By Jim Geraghty
Thursday, February
03, 2022
When Covid-19 first darkened our
lives in the opening months of 2020, it was not only reasonable but logical to
suspect that the virus had originated from some animal sold, slaughtered, or
served in a Wuhan wet market.
In November 2017, Smithsonian magazine
published an eerily prescient feature piece by Melinda Liu titled “Is China
Ground Zero for a Future Pandemic?” It offered a vivid portrait of China’s
urban wet markets as the perfect petri dish for viruses jumping species:
“Stalls overflowed with graphic evidence of the morning’s brisk trade: boiled
bird carcasses, bloodied cleavers, clumps of feathers, poultry organs. Open
vats bubbled with a dark oleaginous resin used to remove feathers. Poultry
cages were draped with the pelts of freshly skinned rabbits. . . . These areas
— often poorly ventilated, with multiple species jammed together — create ideal
conditions for spreading disease through shared water utensils or airborne
droplets of blood and other secretions.”
A wet market appeared to be the origin of
the first SARS outbreak. Researchers Wenhui Li et al., as they wrote in
the Journal of Virology in December 2020, were able to
determine, fairly quickly, that “exotic animals from a Guangdong marketplace
are likely to have been the immediate origin of the SARS-CoV that infected
humans in the winters of both 2002–2003 and 2003–2004. Marketplace Himalayan palm
civets (Paguma larvata) and raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides)
harbored viruses highly similar to SARS-CoV.” Americans saw and heard
relatively little coverage of that outbreak at the time, as it peaked right
around when the U.S. was invading Iraq in 2003. But the first SARS pandemic
infected more than 8,000 people and killed more than 700.
Just about every virologist in the world
is certain that SARS-CoV-2 — the coronavirus that causes Covid — is most like
those found in bats; they differ on whether it is likely to have jumped
directly from bats to human beings, or whether it passed through an
intermediate species such as a pangolin — the scaly-skinned mammals that are
among the most widely illegally trafficked species in the world.
As luck would have it, a Chinese health
inspector, Xiao Xiao, conducted routine monthly surveys of all 17 wet-market
shops selling live wild animals for food and pets across Wuhan, in an effort to
identify the source of a separate disease, the tick-borne severe fever with
thrombocytopenia syndrome. His detailed report revealed that Wuhan’s wet
markets sold all kinds of animals — “38 species, including 31 protected species
sold between May 2017 and November 2019 in Wuhan’s markets.” But his report
also noted that “no pangolins (or bats) were traded, supporting reformed
opinion that pangolins were not likely the spillover host at the source of the
current coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.”
Thus, the first problem with the
wet-market theory is that apparently Wuhan wet markets didn’t sell or trade
bats or pangolins. Could it be another mammal species? Sure.
Do we know for certain that SARS-CoV-2 passed through another mammal before
jumping into humans? No.
Another major complication with the
natural spillover theory is that no one in China has been able to find
SARS-CoV-2 naturally occurring in animals in China — or at least, that is what
Chinese health authorities are telling the world. A detailed analysis by
Antonio Regalado in MIT Technology Review in March 2021 noted
that “no food animal has been identified as a reservoir for the pandemic virus.
That’s despite efforts by China to test tens of thousands of animals, including
pigs, goats, and geese, according to Liang Wannian, who leads the Chinese side
of the research team. No one has found a ‘direct progenitor’ of the virus, he
says, and therefore the pandemic ‘remains an unsolved mystery.’”
As we know, SARS-CoV-2 is quite contagious
among human beings. So why is this super-contagious virus so difficult to find
in a bat?
In addition to the inability to find bats
or pangolins in the wet markets in the pre-pandemic surveys, a few other facts
don’t fit easily with the narrative of the wet-market origin.
A significant portion, although not all,
of the first Covid cases could be traced back to the Huanan Seafood Market — 27
of 41 patients, according to a key early assessment published in the medical
journal the Lancet. But a later, larger study of the first 99
people diagnosed with COVID found that only 49 could be traced back to the
Huanan Seafood Market.
It is likely that the seafood market was a
key location in the early spread of the virus, but not necessarily the origin
point. After examining the Lancet’s data, Georgetown University
professor and pandemic specialist Daniel Lucey contended, as quoted by Jon
Cohen in Science (January 26, 2020), that “the virus came into
that marketplace before it came out of that marketplace.”
