By Ross Douthat
Saturday, May 14, 2016
The rise of Donald Trump, and with him a white-identity
politics more explicit than anything America has seen in decades, has created
an interesting division on the political left — over the question of what, if
anything, liberal politics ought to offer to people who seem bigoted.
On the one hand there are liberals determined to regard
Trumpism as almost exclusively motivated by racial and cultural resentments,
with few legitimate economic grievances complicating the morality play. From
this perspective, the fact that Trump’s G.O.P. has finally consolidated, say, a
once-Democratic area like Appalachia is almost a welcome relief: At last all the white racists are safely in
the other party, and we don’t have to cater to them anymore.
On the other hand, there are left-wingers who regard
Trump’s support among erstwhile Democrats as a sign that liberalism has badly
failed some of its natural constituents, and who fear that a Democratic
coalition that easily crushes Trump without much white working-class support will
simply write off their struggles as no more than the backward and bigoted
deserve.
I like how the left-wing gadfly Fredrik deBoer framed
this issue: “What do you owe to people who are guilty of being wrong?” It’s a
question for liberals all across the Western world to ponder, given the
widening gulf between their increasingly cosmopolitan parties and an
increasingly right-leaning native working class.
But as a conservative, I would add another question: What happens if the bigoted sometimes get
things right?
Don’t worry, this isn’t a setup for my slow
reconciliation with the candidacy of Donald Trump. Rather, it’s a warning
against organizing your politics around antibigotry alone, and assuming that
just because there are racists or nativists or xenophobes on the other side of
a policy argument your side must be right.
Here are a few pertinent examples, from the recent past
to the present day.
For decades following the 1960s, liberals insisted that
the Republican Party’s tough-on-crime rhetoric wasn’t really about crime at
all; it was a barely coded appeal to racists, a transference of white
supremacist politics from “segregation now, segregation forever” to paranoia
about Willie Horton.
Tough-on-crime rhetoric did indeed play on racial fears;
lots of white bigots did vote for law-and-order Republicans. But the rhetoric
also played on fears of the actual immense crime wave sweeping the United
States, a wave that liberal governance failed miserably to arrest or roll back.
And for a long time, elite opinion was so determined not to give white bigots
any aid and comfort, so determined not to take racists’ side in any way, that
it ignored or minimized the actual policy problem, the actual crisis at its
door.
A second example: Both Clintonite neoliberals and
free-market conservatives have long dismissed American anxieties about trade
deals as the province of rubes and xenophobes, Ross Perot’s nationalists and
Pat Buchanan’s nativist brigades. Which was somewhat understandable, since many
people who thrilled to Mexico-bashing and, later, China-bashing — and who
thrill to it today from Trump — really were bigoted or tribal, eager to find a
sinister Latin or Asian scapegoat for their woes.
But that tribal sentiment doesn’t ultimately tell us
anything one way or another about the merits of the trade policies themselves.
And today there’s increasing evidence that the tribalists were, well, right to
be suspicious — that the creative destruction set in motion over their
objections cost more jobs, with fewer compensating benefits, than many liberal
and conservative free-traders once expected.
Likewise with European anxieties about mass immigration,
which for decades the major political parties of Europe labored to confine to
the political fringe. After all, their thinking went, since the ranks of
immigration skeptics included many racists and Islamophobes and
crypto-fascists, the fringe is where those ideas belonged.
Unfortunately, some of the anxieties of the nativists
proved more prescient than the blithe assumptions of the elite. Mass
immigration is now destabilizing Europe’s liberal order, forging Islamist fifth
columns and empowering the very nationalism that open-door cosmopolitanism
thought it could safely marginalize and ignore.
A final, forward-looking example: In our latest culture
war battlefield, the debate over transgender rights, the left is so determined
to rout bigotry that it’s locking in a contested understanding of what gender
dysphoria is and how to handle it in children, backing it with federal
regulatory power, and punishing with academic witch hunts experts who differ
even modestly.
Because bigots bully transgender teenagers, liberalism
has decided that everyone who differs with transgender activists must be
complicit in that bigotry. But we don’t have anywhere near enough data or
experience to confirm the activist perspective — and by embracing it as the
only alternative to “transphobia,” we risk sweeping a broad range of childhood
fantasy and teenage confusion onto a set path of hormonal and surgical
transformation.
If bigots are for
it, we’re against it. It’s a powerful credo. But there’s always a danger
that by following it too far, you end up being against reality itself.
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