By Kevin D. Williamson
Thursday, January 24, 2019
Just when general-purpose kook Alex Jones had almost — almost — single-handedly turned the
phrase “false-flag operation” into an unmistakable banner of kookery, along
comes the news out of Alabama that Democratic operatives working with former
Obama advisers and a left-wing Silicon Valley billionaire indeed ran a series
of false-flag operations against Republican Senate candidate Roy Moore, the
first Republican to lose a statewide race in Alabama in a decade.
Moore, a controversial former chief justice of the
Alabama supreme court, barely lost the race — the margin was just over 20,000
votes out of 1.3 million — in spite of allegations of sexual misconduct
involving minors as young as 14 and his admission of having dated 16-year-old
girls as a lawyer in his 30s.
With an eye on the burgeoning controversy surrounding
Donald Trump’s alleged relationship with Russian operatives, Alabama Democratic
operatives — in the words of their own report on the project — “planted the
idea that the Moore campaign was amplified on social media by a Russian
botnet.” “We then tied that botnet to the Moore campaign digital director,
making it appear as if he had purchased the accounts.” Many of the bots were
obviously Russian, with profiles written in Cyrillic. (In the interest of
disclosure, I should note here that I had the same thing happen to me during
the 2016 presidential race, with about 20,000 new Twitter followers, obviously
Russian in origin, appearing overnight. Twitter helped to weed them out but was
of no use at all in my effort to identify the source.) A Republican write-in
rival to Moore also got a sudden bump of 10,000 new Twitter followers and
received the enthusiastic support of a phony “conservative” Facebook page
operated by Democrats. Another phony campaign, called “Dry Alabama,” attempted
to sway moderate Republican votes by giving the false impression that Moore
intended to pursue the prohibition of alcohol as part of his legislative
agenda.
These shenanigans were paid for by Reid Hoffman, the
billionaire cofounder of LinkedIn. Jonathon Morgan, the CEO of New Knowledge,
which purports to be a cybersecurity firm, helped to carry out the scheme. The
in-house report on the project describes its efforts to “enrage and energize
Democrats” and “depress turnout” among Republicans. According to the New York Times, other participants in
the project included a firm run by Mikey Dickerson, who was the founder and
director of the U.S. Digital Service, an Obama-administration project aimed at
improving federal information-technology programs. Also involved was Sara K.
Hudson, a veteran of the Obama Justice Department who works with a technology
company funded by Hoffman.
Renée DiResta, a New Knowledge executive involved in the
operation, told the Times: “There
were people who believed the Democrats needed to fight fire with fire.” She
says she did not agree with that. Democratic operative Matt Osborne, who was
behind the “Dry Alabama” campaign, was unapologetic: “If you don’t do it,
you’re fighting with one hand tied behind your back,” he told the Times. “You have a moral imperative to
do this, to do whatever it takes.”
That is part schoolyard ethics — “He did it first!” — and
part old-fashioned political cynicism. But there is something else in there,
too. When Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez was challenged by 60 Minutes on one of her patently absurd claims — that there are trillions of dollars in Pentagon
accounting errors, sufficient to fund most of her Medicare-for-all scheme — the
New York socialist elected as a Democrat protested that it was morally wrong to
be “more concerned about being precisely, factually, and semantically correct
than about being morally right.” No, she apparently does not know what
“semantic” means, but she knows what she is trying to say: Lies — and a willful
exaggeration is only a cowardly kind of lie — are just another tool in the
arsenal of social justice.
This is the new normal for American democratic discourse
— a national conversation that no longer performs the function of democratic
discourse at all.
That our discourse has failed is generally understood.
What is not properly understood is that this is the final bitter fruit of the
one thing that dismays conservatives even more than the Left does: media bias.
Legitimate political news was not done in by social media and “fake news.” What
has rushed out of the sewers of
Twitter, Facebook, and Russian troll farms rushed into the void where the media’s credibility used to be.
