological Association.

 

What seems to matter more, he said, is what they are doing when they are online — content about self-harm, for example, has been shown to increase self-harming behavior. 

 

“It’s kind of like saying, ‘Is the number of calories that you eat good for you or bad for you?’” said Dr. Prinstein, who testified before the Senate on the subject last year. “It depends. Is it candy, or is it vegetables? If your child is spending all day on social media following The New York Times feed and talking about it with their friends, that’s probably fine, you know?”

 

(Oh, the American Psychological Association. “Psychology is pseudoscience” isn’t the hill I want to die on this week, but: Psychology is pseudoscience. Mostly.)

 

For students of catastrophist rhetoric, Dr. Murthy’s case will be entirely familiar. 

 

One of the most important lessons I learned in medical school was that in an emergency, you don’t have the luxury to wait for perfect information. You assess the available facts, you use your best judgment, and you act quickly.

 

The mental health crisis among young people is an emergency—and social media has emerged as an important contributor. Adolescents who spend more than three hours a day on social media face double the risk of anxiety and depression symptoms, and the average daily use in this age group, as of the summer of 2023, was 4.8 hours.

 

Additionally, nearly half of adolescents say social media makes them feel worse about their bodies.

 

It is time to require a surgeon general’s warning label on social media platforms, stating that social media is associated with significant mental health harms for adolescents. A surgeon general’s warning label, which requires congressional action, would regularly remind parents and adolescents that social media has not been proved safe. Evidence from tobacco studies show that warning labels can increase awareness and change behavior. When asked if a warning from the surgeon general would prompt them to limit or monitor their children’s social media use, 76 percent of people in one recent survey of Latino parents said yes.

 

It’s always an emergency when you want to impose a policy without such tedious considerations as democratic accountability or piddly little questions like whether you have the legitimate authority in your current role to do the thing you want to do. Just declare the emergency, and then add in a chestnut like this one: “The moral test of any society is how well it protects its children.” Populists and anti-business progressives already are committed to the storyline that social media platforms such as Facebook will sink to any depth of corporate wickedness in the pursuit of profit, and you can see the rhetorical lines being drawn: Over here, “the children”; over there, mustache-twirling corporate villains. 

 

But we have been here before. Warning labels on music and video games had no effect on public morals in the 1980s and 1990s, and warning labels on social media platforms are going to have no effect on the mental health of young people in our time. 

 

There are other approaches that might work. 

 

Dr. Murthy writes: “As a father of a 6- and a 7-year-old who have already asked about social media, I worry about how my wife and I will know when to let them have accounts.” Let me help here: The answer to “when?” is: never. Social media is a sewer, smartphones are the portal to that sewer, and you shouldn’t let your children have them. You can take $1,000 to a good used-book store and get enough reading material to keep your children busy until they are adults. That and a couple of subscriptions will do it. If your children whine about it, tell them “No,” tell them “No” again as necessary, and remind yourself who is the parent and who is the child and then act accordingly. Trying to make social media safe for children is like trying to make guns safe for children. I am as pro-gun a guy as you are going to meet, but they aren’t safe—being safe isn’t what they are made for. Social media is designed to give people instant, unmediated access to the very worst that humanity has to offer. That is what it is there for. If somebody has something thoughtful, well-considered, and worthwhile to say, something that is of long-term value, then he can write a book like a civilized human being would, or at least a newspaper column. Don’t go camping in the garbage dump and then complain that it is full of garbage. 

 

The town dump doesn’t need a warning that says it is full of garbage—it’s a dump. That’s what it’s there for. 

 

The lesson we need about social media comes from the 1980s, but it isn’t warning labels. 

 

It’s “Just Say No.” 

 

And Furthermore …

 

The Supreme Court’s recent Rahimi decision, about which I will have more to say shortly, was one of two recent Second Amendment cases that weren’t really about the Second Amendment. The bump-stock case (Garland v. Cargill) wasn’t even notionally a Second Amendment case; the bump-stock rule cooked up by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) was challenged under the Administrative Procedures Act on the grounds that the ATF was making law in a way that it is not entitled to do, that the question of what the law should be is a matter for the lawmakers, i.e., for Congress. The words “Second Amendment” do not appear in the majority opinion, and, as far as I can tell, the opinion gives no indication that Congress could not pass a law to prohibit bump stocks. Justice Samuel Alito, in his concurrence, is explicit on the issue: “Congress can amend the law—and perhaps would have done so already if the ATF had stuck with its earlier interpretation.” 

 

The Rahimi case was notionally about the Second Amendment, but it really ought to be understood as being about due process rather than the right to keep and bear arms. The Rahimi case was outrageously, maliciously represented, i.e. as in Slate’s insistence that “SCOTUS Is Really Considering if Domestic Abusers Should Be Allowed Guns.” The Supreme Court was considering no such thing—the question of whether people convicted of disqualifying crimes of domestic violence are entitled by the Second Amendment to keep and bear arms was never at issue in the case. The defining fact of the case was that Zackey Rahimi had never been convicted of any crime of domestic violence—he had never even been charged with one, and instead had been stripped of his civil rights based on a civil process, one in which Rahimi had enjoyed neither the benefit of legal counsel nor a hearing of the case before a court. As is the case in civil matters, Rahimi was involved in a process with a much lower standard of evidence than exists in criminal trials. Zackey Rahimi is by all accounts a real lowlife, and he seems to have been involved in a half-dozen shootings. But we do not strip people of their constitutional rights because they are bad guys or because we suspect that they have committed crimes. Rahimi voluntarily entered into a restraining-order agreement, partly under duress from the threat of being made to pay the other party’s legal fees if he contested the issue and lost. 

