By Richard Brookhiser
Thursday, February 06, 2020
At the conclusion of his 1994 book The American
Presidency, Forrest McDonald, historian and occasional contributor to NR,
surveyed the ways in which the job had become impossible. Presidents are “held
totally responsible for situations that one is helpless to manage”; they lack
“contact with ordinary humans”; they are “fair prey for every manner of
vilification”; their inescapable tasks are often “self-defeating” (McDonald
cited image-making: necessary to accumulate political and moral clout, yet apt
to take on a life of its own). Their health suffers, and they die at younger
ages than they once did. Some job.
Yet Donald Trump, a novice with no information, limited
intelligence, and bad character, has held it for over three years without
catastrophe, and may hold it for four more. Is the job easier than we thought?
Trump of course has strengths. “Limited” intelligence
does not mean none. He is a genius at commanding attention, a skill he has
proven over decades in an array of media — tabloid culture, television,
Twitter, the podium. He was never a master builder (that was his father Fred);
instead he is a master persona-builder.
Two other Trump strengths are more surprising. For a man
so given to bluster, he shows considerable caution. His default foreign policy
is not to put American troops in harm’s way. He waxed Russian auxiliaries in
Syria, then pulled out. His most aggressive move has been a drone strike
(admittedly quite a strike). There may come times when he will have to do more,
but for now inaction has served him well.
He has also, for someone thought to be impulsive, shown
consistency on certain large issues. “Honest” crooked pols are defined as those
who stay bought. Trump stays with those whom he has bought. For a loose liver
with a slow student’s understanding of the law (he thought judges signed
bills), he has gratified religious and judicial conservatives alike. His stance
on China began in protectionism, but he has executed something the Obama
administration only talked about — the pivot of focus on our Pacific rival.
His flaws come in two kinds: florid and not evident
enough. Start with the latter. Trump is a lazy executive. He was not helped
by having, as his earliest helpers, such a collection of tyros — Bannon,
Kushner — and freaks — Omarosa, Scaramucci. Three years in, appointments are
still unfilled. Trump himself does so little one can call the White House
switchboard in the evening and have a fair chance of speaking to him or getting
a next-day callback. This sounds like the subplot of a film about teenage
stoners, yet I know one person who has done this successfully.
Trump’s one-on-one diplomacy is wishful. This is an
occupational hazard of the presidency (George W. Bush thought he had looked
into Putin’s soul), but Trump carries it to an extreme. Hence his warm words
for so many of the world’s brutes. To him, it’s part of the art of the deal,
the soft soap over the tight grip. But oh, the suds. In one case they have
caused him real grief. The Obama-era intelligence community spent years looking
for Russkies under Trump’s bed, a search prolonged, then scuttled, by Robert
Mueller. But why would anyone suspect such a thing, or think that such a
narrative could plausibly be spun? Could it be because of Trump’s gushing
comments about Putin, and his testimonies to America’s moral equivalence?
What most amazes and appalls are the noxious aspects of
Trump’s personality, the aura of insecurity and mania that accompanies him,
like a saint’s odor of sanctity. Trump’s great strength is that he is
everywhere; his great weakness is that what is everywhere is him. His
grotesqueries are so numerous they defy listing. The ones that are coming blot
out the ones that just arrived.
Yet the ship of state slides on, the waves roll back from
the bow. Unemployment is down, the stock market is up. Protection has hurt
farmers, but they got a bailout. Trillions keep piling onto the deficit, but
that was happening before Trump and will continue to happen after him, until —
probably suddenly and painfully — it must stop happening. Every new president
from a new party begins a process of rebranding the federal judiciary. The additions
since 2017 are numerous and strong, and may even, if they take up Justice
Thomas’s hints, take on stare decisis. There will be no big beautiful wall on
the Mexican border, but thanks to diplomatic pressure illegal border crossings
are down. Trump kisses some tyrants’ asses, but he defies others, and America
remains a beacon still: Anti-regime students in Iran refuse to walk on the
American flag, anti-Chinese demonstrators in Hong Kong wave American flags and
posters with Trump’s head photoshopped on Rambo’s body. All these results Trump
pushed for or approved, or they fell in his lap. So what is the problem?
The case for there being a problem is made by Stephen
Knott, professor of national-security affairs at the United States Naval War
College, in his most recent book, The Lost Soul of the American Presidency,
which ends with a ferocious chapter on Trump.
Donald Trump is everything critics
of the popular presidency warned about — a demagogue who practices the “little
arts of popularity,” a man lacking the attributes of a magnanimous soul, a
purveyor of conspiracy theories, and a president incapable of distinguishing
between himself and the office he temporarily holds. . . . The president
panders to fears both real and imagined, boasts of himself as the answer to
what ails the nation, and routinely overpromises.
Knott fills in these broad strokes with a selection of
Trump’s greatest hits, vulgar and vicious: arguing publicly about the size of
his penis, accusing Ted Cruz’s father of plotting to kill JFK. For Knott, these
are not personal foibles; they define a demagogue, a trainer, jockey, and
ultimately captive of popular passions. Drawing on the example of George
Washington and the writings of Alexander Hamilton, Knott argues that the
president should be a symbol of the nation and an umpire over transient popular
impulses. He has little trouble showing that Trump fails at both. His
nationalism excludes half the country, and his MO is to stir passions up.
Knott short-circuits whataboutism by showing that Trump
is the culmination of a long process. Knott admires a handful of presidents,
some who are universal favorites — Washington, Lincoln — some slightly less
favored — Ike, Reagan — some who were washouts — John Quincy Adams, Taft, Ford.
Most occupants of the White House, in his telling, have been demagogues, some
with compensating virtues, others without. Obama, W., and Clinton; Nixon, LBJ,
and JFK; Truman, the Roosevelts, and Wilson — all get their licks. The rot goes
back to the two Andrews (Johnson and Jackson), and ultimately to Thomas
Jefferson.
What is Jefferson doing in this rogues’ gallery? Knott
puts him there because Jefferson (and his right hand, James Madison)
anticipated populist politics as we know it. They founded a political party based
on grievance (theirs warred against what Madison called “the opulent”), and a
political style requiring continuous attention to public opinion (a phrase,
originally French, that Madison was one of the first writers in the
English-speaking world to use). Jefferson and Madison were a number of things
besides populists: aristocrats in their tastes, libertarians in their political
philosophy. But they were always also, despite the contradictions, populists.
“The moral sense, or conscience,” wrote Jefferson, “is as much a part of man as
his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree.
. . . State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide
it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led
astray by artificial rules.”
The sweep of Knott’s indictment suggests a weakness. His
ideal president is a republican, a figure out of Roman, Renaissance, and
17th-century-English thought. The genius of America, however, is democratic.
Jefferson believed this, which is why he and his allies prevailed. At the
beginning of the 19th century the White House was occupied for 24 years by
three Virginia neighbors, and their party survives today, the oldest in the
world apart from England’s Tories. Even Knott’s heroes, Washington and
Hamilton, the men the Jeffersonians replaced, were more democratic than Knott,
or perhaps they themselves, realized. Hamilton wrote all his adult life for
newspapers, the popular medium of the day. Washington, every inch the commander
in chief, knew how to lead ordinary enlisted men.
Statesmen in a democratic age must master the arts of
popularity. They don’t have to be little arts, because people are not always
small-minded. It is doable, if hard. Too hard for the incumbent.
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