Friday, February 26, 2016
By Jillian Jordan, Paul Bloom, Moshe Hoffman and David
Rand
Human beings have an appetite for moral outrage. You see
this in public life — in the condemnation of Donald J. Trump for vowing to bar
Muslims from the United States, or of Hillary Clinton for her close involvement
with Wall Street, to pick two ready examples — and you see this in personal
life, where we criticize friends, colleagues and neighbors who behave badly.
Why do we get so mad, even when the offense in question
does not concern us directly? The answer seems obvious: We denounce wrongdoers
because we value fairness and justice, because we want the world to be a better
place. Our indignation appears selfless in nature.
And it often is — at least on a conscious level. But in a
paper published Thursday in the journal Nature, we present evidence that the
roots of this outrage are, in part, self-serving. We suggest that expressing
moral outrage can serve as a form of personal advertisement: People who invest
time and effort in condemning those who behave badly are trusted more.
Our paper helps address an evolutionary mystery: Why
would a selfless tendency like moral outrage result from the “selfish” process
of evolution? One important piece of the answer is that expressing moral
outrage actually does benefit you, in the long run, by improving your reputation.
In our paper, we present both a theoretical model and
empirical experiments. The model involves “costly signaling,” the classic
example of which is the peacock’s tail. Only healthy male peacocks with
high-quality genes can manage to produce extravagant plumages, so these tails —
precisely because of how “resource intensive” they are — function as honest
advertisements to potential mates of a peacock’s genetic quality.
We argue that the same can be true of punishing others
for wrongdoing, which can serve as a signal of trustworthiness. This is because
punishing others is often costly — but less so for those people who find it
worthwhile to be trustworthy. Consider: Trustworthiness pays off for you if
others typically reciprocate your good deeds or reward you for good behavior.
This includes being rewarded for promoting moral behavior via punishment.
Therefore, if you are a person who finds being
trustworthy rewarding, you’ll typically also find punishing less costly. Our
mathematical model shows that, as a result, choosing to punish wrongdoers can
work like a peacock’s tail — if I see you punish misbehavior, I can infer that
you are likely to be trustworthy.
To test whether people actually follow this logic, we ran
experiments in which subjects interacted with anonymous strangers on the
Internet. In our experiments, one subject (the signaler) received some money.
Then, he had the chance to give up some of the money to punish somebody for
being selfish. Our subjects turned out to be fair-minded: A sizable proportion
of signalers were willing to pay to punish selfish acts, even though they had
not been personally mistreated.
Next, a second subject (the chooser) decided whether to
trust the signaler — after observing whether or not the signaler had decided to
punish. This decision had real consequences: If the chooser decided to trust
the signaler, she earned money if the signaler turned out to be trustworthy,
but lost money if he did not. (Either way, the signaler benefited from being
trusted).
We found that choosers were much more likely to trust
signalers who had punished selfishness, earning these signalers extra cash in
the long run. And choosers were right to be trusting, because signalers who
punished really behaved in a more trustworthy way. Furthermore, signalers were
less likely to punish when offered a more straightforward way to appear
trustworthy (namely, helping others directly). Together, our model and
experiments supported the theory that expressing moral outrage can serve to
enhance our reputations.
Again, this is a theory of evolution, not conscious
motivation. It doesn’t mean that people who express outrage are deliberately
trying to show off to others. But we do see this theory as helping to explain
why humans developed a psychology of outrage in the first place.
Our theory also explains why people sometimes punish in
ways that don’t make sense from the perspective of benefiting the greater good.
For example, punishment can sometimes be wildly disproportionate to the
perceived offense. Take the case of a woman named Justine Sacco, who in 2013
tweeted a comment about AIDS in Africa — seen by many as racially insensitive,
but by others as an ironic joke gone wrong — and was viciously attacked by
thousands of outraged strangers, making her for a while the No. 1 worldwide
trend on Twitter. Whether or not they were conscious of it, these attackers
were most likely advertising to their Twitter audiences that they were not
racist.
Moral outrage is a part of human nature. But it’s worth
keeping in mind that the punishment that it triggers is sometimes best
explained not as a fair and proportionate reaction, but as a result of a system
that has evolved to boost our individual reputations — without much care for
what it means for others.
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