By Kevin D. Williamson
Tuesday, January 29, 2019
But why must
the kulaks be liquidated as a class?
Which is to say: Why do progressives believe that
enacting economic policies that harm the wealthy will benefit the middle class?
Presumably they believe this would help the poor, too, but Democrats do not
talk about the interests of the poor very much of late. The Democrats are the
party of the bourgeoisie, and Republicans are the party of the proletariat, or
at least of the parts of it that do not live within 200 miles of a subway
station.
Last week, I noted that Democratic presidential candidate
Elizabeth Warren had suggested a new program of confiscating the assets of
wealthy Americans on an annual schedule, a “wealth tax” with no constitutional
basis and very little to recommend it economically. Representative Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez has recommended a confiscatory income tax. Progressives have
taken to describing the class of people they hate in eliminationist terms:
Representative Ocasio-Cortez insists that it is “immoral” for “billionaires to
exist.” Two influential progressive economic thinkers, Emmanuel Saez and
Gabriel Zucman, have written that one of the benefits of confiscatory taxes is
that they would cause the class of high-income Americans to “largely
disappear.” Marshall Steinbaum, the research director of the progressive
Roosevelt Institute, wrote: “It’s increasingly clear that having wealthy people
around is a luxury our society can no longer afford.”
(In a social-media post with more than one exclamation
point, Steinbaum complains that I “attacked” him. The above quotation is the
entirety of what I have written about him. It is not clear to me that the
English word “attack” includes within its meaning quotation without further
commentary.)
The rhetoric of elimination and the politics of
resentment attached to it are dangerous and unworthy. “Okay,” wrote one critic,
“but what would you do about inequality?”
Good question.
Nothing.
There are two theories about why hurting the wealthy
would help everybody else. The first is the economically illiterate zero-sum
proposition that there exists in the world a bucket marked “Income” and that some force in society —
some combination of government, Chamber of Commerce, and that little Monopoly
guy in the top hat and monocle — goes around ladling out income while the
world’s workers and investors gaze up at them pleadingly like so many
hatchlings with their beaks agape. That is not how wealth works. Jeff Bezos did
not become the world’s wealthiest man by going around and picking people’s
pockets a nickel at a time; he and his colleagues created something in Amazon, something that has real value. If they
hadn’t done so, the thing that they created simply would not exist. The sum of good things in the
world grows greater through economic production; it is not simply a shifting of
resources, taking a coin out of one pocket and putting it in another. This is
another occasion upon which to be mindful of the paradise
of the real. Money is just a record-keeping system only indirectly related
to the vast bounty of actual goods and services, which is why a middle-class
American in 2019 eats better than Louis XVI and sleeps in more comfortable
quarters than did Marie Antoinette or Akbar.
If the rich were radically less rich, the poor and the
middle class would, at best, still be where they are. In some ways, they’d
almost certainly be worse off: A disproportionate share of U.S. economic
growth, wage growth, and employment growth has been driven by a relatively
small number of startup companies. As Vivek Wadhwa of Harvard’s Labor and
Worklife Program put it: “Without startups, there would be no net job growth in
the U.S. economy.” Technology startups are driven by venture capital, and
venture capital is a rich man’s game. The “PayPal mafia” — the group of young
entrepreneurs who got rich from that startup — went on to form Tesla, LinkedIn,
Palantir, SpaceX, Yelp, YouTube, and others. Their investments helped build
Facebook, Spotify, Lyft, and Airbnb, among others. Startup-heavy California has
12 percent of the U.S. population but accounts for 16 percent of its job growth
and 14.2 percent of its economic output. Nobody wants to hear it, but inequality is part of what makes that
happen.
The second argument for liquidating the kulaks as a class
is political rather than economic. By acquiring wealth, the billionaire class
acquires political power and the means to look after its own interests at the
expense of those of the middle class. There is a little something to that, but
less than you might think.
