The Case for the U.S. to Stop Babying Europe on National Security

By Daniel R. DePetris

Thursday, February 29, 2024

 

Earlier this month, during a campaign stop in South Carolina, former president and presumptive 2024 GOP presidential nominee Donald Trump went off on NATO, one of his favorite punching bags. “NATO was busted until I came along,” Trump asserted. “I said, ‘Everybody’s going to pay.’ They said, ‘Well, if we don’t pay, are you still going to protect us?’ I said, ‘Absolutely not.’ They couldn’t believe the answer.” To emphasize the point, Trump stated he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies that fall short of the alliance’s defense-spending standards.

 

The fallout was swift. Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, called Trump’s remarks “irrational and dangerous.” Democratic lawmakers on Capitol Hill were aghast, while others downplayed the comments as an attempt by Trump to scare the Europeans into boosting their defense budgets. During the annual Munich Security Conference in Germany this month, Trump’s words, and the prospect of a second Trump presidency, hovered over the transatlantic dignitaries like a bad cold.

 

Yet in the weeks since, those few sentences in South Carolina have prompted a prevailing sense of urgency in European capitals. Even those who find Trump’s rhetoric boorish and alarming note that he has a point: European defense industries have been left to atrophy since the Soviet Union collapsed more than 30 years ago and are ramping up only now, after two years of war in Ukraine. “It’s high time for Europe to improve its own deterrence capacities and take its security into its own hands,” senior European Parliament lawmaker Valérie Hayer claimed. Dutch defense minister Kajsa Ollongren agreed, stating matter-of-factly that “Europe indeed needs to take more responsibility for its own security.” European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen is even basing her reelection campaign on beefing up the institution’s capacity to spend more and “spend better.”

 

All of this will no doubt be welcomed in Washington regardless of who wins the 2024 election. U.S. presidents have complained about Europeans penny-pinching on their militaries since the days of Dwight D. Eisenhower, when the former general vented to staff that Europe’s conventional forces weren’t up to par and that the continent’s leaders were close to “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam.” Trump and Barack Obama disagree on pretty much everything under the sun, but Europe’s freeloading on the U.S. military isn’t one of them.

 

This debate, however, misses a key element. The root of the issue isn’t defense-spending numbers and budgets but rather the lack of political will among European leaders to move toward self-sufficiency. Nobody wants to make the difficult decisions and trade-offs required to, for instance, transform the decrepit Bundeswehr into a professional military force that can recruit personnel and shoulder more of the burden of European security. It’s easy to cast all of the blame on the Europeans for being cheap and lethargic. But as much as U.S. policy-makers like to pretend otherwise, the U.S. is equally to blame because it hasn’t given its European allies any incentive to change.

 

U.S. policy-makers serving in both Democratic and Republican administrations are far more comfortable treating their European allies as dependents instead of true partners. The post–World War II European security framework has long since become institutionalized, and those inside the Beltway who dare to question it — let alone offer alternatives — are viewed warily. U.S.-troop deployments in Europe are all but permanent, the U.S. military’s basing infrastructure on the continent is extensive, and most of Europe is under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This is a pretty great deal for the Europeans, who have the benefit of focusing largely on domestic matters courtesy of the U.S. defense guarantee. For any European leader to insist on taking more of a leadership role in these circumstances would be almost irrational. Why would any German chancellor, for example, brave the political costs of taking on debt or reducing social-safety-net programs to finance a military reboot when Germany is under the protection of a superpower?

 

It wasn’t always this way. There have been times when visionary European heads of state have sought to turn Europe into an independent geopolitical power with credible military force behind it. In 1998, British prime minister Tony Blair and French president Jacques Chirac signed a declaration that advocated an autonomous European defense capability. The Clinton administration opposed the initiative, with the U.S. defense secretary at the time, William Cohen, going so far as to claim that NATO “could become a relic” if the European Union built up its own military forces. And in 2018, when the EU was pursuing intra-European cooperation on weapons projects, the Trump administration warned the organization to cease and desist lest it shut American weapons manufacturers out of the action. The U.S., concerned that Europe would get out from under Washington’s thumb, has encouraged Europe’s slouching defense posture that policy-makers in Washington gripe about.

 

Why does any of this matter? Because notwithstanding the usual bromides about being the indispensable nation, the U.S. doesn’t have unlimited resources. Nor can it kick the prioritization can down the road. The Europe of 2024 isn’t the Europe of 1945: It is far wealthier and technologically advanced than its adversaries (i.e., Russia), remains an attractive market for global investment, and almost rivals the U.S. economically. The EU’s population is three times Russia’s, and at nearly $17 trillion, the EU’s GDP is more than seven times what Moscow has at its disposal. If there was ever a region where the U.S. could disinvest, it’s Europe. And if there was ever a time for Europe to take primary responsibility for its own defense, it’s now, when the Russian army is tied up expending enormous resources in Ukraine.

 

The most effective way to fix Europe’s dependency problem is for the U.S. to stop treating the Europeans as helpless little children incapable of fending for themselves.