By Kenneth R. Pike
Thursday, January 06, 2022
Whenever the
topic of affirmative action and academic diversity trends, a certain classroom experience comes to
mind. After a lecture comparing the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and
John Locke, I asked my students which seemed worse: tyranny or anarchy. A
consensus began to gel around anarchy being preferable to tyranny, on the
grounds that anarchy affords greater personal freedom and, thus, potential for
improvement. At the time, I was teaching in a suburban Arizona college where
the distinction between conservative and libertarian ideologies can run a bit
muddy, so I was prepared to offer some hypothetical challenges to this view.
But then
Tamara (not her real name) raised her hand. Tamara’s classmates mostly
reflected the community demographics of recent high-school graduates—that is,
middle-class American teenagers of assorted race and indistinguishably suburban
milieu. But Tamara herself was conspicuously Muslim. “I’m from Iraq,” she
volunteered. “Saddam Hussein was a tyrant. When I was little, I heard stories
about girls disappearing from school and never coming home, but it was always
someone else’s school. It never happened to anyone I knew, only to my friend’s
friend or my cousin’s cousin. Sometimes it was scary, but life was mostly
normal. We went to church and school. We talked to our neighbors. When Saddam
Hussein was removed, there was anarchy for a while. No one went to school or
church. My neighbors were killing each other over clean water. Things got
better eventually, even better than before. But if I had to choose between
anarchy or tyranny for the rest of my life, I would choose tyranny.”
Tamara’s
classmates were transfixed. Her personal testimony breathed life into the
question, transforming it from a game of speculative hypotheticals into a
practical problem that demanded serious reflection. Instead of falling back on
shallow political slogans or tired civics clichés, my students began actively
interrogating their own priors, raising the level of discourse.
As my pedagogy
has evolved over the years, I’ve often returned to that moment to reflect not
only on the discussion itself but on the classroom conditions that made it
possible. Much continues to be written about the importance of viewpoint
diversity in student bodies, and I have rarely witnessed a more striking
example. But as faculty, my control over the demographics of my classroom is
essentially zero. There were also only about 20 students enrolled in that
class; could the moment be reproduced in a lecture hall seating a hundred or
more? The size of my classes has also never been up to me. So, I have tried to
focus on variables over which I have some discernible control, like making sure
all my students have a chance to speak, or maintaining a sufficiently
respectful environment that people with heterodox views or sensitive personal
experiences feel comfortable sharing them.
I have since
received many compliments on my ability to draw students into productive
conversations, and my teaching evaluations have provided great professional
satisfaction. But robust success in my classroom continues to depend not only
on the quality of my teaching, but on the willingness of my students to make
personal contributions to the learning environment. This phenomenon was at
least partly explained by English jurist and philosopher Francis Bacon,
who famously cautioned against a number of hurdles to clear
thinking in his essay Novum Organum. These hurdles included
the idola specus or “Idols of the Den”:
The idols of
the den are those of each individual; for everybody (in addition to the errors
common to the race of man) has his own individual den or cavern, which
intercepts and corrupts the light of nature, either from his own peculiar and
singular disposition, or from his education and intercourse with others, or
from his reading, and the authority acquired by those whom he reverences and
admires, or from the different impressions produced on the mind, as it happens
to be preoccupied and predisposed, or equable and tranquil, and the like; so
that the spirit of man (according to its several dispositions), is variable,
confused, and as it were actuated by chance[.]
To overcome
this hurdle, Bacon suggests, we “should suspect whatever particularly takes and
fixes [our] understanding, and should use so much the more caution to preserve
it equable and unprejudiced.” When teaching the Novum Organum, I
invite my students to imagine themselves peering out at the world through the
mouth of a cave, their view constrained by its narrowness. How can they broaden
their metaphorical horizons and keep their understanding unprejudiced?
One answer is
to consult with others whose personal caverns overlook different parts of the
world. This can be a way of talking about the breadth of human experience, but
it can also be somewhat literal; among the contributing causes of the European
Renaissance and Enlightenment eras was an increase in cross-cultural exchange.
While international enrollment is sometimes sought “as a bailout for universities,” the less mercenary justification for
diverse matriculation is that it is of intellectual benefit to
students. This is sometimes called the “diversity rationale” for
demographic-sensitive recruitment and admissions in higher education.
Among the most
powerful objections to the diversity rationale is that students themselves
should not be asked (or do not necessarily care) to contribute their
perspectives for the benefit of their classmates. Recollecting an incident
where a teacher sought comment on the use of racial epithets in the literary
work of Mark Twain, Kimberly Reyes once observed:
I was there to
learn like everyone else. But suddenly, as one of two black students in the
class, I was expected to enhance the learning experiences of my mostly white
counterparts. I’ll never forget the terrifying and confusing feeling of going
from a part of the classroom to a classroom accessory.