The strongest bias in American politics is not toward the
interests of the rich; it is toward the status quo. As Martin Gilens shows in
his Affluence and Influence, a 75
percent majority in favor of a certain policy gets its way in U.S. politics a
little less than 40 percent of the time; a 75 percent consensus against something gets its way about 80
percent of the time.
And the problem for the grand theory of American
oligarchy is that there is so much consensus. We talk a great deal about the
polarization of our politics, which is real but which is in fact mostly a
matter of social identity, not a matter of policy. On matters of policy, there
is broad agreement across income groups on many important issues. Gilens — who,
I should note, is much more concerned about the effects of inequality on
democracy than I am — writes: “Examples of agreement across income groups
include opposition to new taxes, government support for higher education,
strengthening antidrug efforts (but legalizing marijuana for medical use), and
providing welfare recipients with job training and child care.”
While the rich and the poor both are broadly in favor of
job-training programs and limitations on welfare benefits, the wealthy are a
bit more supportive of welfare restrictions. “In contrast,” he writes, “the
affluent and the poor often disagree on issues like stem cell research, gay
rights, abortion, the progressivity of the tax system, and market-oriented
reforms of Social Security and Medicare.” On many of the so-called social
issues — notably gay rights and freedom of speech — the poor have more authoritarian views than do the
relatively libertarian wealthy. For example, the poor are considerably more
likely to support civil-rights restrictions undertaken as anti-terrorism
measures.
As the libertarian economist Bryan Caplan argues, people
who care about things such as gay rights and freedom of speech should be
grateful that in cases in which the preferences of the rich and poor diverge,
the rich tend to prevail politically. That is, he writes, what “makes democracy
tolerable.” Gilens, for his part, offers this disclaimer: “I hold no illusion
that citizens’ policy preferences are in fact the best policies, or even the
policies best suited to advance the interests and values of those citizens.”
That is an important point for two reasons: One is that
there are many things that are rightly beyond the reach of plebiscitory
democracy: Slavery is wrong whether 1 percent of the population desires it or
100 percent of the population desires it. We have a Bill of Rights and other
constitutional protections for precisely that reason. The second reason that
should be understood is that though it is the case that the wealthy tend to get
their way more often when their preferences diverge from those of the rest of
the country, their preferences are not identical with their economic
self-interest. Caplan, himself a scholar of voter behavior (he is the author of
The Myth of the Rational Voter),
clarifies Gilens’s findings:
When the poor, the middle class,
and the rich disagree, American democracy largely ignores the poor and the
middle class. To avoid misinterpretation, this does not mean that American
democracy has a strong tendency to supply the policies that most materially
benefit the rich. It doesn’t. Gilens, like all well-informed political
scientists, knows that self-interest has little effect on public opinion.
The disconnect between material interest and political
opinion plays out in interesting ways: For example, wealthy African Americans
have political views that are very similar to those of low-income African
Americans; interestingly, wealthy African Americans support welfare programs
and redistributive tax policies more strongly than do low-income African
Americans, even though they would be paying those taxes and receiving no
personal benefits. The views of high-income Americans on tax increases aren’t even necessarily what you’d
think they’d be.
The American political scene does not look the way it
does because American politics is dominated by billionaires. If the American
political system were dominated by billionaires, Donald J. Trump would not have
been the Republican nominee in 2016 and probably would not be president. If the
Koch brothers had their way, gay marriage would have been legal a long time
before it was, corporate welfare would be a thing of the past, and there would
be broad decriminalization of drugs. If Jeff Bezos were king for a day, the
results probably would not cheer the hearts of many Americans in red caps.
Everybody has a bogeyman: the Koch brothers, George
Soros, take your pick. But that isn’t how the world works. The poor are not
poor because the rich are rich, and while it certainly is the case that the
wealthy have more political power than the poor — Muppet News Flash — the importance of that fact to the
realities of American political life is grossly distorted by people looking —
praying — for what every political movement must have: someone to blame.
Elon Musk and Alice Walton didn’t make this mess.
We did.
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