Democratic discourse relies on a social order, and all
social orders rely on hierarchy. As it stands, no institution — neither the New York Times nor the Washington Post nor any other organ —
has the power to credibly declare, “These are the facts.” Trying to reestablish
that credibility and hierarchy is what the plague of “fact check” columns and
sites established in recent years is really all about: Unfortunately, PolitiFact et al. have proved as corrupt
and incompetent as the rest of the press and have only repeated its failures.
As the Alabama debacle unfolds, a few old beard-stroking
intellectuals have asked: “What can be done to combat fake news?” (Darrell M.
West of the Brookings Institution, one among many, authored a long report on
the question.) The short answer is: nothing. Fake news cannot be counteracted
because fake news is what people want.
Only a small minority goes to the media for information and insight; most go
for entertainment and social vindication. Think of the relative audiences for
classical music and Taylor Swift and you’ll have an idea of the difference in
scale.
There are four main problems:
One is self-radicalization. Academic research shows a
consistent tendency of groups to self-radicalize when asked to deliberate on a
subject or task, especially a subject or task that the members of the group
know nothing about. For example, mock-jury experiments have found that, after
deliberation, those who had previously evinced severe views of justice became
even more severe, while those who had evinced permissive views became more
permissive. Both kinds of exchange typical of social media — i.e., among
like-minded people and between members of groups with different views —
contribute to polarization: Members of like-minded groups reliably become more
extreme in their views after deliberation (somebody always wants to be the
hard-core purist), leaving the typical view more extreme than it had been
before the conversation; discussions between those with different views tend to
reinforce the in-group/out-group dynamic, the us-and-them orientation that
completely dominates our politics at this point in history.
The second is self-selection: After the murder of
abortionist George Tiller by an antiabortion zealot, two researchers, Sarita
Yardi of the Georgia Institute of Technology and danah boyd (sic) of Microsoft Research, followed the
subsequent conversation on Twitter. What they found was not encouraging for the
prospects of discourse: Even though there was relatively little new
polarization of views (abortion conversations started out polarized), they
discovered that over time the conversation grew more emotional — specifically,
more angry — rather than less so. One of the things that drove the increase in
anger was that the angriest people were the ones who stuck with the
conversation — cooler heads did not prevail, but exited. The authors conclude:
Some people refuse to speak to
people with opposing views and instead direct conversation only toward their
co-ideologues. However, the technical constraints on Twitter could exacerbate
the effect. The kinds of interactions we observed suggest that Twitter is
exposing people to multiple diverse points of view but that the medium is
insufficient for reasoned discourse and debate, instead privileging haste and
emotion.
But it isn’t just Twitter. Paul Krugman made a splash in
January with a column in which he christened the Trump administration a “team
of morons.” There was almost nothing else to the column, just a Nobel laureate
calling some people “morons.” It was one of his most-discussed columns in a
long time. “Paul Krugman has a scathing new nickname for Donald Trump’s
administration,” Lee Moran panted in the Huffington
Post. “Team of Morons.” Anybody remember what Krugman’s Nobel lecture was
called? No? That’s because Krugman’s readers in 2019 are after validation, not
information.
Third, extremists define the conversation. Yardi and boyd
found that the most extreme members of the abortion conversation in effect
determined what counts as reasonable: “These tweets and users define group
boundaries — the occasional extreme post may [bound] the rest of the group as
rational.”
Fourth and finally: In the absence of a hierarchy of
credibility, the only hierarchy that remains is the crude hierarchy of
popularity. Rage and extremism build audiences, especially on social media.
Measured and intelligent conversation? Not really. Celebrity (or notoriety,
increasingly indistinguishable commodities) is the reason Kanye West is a more
important voice in the national political conversation than is, say, George
Will. President Trump may be vain to fret so much about his ratings and crowd
sizes — or he may just be ahead of the curve.
The news is there for people who want it. The problem is:
Most don’t. Intelligent commentary has become, practically overnight, a
rarefied and specialized interest, like opera. If you’re looking for scale: The
editor of Politico has a Twitter
following that is 0.02 percent the size of Justin Bieber’s. Popular discourse
is on the same trajectory as popular music: synthetic, primitive, illiterate.
The future is fake.
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