To avoid
burdening minority students in this way, Reyes suggests, “affirmative
action”—that is, programs and policies that give members of historically
oppressed identity groups privileged access to education and employment
opportunities—should not be used to promote diversity. Rather, it should only
exist as part of a program of reparations. On what can be called
the “reparative rationale,” past oppression of one’s identity group justifies
special benefits to oneself, without regard for personal desert or incidental
benefits (such as exposure to diverse viewpoints) as might accrue to others.
It might be objected that helping everyone is
better than only helping some, but advocates for reparations can
respond that goods like access to higher education are positional. Programs that improve everyone’s
absolute position, but do not change the relevant identity group’s relative position,
do not satisfy the reparative rationale. For example, let’s imagine that, in an
act of penitence, a historically racist institution like Harvard or Yale admits a freshman class consisting
entirely of poverty-afflicted black students from Baptist congregations in
urban Chicago. This would violate the diversity rationale for affirmative
action, since the student body would arrive with substantially overlapping
perspectives. The reparative rationale, by contrast, endorses such an approach:
more black students (and correspondingly fewer non-black students) attending
universities that gatekeep highly compensated careers and the levers of
American political power is, on the reparative rationale, an unqualified good.
Beginning
with Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke in 1978,
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the reparative
rationale, finding it unconstitutional. In the US, “equal protection of the
laws” forbids public universities from favoring applicants of certain groups as
a form of reparations for past injustices. But on the diversity rationale, the
Court recognizes overall student body diversity as a compelling interest.
Admissions officers are therefore permitted to give some “weight” to the race
of individual applicants for admission, at least for the next six years. This is presumably why many universities
now boast committees and administrators dedicated to “diversity, equity, and
inclusion”—not “reparations, equity, and inclusion.”
There are
other rationales for demographic-oriented recruitment and admission. In her
2010 book, The Imperative of Integration, philosopher Elizabeth Anderson
identifies at least two—anti-discrimination and social integration. But the
anti-discrimination rationale is self-refuting, since discrimination in favor of
one group can be difficult to persuasively distinguish from
discrimination against another. Under controlling precedent, the constitutional way to “stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race.” And the aim of social integration faces the same basic hurdle as the
diversity rationale: members of historically oppressed identity groups are
often suspicious of—or even straightforwardly opposed to—being swept into the
assimilative liberal project.
Therein lies
the rub. Viewpoint diversity is a liberal value lacking any necessary
connection to the redistributionist instincts of political progressivism—much
less the identitarian chauvinism indulged in more radical spheres. A Muslim
immigrant from a war-torn nation certainly brings a unique perspective to a
classroom of mostly middle-class American teenagers, but so might the child of
a Chinese real estate mogul, or a convicted felon out on parole, or a
middle-aged Catholic priest, and so on. The original impetus for academic
affirmative action was obviously racial disparities in
education and employment, not a perceived shortage of (say) middle-aged
Catholic perspectives in the classroom.
So, did the
Court’s enshrinement of the diversity rationale in law bring an end to the
reparative schemes of American identitarians? Hardly. Evaluating recent public
debate on affirmative action in higher education, Oliver Traldi argues that the “perspective presently
dominant is not even capable of making sense of itself.” But what if “making
sense” is exactly what the dominant perspective has developed to avoid? Insofar
as “viewpoint diversity” affirmative action happens to benefit the same identity groups favored
by reparative regimes, this can (apparently!) be written off as a happy
coincidence. Appeals to other kinds of diversity are simply dismissed as unserious.
Scholars
like George Yancey and Jonathan Haidt took the diversity pretext at face
value and generated reams of empirical evidence that conservative (and,
especially, religious conservative) viewpoints are heavily under-represented in
higher education. Yet, essentially no one in higher education is seriously
pursuing affirmative action for conservative or Christian students or faculty,
as viewpoint diversity would appear to demand. In many places, the practical meaning
of student body “diversity” has become, simply, “less white and Asian.” Whether this increases viewpoint
diversity in classrooms (and it might) does not appear to actually matter. What
universities overwhelmingly pursue, as US Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas
suggests, is the “aesthetic” of diversity.
Institutional
conflation of diversity and reparations is buttressed by support from review
outlets like US News & World Report, which ranks the “diversity” of student bodies by
first excluding international students from consideration.
Even though US News itself agrees that “international students ... add
diversity to a college or university,” the organization primarily reports
“diversity” as a measure of the disparate racial and ethnic self-identification
of culturally American students. This is a clear nod to the
idea that diversity initiatives in higher education are not aimed at viewpoint
diversity at all, but at the advancement of a particular vision of American
identity politics. (Recognizing this also helps to make sense of the University
of California’s continuing efforts to impose ideological orthodoxy on
its employees.)
Equivocation
between diversity and reparations is a textbook application of what Nicholas
Shackel calls the “motte-and-bailey doctrine.” For those unfamiliar:
[A] Motte and
Bailey castle is a medieval system of defence in which a stone tower on a mound
(the Motte) is surrounded by an area of pleasantly habitable land (the Bailey),
which in turn is encompassed by some sort of a barrier, such as a ditch. Being
dark and dank, the Motte is not a habitation of choice. The only reason for its
existence is the desirability of the Bailey, which the combination of the Motte
and ditch makes relatively easy to retain despite attack by marauders. When
only lightly pressed, the ditch makes small numbers of attackers easy to defeat
as they struggle across it: when heavily pressed the ditch is not defensible,
and so neither is the Bailey. Rather, one retreats to the insalubrious but
defensible, perhaps impregnable, Motte.