Another complication is that bat viruses
don’t seem to jump easily into humans, and when they have done so in the past,
they did not set off massive life-threatening pandemics. Research published by
the Wuhan Institute of Virology in 2018 examined the villagers who lived
closest to the coronavirus-carrying bats in Yunnan Province and concluded that
natural “spillover” from bats directly to humans is “relatively rare” — just
2.7 percent of the villagers had antibodies indicating exposure to a bat
virus.
* * *
There are two naturally occurring
viruses that are particularly similar to SARS-CoV-2. The first is RaTG13,
which shares 96.2 percent of its genome with SARS-CoV-2, according to a paper
released by the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s Shi Zhengli. This virus was
collected from bat feces in a copper-mine shaft in Tongguan, Mojiang, Yunnan
Province, China, that was the site of a small-scale deadly viral infection with
some curious similarities to Covid.
In April 2012, six miners were assigned to
clean bat guano from the mine shaft. Four miners had been working at the site
for two weeks, and two had been working there for four days when they all grew
ill with a cough and fever and experienced difficulty breathing, aching limbs,
heavy and bloody mucus and saliva, and headaches — symptoms of a viral
respiratory infection that are similar to the effects of Covid. All six miners
were admitted to a Kunming hospital in late April and early May, and three died
— one after two weeks, one after a month and a half, and one after three
months. The other three survived.
Dr. Zhong Nanshan, a prominent Chinese
pulmonologist whose high-profile role has been compared to that of Dr. Anthony
Fauci in the United States, consulted on the cases of the miners. Recognizing
that the virus afflicting the miners could be comparable to SARS, researchers
sent blood samples to the Wuhan Institute of Virology for antibody testing.
In 2012 and 2013, teams of researchers from
the Wuhan Institute of Virology conducted a study of coronaviruses in bats in
that abandoned mine shaft — and one of the samples they collected was RaTG13.
The second virus that is particularly
similar to SARS-CoV-2 is really a cluster of three similar viruses discovered
in Laos in autumn 2021. A team led by Marc Eliot, a virologist at the Pasteur
Institute in Paris, collected saliva, feces, and urine samples from 645 bats in
caves in northern Laos and found three new viruses that were each more than 95
percent identical to SARS-CoV-2, which they named BANAL-52, BANAL-103, and
BANAL-236.
Some skeptics of the lab-leak theory
contend that the BANAL viruses proved that SARS-CoV-2 is likely a naturally
occurring virus, and because Laos was roughly 1,000 miles from Wuhan, this
pointed away from the notion that the Covid pandemic could be traced back to a
leak from Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other labs in the city. But there
is ample reason to believe that viruses from Laos — perhaps not the BANAL trio,
but similar ones — were also shipped from Laos to the Wuhan Institute of
Virology.
In 2010, Wildlife Trust, a nonprofit
international conservation organization dedicated to protecting wildlife,
announced it was rebranding itself under the name EcoHealth Alliance. The
organization’s president, Peter Daszak, declared that his group had become “the
central organization defining the intersection of local conservation and global
health” and touted itself as being “on the forefront of informing the public,
businesses, and the scientific community about emerging diseases, including
potential pandemics.” It is safe to say that EcoHealth Alliance is one of the
largest, best funded, and best connected nonprofits, focusing upon “field
research and develop[ing] tools to save ecosystems and predict and prevent
pandemics.”
For decades, EcoHealth Alliance staff and
scientists went out into the wild collecting viruses and conducting research on
how those viruses worked. The watchdog organization White Coat Waste filed a Freedom
of Information Act request for communications between the U.S. National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and EcoHealth Alliance. In June
2018, EcoHealth Alliance’s chief of staff, Aleksei Chmura, emailed Adam Graham,
a grant-management specialist at the U.S. NIAID, and discussed collecting
viruses from bats in countries that neighbor China, including Burma, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos. The email detailed plans to “arrange for shipment of bats
and other high-risk host species to Wuhan Institute of Virology Laboratory in
China” and “all samples collected would still be tested at the Wuhan Institute
of Virology in China.”
So it is quite plausible that a sample of
a bat virus from Laos could end up behind the walls of the Wuhan Institute of
Virology. The institute housed one of the largest collections of coronaviruses
found in bats in the world — if not the largest.
