By Noah Williams
Wednesday, October 13, 2021
The unprecedented surge in unemployment benefits and
other government-transfer programs during COVID-19 is showing increasing signs
of long-term economic impacts.
The September jobs report released last week showed
that hiring had slowed to a crawl as labor supply continued to hold back the
recovery. The economy added just
194,000 jobs in September, with the leisure and hospitality sector —
hardest hit by the pandemic and most affected by labor shortages — adding only
74,000 jobs. Both the overall gains and the gains in this sector were less than
a quarter
of the pace of hiring over the summer.
Since at least the spring of this year, it has been clear
that employers are having difficulty finding workers to hire, despite strong
demand for labor. Every month from February through July set a new record high
for the job-openings rate, which peaked at
7.0 percent in July before falling slightly to 6.4 percent in August,
up roughly two percentage points from the already-tight pre-pandemic labor
market of late 2019. In the hardest-hit leisure and hospitality sector, job
openings reached a remarkable 11.0 percent rate. At the same time, overall
unemployment had fallen only slightly over the previous few months, and the
rate of hiring had slowed. In the most recent data through August, there were
1.25 job openings for every unemployed worker.
There was hope that the lessening of supply-side
restraints in September would give a boost to labor markets. The expectation
was that the expiration of the enhanced federal unemployment-insurance programs
would bring more people back into the workforce, while the return to in-person
schooling would reduce an obstacle for some parents returning to work. But
hiring difficulties seem to have continued now into the fall, raising the possibility
that a return to pre-pandemic levels of employment may be more difficult than
policy-makers have envisioned.
The changes in the labor market over the course of the
pandemic raise the specter of “hysteresis,” where short-term economic shocks
have long-term impacts, even after the shock subsides. This concept became
widespread in discussions of the European unemployment dilemma of the 1980s. To
take just one example, France went from averaging 4.5
percent unemployment from 1970 to ’74 to 9.0 percent from 1980 to ’89,
with roughly two-thirds of unemployed workers remaining jobless for six months
or longer. During the 1960s, France had set up an expansive
unemployment-insurance system, with benefits payments of up to two years in
duration for employees under 50, and three years for those over 50, with a
minimum replacement rate of over 57 percent of pre-unemployment earnings. As
discussed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), this
system was able to function in the relatively tranquil times of the late 1960s
and early 1970s. But when the turbulence increased in the 1980s, France
experienced a secular increase in unemployment and especially long-term
unemployment. France’s labor-force participation rate fell by 2 percentage
points, and the majority of what labor force growth there was fed into
unemployment instead of employment. The enhanced social-insurance programs
turned temporary shocks into persistent increases in unemployment.
Over the course of the pandemic, the social safety net in
the U.S. reached an unprecedented size and scope. When it comes to the labor
market, most of the attention has focused on the federal enhanced unemployment
benefits. These programs not only led to many unemployed workers earning more
in unemployment than they did while working, but they expanded eligibility to
vast numbers of workers who were not previously covered by the
unemployment-insurance system. Furthermore, the administration of these programs
was notably lax, with rampant fraud and minimal administrative
compliance checks.
Even though these programs lapsed nationwide on Labor
Day, with many states ending participation earlier, the effects may still be
felt for quite some while. Enhanced benefits allowed workers to stay out of the
labor market for longer, reducing their attachment to previous employers,
eroding their skills, and perhaps changing their appetite and motivation for
returning to the labor market. Unlike in the French case discussed above, in
the U.S. these effects show up more in non-employment than unemployment. That
is, rather than an upward trend in unemployment, we’ve seen more workers drop
out of the labor force. Unemployment has fallen in recent months, but that has
not translated into large payroll employment gains. Nonfarm payrolls in
September remained nearly 5 million below pre-pandemic levels, and the labor
force has been around 3.1 million below pre-pandemic levels for the last three
months. While it’s only been a short time since benefit expiration, and more
workers may yet return to the labor market, the disappointing results so far
raise the possibility of a more lasting impact.
Moreover, the increased fiscal transfers go far beyond
enhanced unemployment benefits. Since April 2020 there have been three rounds
of large stimulus or relief checks mailed to households, and starting this
spring families with children have been receiving monthly government checks.
Comparing the totals over the 17 months since April 2020 with the preceding 17
months, government
transfer payments have increased by 47 percent and have accounted for
over 30 percent of real personal income during this span. Thus, even though the
enhanced unemployment benefits have ended, other policies are still making
joblessness more attractive than it has been in the past.
Overall, the Biden administration’s shift in policy
direction toward more expansive and universal benefits, without work
requirements or other contingencies, has lessened the incentive to work. Many
employers and market participants are still hopeful that the fall will bring a
stronger labor-market recovery. But we now face the distinct possibility that
policy changes will have turned the temporary upheavals of the coronavirus
recession into persistent reductions in employment.
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