By Ross Douthat
Tuesday, May 03, 2016
When Donald Trump knocked first Jeb Bush and then Marco
Rubio out of the Republican primary campaign, he defeated not only the
candidates themselves but their common theory of what the G.O.P. should be —
the idea that the party could essentially recreate George W. Bush’s political
program with slightly different domestic policy ideas and recreate Bush’s
political majority as well.
Now, after knocking Ted Cruz out of the race with a
sweeping win in Indiana, Trump has beaten a second theory of where the G.O.P.
needs to go from here: a theory you might call True Conservatism.
True Conservatism likes to portray itself as part of an
unbroken tradition running back through Ronald Reagan to Barry Goldwater and
the Founding Fathers. It has roots in that past, but it’s also a much more
recent phenomenon, conceived in the same spirit as Bushism 2.0 but with the
opposite intent.
If Bushism 2.0 looked at George W. Bush’s peaks — his
post-Sept. 11 popularity, his 2004 majority — and saw a model worth recovering,
True Conservatism looked at his administration’s collapse and argued that it
proved that he had been far too liberal, and that all his “compassionate
conservative” heresies had led the Republican Party into a ditch.
Thus True Conservatism’s determination to avoid both
anything that savored of big government and anything that smacked of
compromise. Where Bush had been softhearted, True Conservatism would be sternly
Ayn Randian; where Bush had been free-spending, True Conservatism would be
austere; where Bush had taken working-class Americans off the tax rolls, True
Conservatism would put them back on — for their own good. And above all, where
Bush had sometimes reached for the center, True Conservatism would stand on
principle, fight hard, and win.
This philosophy found champions on talk radio, it shaped
the Tea Party’s zeal, it influenced Paul Ryan’s budgets, it infused Mitt
Romney’s “You built that” rhetoric. But it was only in the government shutdown
of 2013 that it found its real standard-bearer: Ted Cruz.
And Cruz ended up running with it further than most
people thought possible. His 2016 campaign strategy was simple: Wherever the
party’s most ideological voters were, there he would be. If Obama was for it,
he would be against it. Where conservatives were angry, he would channel their
anger. Where they wanted a fighter; he would be a fighter. Wherever the party’s
activists were gathered, on whatever issue — social or economic, immigration or
the flat tax — he would be standing by their side. He would win Iowa, the
South, his native Texas, the Mountain West. They wanted Reagan, or at least a
fantasy version of Reagan? He would give it to them.
It didn’t work — but the truth is it almost did. In the
days before and after the Wisconsin primary, with delegate accumulation going
his way and the polling looking plausible once the Northeastern primaries were
over, it seemed like Cruz could reasonably hope for a nomination on the second
or third ballot.
So give the Texas senator some credit. He took
evangelical votes from Mike Huckabee, Ben Carson and Rick Santorum; he took
libertarian votes from Rand Paul; he outlasted and outplayed Marco Rubio; he
earned support from Mitt Romney, Jeb Bush and Lindsey Graham, who once joked
about his murder. Nobody worked harder; no campaign ran a tighter ship; no
candidate was more disciplined.
But it turned out that Republican voters didn’t want True
Conservatism any more than they wanted Bushism 2.0. Maybe they would have
wanted it from a candidate with more charisma and charm and less dogged
unlikability. But the entire Trump phenomenon suggests otherwise, and Trump as
the presumptive nominee is basically a long proof against the True Conservative
theory of the Republican Party.
Trump proved that movement conservative ideas and litmus
tests don’t really have any purchase on millions of Republican voters. Again
and again, Cruz and the other G.O.P. candidates stressed that Trump wasn’t
really a conservative; they listed his heresies, cataloged his deviations, dug
up his barely buried liberal past. No doubt this case resonated with many
Republicans. But not with nearly enough of them to make Cruz the nominee.
Trump proved that many evangelical voters, supposedly the
heart of a True Conservative coalition, are actually not really values voters or religious conservatives after all, and that the less frequently
evangelicals go to church, the more likely they are to vote for a philandering
sybarite instead of a pastor’s son. Cruz would probably be on his way to the
Republican nomination if he had simply carried the Deep South. But unless
voters were in church every Sunday, Trump’s identity politics had more appeal
than Cruz’s theological-political correctness.
Trump proved that many of the party’s moderates and
establishmentarians hate the thought of a True Conservative nominee even more
than they fear handing the nomination to a proto-fascist grotesque with zero
political experience and poor impulse control. That goes for the prominent
politicians who refused to endorse Cruz, the prominent donors who sat on their
hands once the field narrowed and all the moderate-Republican voters in blue
states who turned out to be #NeverCruz first and #NeverTrump less so or even
not at all.
Finally, Trump proved that many professional True
Conservatives, many of the same people who flayed RINOs and demanded purity
throughout the Obama era, were actually just playing a convenient part. From
Fox News’ 10 p.m. hour to talk radio to the ranks of lesser pundits, a long
list of people who should have been all-in for Cruz on ideological grounds
either flirted with Trump, affected neutrality or threw down their cloaks for
the Donald to stomp over to the nomination. Cruz thought he would have a
movement behind him, but part of that movement was actually a racket, and
Trumpistas were simply better marks.
Cruz will be back, no doubt. He’s young, he’s
indefatigable, and he can claim — and will claim, on the 2020 hustings — that
True Conservatism has as yet been left untried. But that will be a half-truth;
it isn’t being tried this year because the Republican Party’s voters have
rejected him and it, as they rejected another tour for Bushism when they
declined to back Rubio and Jeb.
What remains, then, is Trumpism. Which is also, in its
lurching, sometimes insightful, often wicked way, a theory of what kind of
party the Republicans should become, and one that a plurality of Republicans
have now actually voted to embrace.
Whatever reckoning awaits the G.O.P. and conservatism
after 2016 will have to begin with that brute fact. Where the reckoning goes
from there — well, with now is a time for pundit humility, so your guess is
probably as good as mine.
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