EcoHealth Alliance has earned its scrutiny
and suspicion in the two years since the Covid pandemic started. Science writer
David Quammen joined Chmura on a trip to China in 2009. In Quammen’s 2013
book, Spillover: Animal Infections and the Next Human Pandemic, he
describes his conversation with Chmura about the lack of safety gear:
At this
moment I became conscious of a dreary human concern: Though we were searching
for SARS-like coronavirus in these animals, and sharing their air in a closely
confined space, none of us was wearing a mask. Not even a surgical mask, let
alone an N95. Um, why is that? I asked Aleksei. “I guess it’s
like not wearing a seat belt,” he said. What he meant was that our exposure
represented a calculated, acceptable risk. You fly to a strange country, you
jump into a cab at the airport, you’re in a hurry, you don’t speak the language
— and usually there’s no seat belt, right? Do you jump out and look for another
cab? No, you proceed. You’ve got things to do. You might be killed on the way
into town, true, but probably you won’t. Accepting that increment of risk is
part of functioning within exigent circumstances. Likewise in a Chinese bat
cave. If you were absolutely concerned to shield yourself against the virus,
you’d need not just a mask but a full Tyvek coverall, and gloves, and goggles —
or maybe even a bubble hood and visor, your whole suit positive-pressurized
with filtered air drawn in by a battery-powered fan. “That’s not very
practical,” Aleksei said.
Oh, I
said, and continued handling the bagged bats. I couldn’t disagree. But what I
thought was, Catching SARS — that’s practical?
We also know that another research
institution in the same city, the Wuhan Center for Disease Control, was also
doing research on coronaviruses found in bats — and it is probably worth noting
that the Wuhan CDC building is less than a mile from the Huanan Seafood Market.
Bat coronaviruses are the specialty of
virologist Tian Junhua. In 2017, the Chinese state-owned Shanghai Media Group
made a seven-minute documentary about him, entitled “Youth in the Wild:
Invisible Defender.” Videographers followed Tian Junhua as he traveled deep
into caves to collect bats. “Among all known creatures, the bats are rich with
various viruses inside,” he says in Chinese. “You can find most viruses
responsible for human diseases, like rabies virus, SARS, and Ebola.
Accordingly, the caves frequented by bats became our main battlefields.”
Ominously, Tian Junhua described being
infected with viruses during his excursions, getting sick, and self-isolating
for two weeks. As stated in a May 2017 report by Xinhua News Agency, repeated
by the Chinese news site JQKNews.com:
In the
process of operation, Tian Junhua forgot to take protective measures. Bat urine
dripped on him like raindrops from the top. If he was infected, he could not
find any medicine. It was written in the report. The wings of bats carry sharp
claws. When the big bats are caught by bat tools, they can easily spray blood.
Several times bat blood was sprayed directly on Tian’s skin, but he didn’t
flinch at all. After returning home, Tian Junhua took the initiative to isolate
for half a month. As long as [infection during] the incubation period of 14
days does not occur, he will be lucky to escape.
We know for a fact that the people
collecting samples do not always follow the necessary safety procedures. And
the risk of accidental infection does not disappear once the viruses and bats
are brought back to the laboratories.
* * *
Lab accidents happen. The first
argument against the lab-leak theory that can be safely dismissed is the notion
that Chinese scientists were simply too careful or too diligent to ever let a
virus escape their lab. Accidents occur even in the most well-trained and
highly regarded research facilities in the world. In June 2014, the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention determined that they had
unintentionally exposed personnel to potentially viable anthrax. A month later,
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration found samples of smallpox, dengue, and
spotted fever just sitting in a storage room. A decade earlier, the Chinese
CDC’s National Institute of Virology in southern Beijing had accidentally
released SARS. Twice.
In February 2019, Lynn Klotz, a senior
science fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, laid out a
report in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists detailing that
from 2009 to 2015, a federal program “received a total of 749 incident reports
from select-agent research facilities,” including “1) needle sticks and other
through the skin exposures from sharp objects, 2) dropped containers or
spills/splashes of liquids containing pathogens, and 3) bites or scratches from
infected animals.”
Some virologists contend that if the world
wants to know how to counter and defeat particularly dangerous and contagious
viruses, they need to work with and study particularly dangerous and
contagious viruses. Because those particularly dangerous viruses aren’t always
readily available for research and experimentation, they contend they must
create them through “gain-of-function research” — taking existing viruses and,
through various means, making them more infectious, contagious, or virulent.
Other virologists see this research as an accident waiting to happen.
In October 2014 — not too long after the
embarrassing but nonfatal incidents at the CDC and FDA — Dr. Francis Collins,
director of the U.S. National Institutes of Health, announced a pause in
federal funding of gain-of-function research experiments with influenza, SARS,
and MERS viruses, as NIH wanted to evaluate whether the research was worth the
potential risks. But NIH allowed one ongoing international research effort to
continue, an effort that included Ralph Baric, an infectious-disease researcher
at the University of North Carolina, and the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s Shi
Zhengli.
