By Noah Rothman
Friday, February 28, 2020
Tensions had been building for weeks in Syria by late
January when forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad launched an offensive on the towns
surrounding the last rebel-held stronghold in the country, the city of Idlib.
The Russian-backed Syrian government offensive
represented, according to Turkey, a violation of the “ceasefire” agreement
Washington helped broker between the nations and non-state forces competing
over Northwestern Syria. The attacks had unleashed a new wave of refugees streaming
toward the Turkish border, numbering now almost 1 million strong and once again
threatening to destabilize Europe. More importantly, Turkey warned, its
positions were at risk of being targeted by Syrian forces, and they would
retaliate if necessary. And on February 3, six Turkish soldiers were killed by
Syrian artillery. Turkey responded, striking 54 military targets inside Syria,
reportedly killing at least 76 Syrian soldiers.
But the fighting did not stop. The cycle of attacks and
retaliatory strikes between Syria and Turkey accelerated. Five Turkish soldiers
were killed on February 10, to which Turkey responded by shelling Syrian
targets. Two more soldiers loyal to Ankara lost their lives on February 20,
yielding another proportionate response. On February 22, Turkey destroyed 21
“regime targets” after it lost its 16th soldier this month to Assad’s forces.
All the while, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned both Assad and his
logistical partners in Moscow that his country would not tolerate these attacks
forever, and Turkey would be “everywhere in Syria” if it needed to be.
This violence may have climaxed on Thursday in a
staggeringly brazen escalation when at least 33 Turkish troops died and 30 more
were wounded in an airstrike. Once again, Erdogan’s retaliation was
proportionate, attacking Russian and Assad regime strongholds near Latakia with
missiles. But the time for proportionality may be coming to an end. Since the
collapse of the 2019 ceasefire in January, Ankara has warned the Syrian
government that it has until the end of February—this weekend—to halt its
advance on Idlib. “We plan to free our besieged observation towers, one way or
another, by the end of this month,” Erodgan said this week. The slaughter of scores
of Turkish forces has surely only hardened his resolve.
Turkey claims that the strike was attributable to the
Assad government, but Russian warplanes supporting the advance of Syrian forces
are more likely to blame. You can see why Erdogan would run reluctant cover for
Moscow. There are no guarantees that a low-intensity conflict between a member
of the NATO alliance and Russian forces won’t spiral into a more dangerous
series of increasingly violent confrontations.
This is now the most dangerous period of the conflict
since Turkey shot down a Russian warplane in 2015 in the earliest days of
Moscow’s military intervention on behalf of its besieged client in Damascus. As
it did in 2015, Turkey immediately invoked Article IV of the NATO alliance
treaty—a provision that compels member states to enter into emergency
consultations, a prerequisite for triggering NATO’s mutual defense provisions
in Article V. The Atlantic alliance was able to talk Turkey off the ledge in
2015, but the West can produce few inducements that might convince Ankara to
endure these deadly assaults on its soldiers and sovereign dignity
indefinitely.
None of this should come as a surprise. This is what
American disengagement looks like. The United States beat a hasty retreat from
Northern Syria last year—a political, not strategic, decision that seemed
justified only by the president’s frustration with America’s modest footprint
in that lawless part of the world. In its wake, America left behind a fiction
of a “ceasefire” arrangement, the fragility of which was apparent to most
observers even as the administration was celebrating its achievement. Even if
the deal was doomed to fail, said its more candid supporters, so what? This was
not America’s fight; it’s time to let the rest of the world fight its wars and
get America out. Well, mission accomplished.
For all the consternation U.S. deployments in Syria
caused advocates of American retrenchment, the small and cost-effective
American presence in the Levant deterred states like Russia and Turkey—whose
interests in Syria are in direct conflict—from litigating their grievances on
the battlefield. In America’s absence, deterrence has broken down, and the
prospect of something far more dangerous now looms large.
American disengagement from such a crisis is an untenable
position. The United States will commit itself to de-escalating this
potentially catastrophic state of affairs; its interests in this region and in
this crisis are imperative. But in that effort, the tools at its disposal are
limited. We left them behind in Northern Syria.
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