Wednesday, January 30, 2019

The Conservative Case for NATO


By Mike Gallagher & Colin Dueck
Wednesday, January 30, 2019

How important is NATO for U.S. national security? American conservatives have long debated this question.

In early 1951, General Dwight Eisenhower met with Senator Robert Taft (R., Ohio), his rival for the Republican presidential nomination. Eisenhower offered Taft a simple deal: If the senator, who had voted against the formation of NATO two years earlier, would commit to supporting the Western alliance, Ike would end his candidacy and Taft would have a clear shot at the White House. Taft declined his offer. Eisenhower eventually resolved to win the election and, in so doing, he preserved America’s burgeoning alliance system in Europe. As he told Congress that February, “in a world in which the power of military might is still too much respected, we are going to build for ourselves a secure wall of peace, of security.”

Eisenhower went on to preside over eight years of relative peace and prosperity, in part through a sensible commitment to international policies of peace through strength. Ike’s commitment to U.S. alliances and collective defense was part of this package, and it became a baseline for successful Republican foreign-policy presidencies after his, including Ronald Reagan’s.

Today, we again see questions of whether and why conservatives should support NATO, this time from the perspective that the Soviet Union collapsed long ago.

President Trump has emphasized the need for America’s European allies to spend more on their own defenses and to wean themselves off Russian natural gas. He is right to do so, and recent NATO commitments to increase defense spending by $100 billion suggest that such criticism may be having a positive effect. Over the years, Trump has also more than once raised the question of whether NATO is still an asset or has become a liability instead. For American citizens to ask this question is not outrageous. The question deserves an answer.

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

Now consider the alternative. American withdrawal from NATO would be a grave error. Not only would it surrender the above advantages and undo existing progress in Europe. It would also have negative long-term implications globally pertaining to America’s foremost long-term strategic challenge: namely, the People’s Republic of China. As Beijing extends its influence worldwide, U.S. disengagement from NATO would send the signal that the United States is an unreliable friend. America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific would have to rethink the integrated security architecture we have painstakingly built since Eisenhower’s day. This is not to mention the obvious and immediate tactical and operational military advantages that would accrue to Russia in Europe, shifting the balance of power against the United States.

The irony is that the Trump administration actually has a success story to tell about its policies toward NATO and Russia, particularly in Europe. Under this administration, the U.S. has provided lethal aid to Ukraine to fight off Russian-backed insurgents. It has made no concessions to Moscow regarding that conflict. It has increased sanctions against Russia and boosted America’s military presence in Eastern Europe. It has increased funding to the European Defense Initiative, bolstered U.S. defense spending, held Russia accountable for its breach of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) Treaty, and explored the place of low-yield nuclear weapons as a necessary component of the American arsenal to deter Russian aggression. At the same time, the president’s calls for increased European defense spending have had some useful effects. Virtually all NATO allies have increased their levels of defense spending over the past two years. As president, Mr. Trump has regularly reiterated his support for NATO. The concomitant emphasis on allied burden-sharing is not unreasonable, as Eisenhower regularly insisted.

In keeping with its treaty powers under the U.S. Constitution, Congress should not be passive on this issue. Last week, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced a bill to express continuing congressional support for the NATO alliance. The bill passed by a vote of 357 to 22 in the House of Representatives. The Senate is working on similar legislation.

Public-opinion polls taken over the last three years show that a solid majority of Trump supporters, conservatives, Republicans, and Americans continue to back the NATO alliance. Conservative voters in heartland states such as Wisconsin certainly expect Europeans to do their fair share in defending themselves. But they do not oppose NATO. On the contrary, they support it.

An overarching support for America’s Western alliance has been a key component in the conservative foreign-policy approach since Eisenhower’s time. It remains relevant to this day. As conservative Republicans and other Americans consider the costs and benefits of the U.S. alliance system, recall Ike’s wise recommendation: “Now boys, let’s not make our mistakes in a hurry.”

Howard Schultz Did Not Leave His Party


By Kevin D. Williamson
Wednesday, January 30, 2019

My view of American life is one of short-term pessimism and long-term optimism. And here is a bit of optimism that I’ll share even though it risks my coming to regret it: I think this may be the last time I am obliged to write about the Clintons. The Clinton era is over.

Ask Howard Schultz.

The Nineties were a hoot of a decade, a decade that was, if it is possible for a decade to be such a thing, nouveau riche: flush and full of appetite, and not yet decrepit enough to be ashamed of it. It was a decade epitomized in these United States by Nirvana, the Clinton presidency, and Starbucks — each of which in its way exhibited the characteristic style of the Nineties, in which the countercultural ambitions of the Sixties were wedded to the frank cheerful materialism of the Eighties.

Seattle was the center of the Nineties aesthetic. Grunge is long gone, along with all those flannel shirts, but Starbucks is still here. It is the McDonald’s of its age, the thermonuclear-proof cockroach of the corporate food-service scene. You could have bought a share of its stock for the price of a venti latte in 2008; it’s now a little over $67 as chairman emeritus Howard Schultz contemplates a Ross Perot–style run for the presidency.

