The Deterrents Weren’t Deterring

By Judson Berger

Friday, February 02, 2024

 

Mike Watson of the Hudson Institute described in one of National Review’s December cover stories how the post–Cold War West had “built and inhabited an elaborate fantasy,” one in which the collapse of the Soviet Union brought peace to the realm at last, and all that remained was a bit of clean-up of “the nasty old world of conflict and chaos.”

 

Not every member of the Western foreign-policy elite shared each aspect of this dream, but enough of them picked up enough parts of the story to push the United States and its allies into hubris and overreach. Like the Pompeiians in search of fertile soil, they forgot the wisdom of their ancestors, ignored the dangers, and moved steadily closer to the mouth of Vesuvius.

 

Now, the rumblings from the caldera are shaking the foundations of this fantasy world.

 

The deadly, Iran-linked drone attack on American forces in Jordan last weekend is another sign of the eruption that is either coming or already under way, adding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s Taiwan rumblings, Hamas’s slaughter of Israelis and the resulting war, and Houthi attacks on Red Sea vessels. The strike increases the potential for an expanding confrontation in the Middle East, one the Biden administration so clearly wishes to avoid but, paradoxically, might be unable to if it wishes to contain it.

 

On Friday, the U.S. began what is likely to be a campaign of retaliatory strikes for the killing of three Americans and wounding of 40 others — hitting dozens of sites in Iraq and Syria including “command and control operations centers, intelligence centers,” and more. The military response is likely to be carried out in stages; according to the Wall Street Journal, the administration wants to retaliate in such a way that deters further attacks on U.S. forces, short of entering a new war in the Middle East (Jim Geraghty provides a menu of options here). At the same time, the White House has stressed, “We do not seek to escalate.”

 

The last 20 years of U.S. engagement in what was once the cradle of civilization — now its tormentor — no doubt inform their hesitation. But Noah Rothman argues that Biden is “obliged to respond dramatically” here and that, in doing so, he would not be starting a war; rather, he would be “reimposing sobriety” on an enemy that’s been waging “an unreciprocated war against the U.S. and its allies for months.” As is tragically evident, the administration’s warnings and military reactions so far have not deterred our adversaries and those eager to join their ranks. And as Jim notes, expectations of a “proportionate” reply will continue to allow those adversaries to determine the force of the counterpunch — until such time as those expectations are challenged.

 

Time will tell whether the ongoing strikes achieve this with respect to Iran and the forces it controls. NR’s editorial predicts that “this wave of violence will not stop until the costs of Iran’s campaign of aggression become unendurable.” The military response to the Yemeni Houthis provides another example of how the current approach has not, to this point, deterred those actors exploiting what they see as an opportunity. The Houthis continue to strike Western naval assets and commercial vessels, as our editorial notes, while Iranian proxy groups hit U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. The Houthis boasted Wednesday of firing more missiles at a U.S. warship, and vowed to keep doing so; one Houthi missile reportedly came closer than ever to hitting its American target.

 

Andrew McCarthy aims to reset the conversation around “proportionality”:

 

For about the millionth time, the law-of-war concept of proportionality does not hold that a response to an attack has to be on the same scale as the attack itself. . . .

 

The driving question in a proportionality calculation is: What is the military objective? If that objective is legitimate (which, under the United States Constitution, we get to decide for ourselves), then the use of force must be reasonably proportionate to what is required to achieve the objective. If the objective is to end or drastically diminish the aggression of Iran and its proxy forces, then a proportionate use of force would be whatever is necessary to break the enemy’s will to continue (and even escalate) that aggression.

 

Arguing against an interminable tit-for-tat, he concludes: “The point of a response is not to even the score. It is to end the contest.”

 

The caldera will either be capped or hurl its terrible contents. Jay Nordlinger, zooming out on the globe, highlights recent remarks from Admiral Rob Bauer, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, primarily addressing the threat from Russia and the pressure being put on “the rules-based international order.” As “the tectonic plates of power” shift, Bauer warned, “we face the most dangerous world in decades.” A menacing cartel of rogue states and their proxies appear determined to prove him right.