By Noah Rothman
Monday, May 20, 2019
It was only six months ago that Democrats surged to their
largest margin of victory in a midterm election in American history, but it
feels like a lifetime has since passed. In the months following the election,
the Democratic Party’s internal deliberations have hung on precisely how far to
the left its members are prepared to drift. The Green New Deal,
Medicare-for-all, a federal employment guarantee, universal basic income,
slavery reparations, “wealth” taxes, lowering the voting age to 16, “free”
college, a national gun registry; Democratic successes at the polls have made
them giddy.
Given this dynamic, you could be forgiven for thinking
that the Democrats’ resounding 2018 victory was the result of a resonant,
coherent, and profoundly progressive message. After all, figures as lofty as
Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer warned Democratic lawmakers that his party
“can’t just be anti-Trump” if it wanted to win—they had to be for something. But Schumer’s party
didn’t follow his lead. By and large, the Democrats who’ve won in the Trump era
have tailored their message to their districts, shying away from policy
specifics and preferring instead to capitalize on being the “anyone” in “anyone
but Trump.” By contrast, many of the overtly progressive candidates who
campaigned in purple states and districts lost.
This revisionism is, in part, a function of media’s bias
toward the controversial. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ilhan Omar,
attention-seekers both, will always generate more attention than Conor Lamb and
Katie Hill. That also explains why senatorial losers like Beto O’Rourke and
Stacey Abrams never left the limelight while the first Democrat to be elected
to the U.S. Senate from Arizona since 1988, Kyrsten Sinema, hasn’t received the
soft-focus treatment.
The popular fixation on the ascendant progressive
movement within the Democratic Party has certainly obscured the party’s true
ideological center of gravity, which is more moderate and favorable toward compromise
than its progressive fringes and their boosters in the press would prefer. This
may also have confused Democrats as to precisely how popular their policies
are. The Australian experience may prove enlightening for those Democrats who
want to be informed.
Poll after poll showed only one thing: Australia’s
left-leaning Labor Party was poised for a comeback, and it wasn’t going to be
especially close. Not only had voters soured on the governing center-right
coalition government, but they had supposedly warmed to the left’s program: a
broader social safety net, higher taxes, and radical efforts to mitigate the
threat posed by climate change. Surveys showed that up to six-in-ten
Australians favored “taking steps now” to combat global warming “even if this
involves significant cost.” This election was to be the culmination of a
building public anxiety, and it was in a way. But the fear Australia’s voters
expressed in the voting booth wasn’t over climate change but how Labor had
promised to address it.
A New York Times
analysis of the surprising success of the Australian right reads like an
analysis of the Democratic Party’s predicament. Labor’s educated, well-to-do
voters were responsive to a radical reduction in carbon emissions that was
projected to cost the country up to 167,000 jobs and hundreds of billions of
dollars, but the party’s working-class voters weren’t sold. It was their jobs
that were on the chopping block, after all. But why didn’t the polling reflect
this trepidation? What happened to the consensus around both the threat posed
by climate change and the need for dramatic reforms to stave off the worst?
Maybe it never existed in the first place.
Voters lie to pollsters. They over-report their voting
histories, conveniently forget voting for the loser in the last election, and
tell pollsters what they think they want to hear—particularly if the expected
answer comports with preferred social conventions. In America, Democrats tell
pollsters that they prefer a party that’s more “moderate,” which sounds nice
and accommodating, but they also claim they support a progressive policy
agenda. They want a broader entitlement state and higher taxes to support it.
They see climate change as an urgent threat, and cost is no issue when
evaluating proposals for dealing with it.
This contradiction cannot be reconciled, so Joe Biden
seems to be prepared to test it. In a field of candidates all vying to lay
claim to progressive bona fides, Biden has all but rejected the party’s
leftward drift. He has described Donald Trump as an departure from, not the
apotheosis of, conservative thought. He’s promised to work with Republicans
toward shared legislative objectives, not to bury them under an avalanche of
snark and opprobrium. He’s rejected unworkable progressive proposals like
Medicare-for-all and a government-provided basic income. He’s refused to
apologize for his record on criminal justice issues, unlike many of his
competitors. Even Biden’s climate-change plan is aimed at securing a “middle
ground” solution to the issue. “This is a deal breaker,” Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez wrote. Maybe it is for her, but it hasn’t been for Democratic
voters yet.
Surely, Joe Biden is trading on Democratic nostalgia for
the Obama era. Further scrutiny and unforced errors on the campaign trail may
chip away at the former vice president’s sizable early lead. But no candidate
for the presidency stakes out positions as divergent as Biden’s on a lark.
Maybe, as seems to have been the case in Australia, voters know what is
expected of them. They know they are supposed
to adopt a posture of socially desirable deference when it comes to climate
change. They know they’re supposed to
support the fresh-faced progressives who advocate draconian solutions to the
problem. They just don’t always behave like they’re supposed to.
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