 

This might be easier to understand if you thought of a civil right other than the right to keep and bear arms. If Rahimi had been stripped of his First Amendment rights, or incarcerated, or forbidden to vote without a criminal conviction, some of our progressive friends would no doubt see the question in a different light. They just don’t think of the rights protected by the Second Amendment as real rights, as legitimate. 

 

The best point of comparison, in my view, is the process by which people are declared mentally incompetent or are remanded to involuntary psychiatric commitment. That doesn’t happen without a hearing with counsel or without substantial procedural protections for the targeted party—and, more important, it does not produce a result that includes open-ended forfeiture of a person’s civil rights or the imposition of felony penalties for non-compliance with treatment. Unlike someone committed involuntarily to psychiatric care, Rahimi did not have his liberties curtailed for two weeks, after which he would have an opportunity to petition for the reinstatement of his rights—he lost his rights indefinitely with no ready way to recover them. 

 

For those who think Justice Clarence Thomas’ dissent in Rahimi is outrageous, ask yourselves: Which other civil rights should Americans be liable to forfeit without having been convicted of a crime? I understand that “due process” means only the process that is due, but it seems to me that the Bill of Rights should be made of sterner stuff, and that its protections should not be set aside by means of such a flimsy process as Zackey Rahimi endured. 

 

Words About Words

 

The Times above seems to be violating its own style guide in the matter of Mitch Prinstein, Ph.D.

 

Dr. should be used in all references for physicians, dentists and veterinarians whose practice is their primary current occupation, or who work in a closely related field, like medical writing, research or pharmaceutical manufacturing: Dr. Alex E. Baranek; Dr. Baranek; the doctor. (Those who practice only incidentally, or not at all, should be called Mr., Ms., Miss or Mrs.)

 

Anyone else with an earned doctorate, like a Ph.D. degree, may request the title, but only if it is germane to the holder’s primary current occupation (academic, for example, or laboratory research). Reporters should confirm the degree holder’s preference. For a Ph.D., the title should appear only in second and later references.

 

For much more on “doctor,” see Jay Nordlinger’s characteristically interesting and erudite writeup

 

Economics for English Majors

 

You can’t move all the jobs to Florida. But you can move Floridians to where the jobs are!

 

“I feel the American dream here,” said Alan Rodriguez, who moved to Warroad [Minn.] in October from West Palm Beach, where he was working at a window company that Marvin acquired in 2019. When orders slowed at that factory, Marvin asked for volunteers to come to Warroad temporarily, offering a $1,250 bonus. Rodriguez, 37, and his wife raised their hands and came for three weeks in June 2023. 

 

Soon after arriving, Rodriguez, who moved to the U.S. from Cuba after winning a visa lottery in 2016, told his supervisor he wanted to stay. He and his wife were the first residents in the Icon Apartments, a new housing development in which Marvin is an investor. The company also supplied the windows and doors for the apartments, some of which are reserved for Path North participants and other Marvin employees. Rodriguez now earns $21 an hour as an assembler, up from the $16 he was making in Florida.

 

In my writing about Eastern Kentucky, a local told me sadly that some big company could build a factory in his poverty-stricken community, but it wouldn’t change things for the locals, because the company would have to import all the workers, given the state of the local labor offerings. Sometimes, people go where the work is—and, sometimes, work goes to where the workers are. U.S. workers have the advantage of being extraordinarily productive by world standards, and being productive is better than being cheap. An American worker who creates $5 in value for every $3 in wages is a better investment than a Pakistani worker who creates $3.40 in value for every $3 in wages—even if the American worker is paid 60 times as much. 

 

Why aren’t the world’s manufacturers pouring into Haiti or Venezuela? Because the big corporations can’t afford that cheap labor. 

 

In Conclusion 

 

As mentioned above, last week I found myself a little bit annoyed with a Republican nobody down in Florida and kind of nuked him from orbit. Rhetorically, it was a fun exercise—the unexpurgated version was a lot more fun!—but there is a serious point, too. The Republican Party is never going to be a normal political party until it reckons with Donald Trump’s attempted coup d’Ă©tat, which was not limited to the photogenic events of January 6, 2021. The Republican Party will not be able to move forward until people running for the House or for governorships can answer basic, obvious questions, such as: Who won the 2020 presidential election? 

 

Evangelical Christians in particular are doing themselves no favors by associating themselves with an enterprise that currently requires bearing false witness. If you can’t even answer basic questions of fact—like whether Donald Trump dishonored himself and his family with Stormy Daniels in that Tahoe hotel room, irrespective of the question of whether he should have been charged with a crime in the ensuing hush-money controversy—then you are not going to be able to deal credibly with heavier issues: China, entitlements, debt, etc. I know that Republicans probably don’t feel this way, but I’m actually doing them a favor by not letting this stuff go. 

 

You’re welcome, you dumb SOBs.