Schultz was a Clinton Democrat back when that meant Bill Clinton, though as a reliable donor he stuck with Herself, and he dutifully wrote checks to Barack Obama, John Edwards, the DNC, and others. But in 2019, he says he cannot in good conscience run as a Democrat. He is considering an independent run. “What the Democrats are proposing is something that is as false as the wall,” he says, indicating “free” health care, “free” college, and the entire litany of “free” things “which the country cannot afford.” He worries — oh, bless his pointy little head! — about the national debt, unfunded liabilities, and other examples of fiscal recklessness. He thinks that the Democrats’ current “liquidate the kulaks as a class” approach to taxes may prove counterproductive to the long-term interests of the United States as a whole. He worries that “extremists” have taken over both parties.

As you might have imagined, he is not exactly setting on fire the hearts of his former Democratic co-partisans. They believe that an independent candidacy from the center-left might be just the thing to give Donald Trump a second term. (Assuming he wants one.) That risk would be a high price to pay for Schultz’s political moderation even if Democrats wanted such moderation — which they don’t.

The Democrats are in a funny position. They all assume that 2020 is the year to run as a Democrat, believing Trump to be doomed. Their triumphalism may be premature, but they are not without reason for hope. The Democrats believe that 2020 is theirs because they believe that the Republican party has gone mad, an opportunity that Democrats have decided to make the most of by . . . going just as bonkers themselves. Self-proclaimed socialists are the Democratic headliners of 2019, along with Senator Elizabeth Warren, who boasted that she “created much of the intellectual foundation” for Occupy Wall Street. Reasonably sane figures with respectable executive résumés are, for the moment, spat at. The soul of the Democratic party in 2019 is in Brooklyn, but few Democrats seem eager to line up behind the former mayor of New York City. Michael Bloomberg may be an up-and-down-the-line progressive on most of the sensitive cultural issues — abortion rights, gun control, etc. — but he is an old white guy in a party that regards old white guys as a cancer, a billionaire in a party whose leading light insists that it is “immoral for billionaires to exist,” and something less than a Trotskyite on economic questions. Bloomberg is a bloodless creature of cash-flow statements and balance sheets.

All of the above also applies to Howard Schultz, who is only a little behind Bloomberg in the years and the billions (eleven years and . . . oh, $44 billion or so). Schultz, like Bloomberg, is on cultural issues where the Democrats are, but he is not culturally where they are, which at the moment is somewhere in the leafy suburbs of Pyongyang. All that balanced-budget stuff, efficiency, sobriety, good government — so Nineties. It’s as though he got his policy agenda at the Gap.

If Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is the Democrats’ answer to Trump, then Howard Schultz is their John Kasich.

The Republican party has not, endless klaxons of alarum notwithstanding, embraced radicalism in terms of its actual policy agenda. What the GOP has embraced, very likely to its long-term detriment, is the Republican version of radical chic, that obstreperous, mulish mode of talk-radio/cable-news politics that is now the Republican mother tongue. That this is likely to cost the Republicans a great deal of support in the parts of the country where the people and the money are — places they insist are alien to “the Real America” — seems obvious enough. All the Democrats really need to do in the short term is provide a sober, sensible, and neighborly alternative to that — a politics of genuine republican collaboration rather than a politics of Kulturkampf. Lucky for Republicans, they do not seem much interested in that.

Which leaves Howard Schultz out in the cold, with only his billions to comfort him. Building a third-party campaign of any consequence is an extraordinarily difficult thing in the American system — the real political genius of Donald Trump was to forgo that and basically run the Ross Perot campaign inside the Republican party, intuiting that exploiting the fissure between Fox Nation and the Republican-party leadership within the GOP apparatus would be more effective than trying to pry disaffected Republicans away from their party entirely. But that option is not available to Schultz, because the Democratic party wants more radicalism in style and substance both. He may have been a big deal back in 1996. In 2019, he’s just another white man in a suit.

Ronald Reagan, who considered himself a New Deal Democrat, famously said, “I didn’t leave my party. My party left me.” Howard Schultz has left his party, but that is only pro forma. It left him some time ago, and it isn’t — probably — coming back.

The Brokaw Controversy and Assimilation


By Kevin D. Williamson
Tuesday, January 29, 2019

About Rich Lowry’s defense of assimilation: Maybe I missed a talking point somewhere along the way, but in response to the Brokaw controversy I have heard a couple dozen nearly identical invocations of “what about Irish pubs and Italian restaurants?” The source here seems to be Paul Waldman writing in the Washington Post: “Something tells me that Brokaw doesn’t stop in an Irish pub or an Italian restaurant and say to himself, ‘These people should really work harder at assimilation.’”

Of course he doesn’t. They don’t need to.

I think those establishments actually make the case for assimilation. Yes, the United States has been greatly enriched by the contributions of Italian Americans. No, the United States is not full of Italian Americans who cannot speak English. Some people have a Sicilian grandmother they remember who never learned English, but the Italians did in fact assimilate pretty quickly and pretty thoroughly. Italian Americans are not very much like the Mexican Americans and Mexican nationals who live and travel frequently between the countries, vote in elections in their home country, have limited command of English, etc.

In Chicago, for example, ballot assistance is available in Spanish, Chinese, and Hindi — but not Italian.

There isn’t very much that is Irish about most “Irish” pubs. In the same way, the people who run the taco shops in New York do not speak Spanish — they speak Chinese.

The big Irish-American populations in cities such as Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago assimilated pretty thoroughly, too. This was probably helped along by the limitations of the time: no Internet, international travel largely restricted to the wealthy, etc.

“Assimilation” does not mean — or require — the abandonment of every item of cultural distinctiveness. Jewish immigrants did not need to become Methodists to assimilate. That isn’t what assimilation really means.