In 2015, that team of scientists, Vineet
Menachery and colleagues, announced in Nature Medicine that
they had “generated and characterized a chimeric virus expressing the spike of
bat coronavirus SHC014 in a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV backbone.” This was a new
kind of virus that was resistant to existing treatments: “Both monoclonal
antibody and vaccine approaches failed to neutralize and protect from infection
with CoVs using the novel spike protein.”
The announcement inflamed the concerns of
certain researchers that gain-of-function research was too risky — that it
generated too little useful knowledge and created the potential for disaster.
In a 2015 article by Declan Butler in Nature, Simon Wain-Hobson, a
virologist at the Pasteur Institute, warned that “if the virus escaped, nobody
could predict the trajectory.” In the same article, Richard Ebright, a
molecular biologist and biodefense expert at Rutgers University, concurred:
“The only impact of this work is the creation, in a lab, of a new, non-natural
risk.”
Collins and the NIH restored funding for
gain-of-function research in 2017, after concluding that very few
government-funded gain-of-function experiments posed a significant threat to
public health and pledging greater scrutiny of grant requests.
Baric dismisses the notion that his work
ever contributed to the creation of a supervirus. But over the course of 2021,
Baric did grow more concerned about the safety standards in Chinese
laboratories. In September 2021, Baric told CNN: “Their papers indicate that
they did much of their work with these bat viruses under Biological Safety 2
conditions. There are many more laboratory accidents or laboratory-acquired
infections in BSL-2 as compared to BSL-3. We do all the research in our lab on
bat-related coronaviruses under Biological Safety 3 enhanced conditions. We
wear portable air-breathing apparatuses with tied-back suits so the workers are
protected from anything that might be in the laboratory.”
In 2015, the Wuhan Institute of Virology
become China’s first laboratory to achieve the highest level of international
bioresearch safety, Biosafety Level 4. Up until then, the institute was doing
its research in Biosafety Level 2 labs.
In early January 2018, the proud Chinese
scientists invited U.S. scientists to tour the Wuhan institute, the crown jewel
of the Chinese Academy of Science’s viral research. But U.S. consul general
Jamie Fouss and Rick Switzer, the embassy’s counselor of environment, science,
technology, and health, were more unnerved than impressed by what they saw, and
they sent two sensitive but unclassified memos back to Washington.
The first memo, dated January 19, 2018,
states that the institute’s “current productivity is limited by a shortage of
the highly trained technicians and investigators required to safely operate a
[Biosafety Level] 4 laboratory and lack of clarity in related Chinese
government policies and guidelines.” The second memo, dated April 19, 2018,
noted that the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s “English brochure highlighted a national
security role, saying that it ‘is an effective measure to improve China’s
availability in safeguarding national bio-safety if [a] possible biological
warfare or terrorist attack happens.’”
EcoHealth Alliance was clearly interested
in gain-of-function research in its work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
A March 2018 grant proposal from EcoHealth to the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) proposed “introduc[ing] appropriate human-specific
cleavage sites” into SARS-like viruses; in other words, to take existing bat
viruses and make them more likely to infect human beings. The proposal
declared, “Dr. Shi, Wuhan Institute of Virology, will conduct viral testing on
all collected samples, binding assays and some humanized mouse work.”
(Before the pandemic, Chinese research
scientists had engineered a supply of mice with “humanized” lungs, to give a
better sense of how these viruses would affect human beings. Some U.S.
officials have wondered if the Chinese scientists’ supply of mice with
“humanized” lungs had a more sinister purpose, as part of an effort to develop
viruses more likely to kill human beings. But at this point, there is no
concrete evidence that the virus research in the Wuhan labs was connected to a
desire to develop biological weapons.)
The NIH revealed last year that EcoHealth
Alliance had unintentionally made viruses more virulent during their research
work with the Wuhan Institute of Virology in 2019. “The limited experiment
described in the final progress report provided by EcoHealth Alliance was
testing if spike proteins from naturally occurring bat coronaviruses
circulating in China were capable of binding to the human ACE2 receptor on a
mouse model,” NIH’s Lawrence Tabak wrote.
“All other aspects of the mice, including
the immune system, were unchanged,” the letter continued. “In this limited experiment,
laboratory mice infected with the SHC014 WIV1 bat coronavirus became sicker
than those infected with the WIV1 bat coronavirus.” NIH emphasized that “as
sometimes occurs in science, this was an unexpected result of the research, as
opposed to something that the researchers set out to do.”
