By Noah Rothman
Friday, October 22, 2021
It was a straightforward question—one that American
presidents have typically refused to answer straightforwardly. Would the United
States “vow to protect Taiwan” in the event of a Chinese attempt to conquer the
island by force? On Thursday night, Joe Biden broke with protocol. “Yes,” Biden replied. “We have a commitment to do that.”
In fact, we don’t. In 1971, amid American efforts to
exacerbate tensions between the Soviet Union and China and in pursuit of a
presidential visit to the Chinese capital, the Nixon administration conceded to
the mostly notional idea that Taiwan and the mainland were all part of “one
China.” In 1979, the U.S. broke with the Republic of China in Taipei and recognized the People’s Republic of China in Beijing.
But the United States never explicitly renounced its prior commitments to the
defense of that island nation. That same year, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations
Act, which neither guarantees that the U.S. would support the island militarily
nor precludes it. The policy the U.S. subsequently adopted toward the region
has been deemed “strategic ambiguity.”
Some have argued that America’s policy of deliberate
vagueness has passed its sell-by date. Times have changed. The Soviet
Union is no more. Communist China’s capacity to threaten American interests in
the Pacific grows more pronounced by the day. America’s commitment to Taiwan’s
defense is no longer a symbolic commitment to a fellow democracy but an
acknowledgment of America’s increasingly vital strategic interests in the
region. If Biden’s comments signaled a shift in U.S. policy, critics of
“strategic ambiguity” would have welcomed this statement of the obvious, and
the moderating influence a policy of deterrence may have on the Chinese
Communist Party. But this was not a coherent policy shift.
Soon after Biden’s remarks, the White House scrambled to
clean up after the president. “The President was not announcing any change in
our policy and there is no change in our policy,” a
White House spokesperson insisted. “The U.S. defense relationship with
Taiwan is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act.” Which is to say, “we will
continue to support Taiwan’s self-defense, and we will continue to oppose any
unilateral changes to the status quo.” Ambiguity reigns once more. Order is
restored.
The Biden administration may not, however, be able to put
the toothpaste back in the tube. Biden himself acknowledged that the challenge
posed by near-peer competitors like Russia and China is “whether or not they’re
going to engage in activities that will put them in a position where they may
make a serious mistake.” In geostrategic terms, a mistake—a miscalculation born
of misplaced assumptions about how the United States would respond to acts of
aggression that could trigger broader conflicts neither party wants—is easy to
envision.
From Beijing’s perspective, the last decade has been one
in which the United States has become an unreliable ally. Washington let Moscow
invade and annex territory in Europe. It withdrew from Iraq in pursuit of no
discernible strategic objective. It allowed Syria to implode and outsourced the
job of stabilizing that nation to Russia. It looked helplessly on as China
crushed democracy in Hong Kong in violation of its treaty obligations. It
sacrificed a 20-year project in Afghanistan, even going as far as to abandon
its own citizens in the process. An irredentist power could be forgiven for
thinking the window of opportunity to take and hold long-sought objectives in
defiance of the West is wide open.
That is the sort of ambiguity the United States doesn’t
want. Indeed, America’s recent unreliability is the only reason that
Washington’s commitment to Taiwan’s defense is a live issue. Given Joe Biden’s
rhetorical commitment to defend the legitimate Afghan government and preserve a
troop presence in the region sufficient to ensure the extraction of all
Americans—commitments he never meant and subsequently abrogated—why
should Taipei believe him now? Why should Beijing?
Biden may have inadvertently painted the United States
into a corner, but his administration would be better served by treating what
was likely a rhetorical gesture from the president as though it were a
doctrine.
China’s aggression, its grotesque human rights violations,
and the leveraging of access to its market to force Western commercial
interests to defer to its authoritarian values are increasingly intolerable.
Taiwan’s citizens have responded to the CCP’s hostility by sidelining its
pro-engagement political parties, diversifying its economy away from dependence
on the mainland, and openly allying with the United States. America’s
investments in the island’s independence are now as material as they are
ideological. Between congressionally mandated arms sales to Taiwan upending the
“third communique” settlement, regular U.S. naval transits
through the Strait, and the American public’s growing support for Taipei’s independence, “strategic
ambiguity” has been dead and gone for some time. Uncertainty no longer favors strategic
balance. It is, in fact, promoting instability.
It would have been nice if Joe Biden was articulating a
coherent policy on the stage last night, but the White House has made it clear
that the president doesn’t know what he’s talking about. That incomprehensibly
foolish misstep could have disastrous implications. Washington should take this
opportunity to restore stability to the region with a clear statement that
leaves no room for uncertainty: The United States will go to war to defend
Taiwan. But that would be to expect a level of competence from this
administration we’ve not yet seen.
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