[...]
[T]he
desirable but only lightly defensible territory of the Motte and Bailey castle,
that is to say, the Bailey, represents philosophical propositions with similar
properties: desirable to their proponents but only lightly defensible. The
Motte represents the defensible but undesired propositions to which one
retreats when hard pressed.
A surfeit of
reparations advocates (including Ta-Nehisi Coates) are openly disdainful of the diversity
rationale—just not so disdainful as to actually oppose diversity
initiatives. In the spirit of Ayn Rand on the dole, reparations advocates are willing to
take what they can get even when it falls short of their ideals. Indeed,
offices of “diversity, equity, and inclusion” appear mostly free in practice
to function on the reparative rationale, so long as they
don’t call it that in any FOIA-accessible documentation.
The reparative
rationale is the reparation advocate’s bailey: desirable on a certain view but
difficult to defend, especially in cases where the primary beneficiaries are
young people from wealthy families. As Justice Thomas observes, the pursuit of a racially diverse student body “does
nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher
education.” This is not to claim that the reparative rationale cannot be
defended—only that the argument is both challenging and broadly unnecessary.
Reparations advocates can retreat to the diversity rationale the moment critics
come calling.
Then, if
pressed on the diversity rationale, the reparations advocate can default to the
interminable aspiration of imperfect duty. A maximally diverse classroom could make
education impracticable, if the instructor and the students lacked so much as a
common tongue. On the spectrum between “so different we cannot learn from one
another” and “so alike there is nothing to learn from one another,” there are
presumably more and less optimal places to situate our institutions of higher
education. If we cannot do everything that might improve viewpoint
diversity, this is surely no objection to the things we can do. If
our “diversity, equity, and inclusion” efforts focus on increasing black or
Hispanic enrollment while doing nothing about the absence of rural students or plummeting male matriculation, well, it would be unrealistic to expect
diversity officers to solve every problem at once.
Fair
enough—but once this is identified as a motte, the jig is up. The real question
is whether it is unrealistic to expect admissions officers to actually
pursue viewpoint diversity, rather than running reparations programs
under its cover. Thus far, the US Supreme Court has taken universities at their
word, accepting a veneer of diversity as the genuine article. But as the
Court again weighs certiorari on the matter of admissions
discrimination, this time against Asian applicants to Harvard and the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, identitarians understandably fear
for the future of affirmative action.
If the Court
agrees to hear either case (or both), there are only three likely outcomes. The
first is that the Court could put some teeth into Equal Protection and outlaw
affirmative action altogether, six years ahead of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
proffered deadline. I suspect the practical consequences of such a ruling would
be less dire than is sometimes supposed, but I am also skeptical that the
Roberts Court can be persuaded to go that far. The more likely result is a
finding that admissions procedures disadvantaging Asian Americans are, under
the diversity rationale, either permissible or impermissible. The Biden
administration has asked the Supreme Court to deny certiorari on the theory that targeted
discrimination against Asian applicants is a permissible way to increase
viewpoint diversity among university students.
But whether or
not Harvard and UNC prevail in the judgment, the resulting opinion would most
likely reinforce the diversity rationale—putting another
doctrinal nail in the reparative coffin. Since there is essentially zero chance
that the conservative Court will pivot to the reparative rationale, the best
case scenario for identitarians is exactly what the Biden administration has
requested: for the Court to deny certiorari, allowing the status quo of
prioritizing a spurious “viewpoint diversity” to persist unaltered until a more
identitarian Court can be appointed.
Not everyone
values viewpoint diversity in their classroom—or, for that matter, in their
community—but I certainly do. And while I hope I never make any of my students
feel like a “classroom accessory,” I do expect all of
them to contribute their unique perspectives for the betterment of their peers.
In fact, I regard such interactions as central to the university experience.
So, I think it is important that university admissions officers be empowered to
matriculate a student body with a variety of experiences and backgrounds among
their merits. Such latitude must surely include reasonable recognition of the
role that race (but also region, and recreation, and religion) plays in
viewpoint diversity.
But, whether
overtly or covertly applied, the reparative rationale limits the
ability of admissions officers to craft a diverse student body. It demands that
universities carry out an external agenda of social engineering. This is the
very opposite of empowerment. Worse, the reparative rationale invites students
to comprehend education as an entitlement, something society is obligated to
provide them in recompense for past discrimination. This obscures the truth
that higher education, liberal education, can never be
passively received—only taken, wrested from the struggle to
emerge from one’s Baconian cave by facing the challenging ideas of diverse,
even disagreeable others. Equivocation between the diversity rationale and the
reparative rationale leads to more than just confusion in public discourse. It
reduces higher education from a collaborative pursuit of personal betterment,
to mere political spoils.
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