EcoHealth was supposed to notify NIH if it
enhanced a virus’s ability to grow by a factor of ten. Instead, the work with
the Wuhan Institute of Virology created novel coronaviruses that enhanced viral
growth by 1,000-fold to 10,000-fold — and the heavier viral loads made the mice
sicker.
Shortly after the Wuhan Institute of
Virology was achieving these breakthroughs in gain-of-function research, making
bat coronaviruses much more contagious, another potentially ominous event
developed: According to the Wall Street Journal, U.S. intelligence
determined that three researchers from China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology
became sick enough in November 2019 that they sought hospital care “with
symptoms consistent with both Covid and common seasonal illness.” They may have
just had the seasonal flu. Or they may have brought their work home with them,
so to speak.
* * *
Finally, there is the undeniably
suspicious behavior of the Chinese government since the first cases were
reported in Wuhan in December 2019. Until January 21, 2020, the Wuhan Regional
Health Commission insisted that “no clear evidence of human-to-human
transmission has been found.” On January 4, 2020, former CDC director Dr.
Robert Redfield was incredulous during a phone call with his Chinese
counterpart, George Gao. Redfield described asking his old friend Gao, “George,
you don’t really believe that mother and father and daughter all got it from an
animal at the same time, do ya?” Gao insisted there was no evidence of
human-to-human transmission. But Redfield recounted that two days later, Gao
broke down during a call, “audibly and tearfully distraught after finding ‘a
lot of cases’ in the community who had never visited the wet market.”
In late January and early February, the
Chinese government ordered all labs processing samples of the strange new virus
to destroy them. On January 3, China’s National Health Commission ordered
institutions not to publish any information related to the unknown disease and
ordered labs to transfer any samples they had to designated testing
institutions, or to destroy them. The justification for this order was public
safety, although it is hard to see the public-safety benefit in suppressing
information about the disease.
It took a year to get a World Health
Organization investigative team into Wuhan, and when that team arrived, it
encountered angry refusals to turn over raw data about the earliest cases. According
to the New York Times, “disagreements over patient records and
other issues were so tense that they sometimes erupted into shouts among the
typically mild-mannered scientists on both sides.” The Chinese government has
refused to allow another team of investigators to enter Wuhan or the labs in
the city. The Chinese government does not care if it looks guilty.
A much-hyped U.S. intelligence-community
investigation completed in August offered almost nothing useful, declaring,
“All agencies assess that two hypotheses are plausible: natural exposure to an
infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident.” Ninety days of effort,
with all the resources of the U.S. government, generated nothing new.
To paraphrase Ebright, in the autumn of
2019, there were three institutions in the entire world that were doing
gain-of-function research on novel coronaviruses found in bats. One was in
Galveston, Texas, one was in Chapel Hill, N.C., and the third was in Wuhan,
China.
In theory, the pandemic could have started
with some random Chinese person who didn’t have any connection to the bat
coronavirus research conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or the Wuhan
CDC. This person would have a spectacularly unlucky run-in with a bat or other
animal, and that random Chinese person caught the exceptionally rare naturally
occurring animal virus that infects, sickens, and spreads among human beings
like wildfire. This same hyper-contagious bat virus would have the
exceptionally unusual trait of being extremely difficult to find in bats.
This extraordinarily unlucky person would
then travel to the metaphorical doorstep of one of the three labs in the world
doing gain-of-function research on novel coronaviruses found in bats and start
infecting other people in the city of Wuhan. Under the natural-origin theory,
the Wuhan laboratories just happen to be mind-bogglingly unlucky that events
played out in a way that so closely mimics the consequences of a lab accident.
That would be a remarkable series of
coincidences.
Or, within the walls of an institution
that we know was doing gain-of-function research on coronaviruses found in
bats, aiming to make them more contagious and virulent, at an institution that
we know was insufficiently staffed to operate safely, a single employee may
have not worn his personal protective equipment correctly one day in late 2019.
A single employee may have been scratched or bitten by a bat, or inhaled a
virus shed by a bat undergoing the stress of an anal swab, or just carelessly
wiped his eyes or nose or mouth. After that employee left the lab and returned
home for the evening, he would have been shedding viruses once the infection
took hold — in his home, through the public-transportation system and streets
and sidewalks, and perhaps he or a family member visited a seafood market.
As of this writing, more than 5.6 million
people around the world have perished from Covid, and 354 million have been
infected.
The first great mystery of this pandemic
is how it got started — a question that must be answered to adequately prepare
us for another pandemic in the future.
The second great mystery of this pandemic
is why so many powerful people don’t seem to feel any sense of urgency about
solving the first great mystery.
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