National Review Online
Thursday,
January 18, 2024
The Supreme
Court heard arguments Wednesday morning in two cases to decide whether to overrule the Chevron doctrine. It should do so.
The
rule adopted in the 1984 Chevron case was a well-intentioned
effort to free the executive branch from judicial micromanagement.
Specifically, the Court was then concerned to prevent activist liberal judges
from preventing new administrations from changing their policies in a deregulatory
direction. There are, in fact, always some policy questions left by Congress to
the executive’s discretion. But Chevron proved a cure worse
than the disease.
Chevron claimed for
agencies the power to change how the courts interpret the meaning of laws
passed by Congress. Under Chevron, where a statute is “ambiguous,”
courts defer to the agency’s interpretation — even if the agency had a
different interpretation under the last president. As Justice John Paul Stevens
wrote then, a court applying Chevron “need not conclude that
the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to
uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if
the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”
That
deference is a dereliction of the power of courts to do what Chief Justice John
Marshall defined as their central role: “to say what the law is.” A statute
that means one thing when it is passed by Congress does not mean another thing
after an agency interprets it, and a third thing when the agency reinterprets
it under a different president. Defenders of Chevron say that
it would unsettle precedent and violate the doctrine of stare decisis to
overrule the decision, but Chevron itself unsettles both
precedents and the expectations of regulated parties by allowing agencies to
flip-flop in how they read the law without going through Congress to change it.
The
two cases heard Wednesday, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless,
Inc. v. Department of Commerce, were brought by herring fishermen whose
budgets were strained by intrusive regulation. Congress authorized the
secretary of commerce and the National Marine Fisheries Service to “require
that one or more observers be carried on board a vessel . . . for the purpose
of collecting data necessary for the conservation and management of the
fishery” — for example, to prevent overfishing.
The
problem: The agency (the NMFS) ran short on its budget to hire observers. It
could have asked Congress for more money, or for the power to make the
fishermen pay for their own regulation. It did neither. The statute never said
anything about the NMFS having the power to compel the fishermen to pay the
costs of the observers. Imposing that cost is a further exercise
of government power, above and beyond compelling the vessels to carry the
observer. When pressed at argument to identify the government’s authority,
Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar argued for a chain of inferences from four
separate parts of the statute, none of them close to an explicit grant of that
power. Yet, lower courts used Chevron to say that because the
statute never says who pays for the observers, it is ambiguous, and they
deferred to the agency when it claimed that power. As Justice Neil Gorsuch put
it, this is a rule under which “the government always wins” against the individual
citizen or business.
Defending Chevron,
Justice Elena Kagan said that agency power to decide such questions must step
in when “law runs out.” Prelogar picked up that theme throughout the argument.
Otherwise, Kagan and Prelogar feared, agencies would lack the power to deal
with questions Congress failed to consider when writing the statute. But that
is not how our rule-of-law system was designed. We have a government of
enumerated powers. When Congress has not empowered an agency to do something —
when it has not given it law to enforce — the correct answer
should be that the agency does not have that power. As Paul Clement put it in
arguing for one of the fishermen, when the law doesn’t give an answer,
“give the tie to the citizen.”
The
sky will not fall without Chevron. Federal administrative law under
the modern Administrative Procedure Act was around for 40 years before Chevron,
and many states have abolished the doctrine and done just fine without it. The
better solution to the activist-judicial overreach of the 1970s is simply for
courts to stay in their own lane, and apply laws as written. The courts have
grown much more rigorous in doing so since the mid 1980s, under the influence
of Justice Antonin Scalia’s advocacy for textualism. Scalia himself, once a
supporter of Chevron, grew more skeptical as he saw in practice how
it interfered with the project of reading law as it was written by the people’s
representatives.
Our
system of checks and balances assumes that, when the two houses of Congress and
the president cannot agree, nothing will happen. Then, in turn, when nothing
happens, either gridlock will bring all sides to the bargaining table, or power
to deal with the issue will remain with the states, or with the people.
Allowing agencies to step in when the law falls silent short-circuits that
process. As Clement noted, using the example of the Securities and Exchange
Commission claiming authority over cryptocurrency regulation, that produces
more gridlock rather than less: Why should Congress do the hard and sometimes
unpopular work of legislating when agency heads claim that old, vague language
gives them all the power they need?
Presidents
are not kings; they rule under laws written by Congress. The same is true of
agencies, whether or not they are under direct presidential control. It is much
in fashion to fret about dictatorial powers in the presidency. The defining
feature of dictators is that they dictate: They say what the law allows them to
do, rather than being told what it empowers. One of the best checks we know on
dictatorial power is to demand that the executive have only those domestic
powers written for them by Congress, under laws read by the courts.
Overturning Chevron will restore a critical aspect of that
balance — and not a moment too soon.
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